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Introduction
Regional Leaders in the Global Security Arena: Interests, Strategies and 
Capabilities
While theories of  “new regionalism” consider regional security organizations as 
key actors to cope with complex security challenges, recent trends increasingly 
seem to suggest that individual countries take on the role of  a “regional leader.” 
What are the characteristics of  a “regional leader” and which countries currently 
deserve this label? Are only nation-states capable of  assuming such a role? How 
do perceptions of  regional leaders differ and in what way do these assessments 
result into different policies towards the respective countries or institutions? How 
does the rise of  regional leaders affect the role and work of  multilateral security 
organizations? How and where do different regional power patterns evolve and 
in how far does this affect the relationship between regional institutionaliza-
tion (that is, formal organizational structures) and regional security? Theories of  
regionalization in the political and security sphere have long suggested that there 
is no simple causality between high institutionalization and a stable and secure 
region or vice versa. What happens if  there are several potential leaders within 
the same region, but none of  them enjoys clear dominance? In terms of  orga-
nization and security this multi-leader situation can develop into quite different 
directions. In the case of  Europe, potential leaders such as Germany and France 
have been able to overcome frictions by putting an end to previous and repeated 
military conflict, which has led to the most profound integration model we know 
today. On the other hand, several candidates for leadership in the Middle East 
have been facing an unparalleled period of  rivalry and conflict detrimental to any 
form of  regional cooperation and institutional build-up.
The fall of  Iraq, the emergence of  Iran as a—perceived or real—security threat 
in the region, the recent war in Gaza and the rise of  oil prices, to name just a 
few factors, have led to a considerable shift in the Middle East’s constellation 
of  power. Egypt seems to have lost some of  its regional influence, while Saudi 
Arabia is establishing itself  increasingly as the new regional leader, both politi-
cally—as a counterweight to Iran—and, together with the United Arab Emirates, 
economically, through strategic investments of  its petro-dollar wealth on global 
financial markets. Turkey, which by some is being considered a bridge between 
Europe and the Middle East and thus a potential regional power broker, is being 
confronted with historically motivated prejudices throughout the Arab world. 
Syria, at least in theory, retains great potential for regional leadership, yet would 
need to overcome its isolation from the West due to its close alignment with Iran. 
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What are the regional agendas of  the aforementioned actors and how will they 
shape the future of  this most volatile and strategically important region in terms 
of  security and stability?
Discussing regional leadership in Asia is less associated with military confronta-
tion but with the region’s economic potential and performance. Most notably, 
China and India come to mind in that respect. In the industrialized world the 
markets, production capacity and services industry of  these countries are con-
sidered a great opportunity and also increasingly as a credible challenge. Their 
importance is growing not only in economic, but also in geo-political and security 
terms. India possesses impressive battle groups in the Indian Ocean, has exten-
sive expertise in the field of  strategic warfare and its traditional multilateralism is 
slowly being replaced by its striving for leadership. During a period of  deepening 
economic and military cooperation between the US as well as East Asian states 
and India, Europe seems to be falling behind. China, traditionally a strong advo-
cate of  state sovereignty and noninterference, has gradually opened up towards 
regional security organizations, and has significantly increased its contributions to 
UN peacekeeping missions. What role will China and India assume in the global 
security arena and in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)?
Yet, regional power dynamics are not exclusively limited to Asia, the Middle East 
and Europe. For instance, South Africa is by far the most powerful actor on the 
African continent both militarily and economically, and has long been claiming 
a role for regional leadership on the African continent. However, its capabili-
ties to actually fulfill such a role remain limited. The African Union (AU) and its 
Common African Defense and Security Policy, on the other hand, have made 
considerable improvements, even though the African Standby Force will probably 
not become fully operational by 2010. Recent initiatives, not least by the EU and 
UN, have stressed the need for strengthening the AU, partnership and coopera-
tion. Unfortunately, as recently became apparent in the cases of  Sudan and Chad, 
capabilities remain scarce. What is the potential for South Africa, the African 
Union and the international community to contribute to regional stability in the 
long term?
The multi-leveled nature of  the European Union, the constraints of  intergovern-
mentalism and diverging national interests make the question of  how emerging 
regional leaders should be dealt with a particularly challenging one within the 
EU. The dilemma between attempts to reach common positions and long-stand-
ing bilateral relationships makes it difficult for the EU to “speak with one voice.” 
Introduction

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Taking into consideration that countries such as Russia exert power in the EU’s 
immediate neighborhood, i. e. with regard to Kosovo or Transnistria, it is obvious 
how pressing the challenge for the EU has become. However, some EU member 
states have the potential to assume leadership within the Union and could give 
new impulses to establishing the EU as a credible and effective regional actor in 
foreign and security policy. Despite the absence of  a consistent group of  lead-
ing member states, changing coalitions of  member states considerably advanced 
ESDP, since its inception. Is an avant-garde group of  leaders desirable for and 
conducive to integration dynamics in EU Foreign and Security Policy? Could 
the three largest member states France, Great Britain and Germany assume 
a similar role in ESDP as the Franco-German motor has done in the field of  
economic and political integration, and what will be the pre-conditions for such a 
development?
Regional Leaders are on the rise. The present volume presents the outcome of  
DGAP’s 11th New Faces Conference, which, through various case studies, has 
thoroughly examined established and emerging “regional leaders”, their geo-po-
litical agendas and security interests, their strategic partnerships with other coun-
tries, their role in regional security organizations and the international community, 
and their capabilities to provide stability and security in their region and beyond. 
As the following contributions show, we can find a multitude of  understandings 
and conceptualizations of  what constitutes ‘power’ and a ‘region.’ While there are 
certainly predominant understandings of  the region as a synonym for a geo-
graphical unit we normally refer to as ‘continent,’ the reader will be confronted 
by rather unconventional conceptualizations of  the regional category. The same 
holds true for most accounts of  ‘power’ which is commonly conceived of  as rep-
resenting a quantifiable dimension of  material assets such as military power, eco-
nomic output and the like. Yet, as we can learn from the writings of  Joseph Nye 
and his concept of  ‘soft power’—or Hillary Clinton’s more or less identical idea 
of  ‘smart power’—power and influence also depend heavily on the attractiveness 
of  ideas and concepts. We therefore hope that the following chapters will provide 
the reader with some fresh ideas on the different forms of  regional power.
Kathrin Brockmann and David Bosold

A Reassessment of the 
“Regional Turn” in Security 
Studies in Light of the Czech 
Missile Defense Experience
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A Reassessment of the “Regional Turn” in Security Studies 
in Light of the Czech Missile Defense Experience
Nik Hynek and Vit Stritecky
Introduction
This paper critically appraises the recent literature on security-oriented regional-
ism and on individual state leadership in regionally-anchored security matters, 
though with global implications. Two bodies of  literature are identified and exam-
ined. Since this article also espouses an issue-oriented research strategy, the key 
question of  practical utility of  the two existing bodies in explaining the Czech 
missile defense experience is then put forward namely the question, whether the 
Czech Republic can be considered a regional security leader in general, or at least 
in particular as far as the missile defense case is concerned.
The authors argue that in order to make theoretical sense of  the issue in ques-
tion, two methodological and conceptual moves need to be made. Apart from the 
necessity to go beyond the material-ideational divide, exemplified in this paper 
by the investigation of  material effects of  the discourse on missile defense and 
the Czech Republic’s role in the system, it is mainly what we call the analysis of  
“supply-driven leadership.” The process of  supply-driven—or conferred—lead-
ership is studied through a shift from original bilateral responsibilization of  the 
Czech Republic by the U. S. to subsequent Czech attempts to diffuse its newly 
acquired responsibility through standard multilateral channels, that is, NATO. In 
conclusion, implications of  this dynamics for theories and approaches to regional 
leadership in security area are outlined.
Regional Security in Existing Theories of International Relations (IR)
Neo-utilitarian Approaches: (Neo-)Realism, Liberal Interdependence, and the Security-Complex 
Theory
Most of  the recent realist scholarship, and neorealist thinking in particular, has 
built its explanatory framework around the crucial position of  the distribution of  
power and the patterns and dynamics of  power competition within the interna-
tional system. Despite its global (systemic) focus, some neo-realists have ap-
proached the regional level through the observation of  alliance formation. Most 
notably, Walt has mitigated neorealist foreign policy determination and increased 
states’ operational options. Traditional balancing has been complemented by a 
1  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of  International Politics, New York, NY, 1979. 
2  Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of  Alliances, Ithaca, NY, 1987. 
Nik Hynek
 
New Faces Conference 2008 10
Panel I: Regional Leaders 
and 21st Century Security 
Challenges – Missile 
 Defence, Cyber Security 
and Peacekeeping
possibility of  band wagoning, that is, the support of  the regional hegemon by 
other states. Moreover, Walt has also opened the black box of  primary influence 
of  material capabilities by bringing in the categories of  proximity and intentions 
into threat consideration. The threat is therefore not solely based on the weap-
onry but also on the two latter factors when states formulate their security policy.
Slightly different, a ”neo-classical” understanding of  regional security is offered 
by the offensive realism advocated by Mearsheimer. According to this author, 
only strength ensures safety, hence the ultimate goal is to gain the safest position, 
which is that of  a hegemon. There are no great powers seeking to maintain the 
status quo, since they all have a constant incentive to change the distribution of  
power. Secondly, he claims that liberals have brought only little empirical evi-
dence of  cooperation, which would not have appeared in the absence of  institu-
tions. “What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little indepen-
dent effect they seem to have had on state behavior.”
A major challenge to neo-realist patterns of  description has come from the group 
of  theories that could be subsumed under the label of  interdependency liberal-
ism. Although these theories also rely on structural effects to explain actors’ be-
havior, the interdependency approaches are by no way restricted to the systemic 
level, that is, the global level, and hence provide an analytical platform for lower 
levels. The most prominent theoretical approach that aims at explaining interna-
tional cooperation is based on the idea of  interdependency as it is put forward 
in neo-liberal institutionalism. Also, neo-functionalist reflections on the regional 
interdependence became influential due to their focus on functional responses by 
states and, perhaps even more importantly, by the fundamental role attributed to 
the development of  procedures cementing subsequent regional cooperation.
Other important insights have been provided by the regional security complex 
theory. Regional security complex is defined as a “set of  units, whose major 
processes securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another.”7 Put differently, the crucial characteristics of  a regional security com-
plex are the patterns of  amity and enmity, which reflect the patterns of  security 
interdependence.
  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of  Great Power Politics, New York, NY, 2001, pp. 62–6.
  John J. Mearsheimer, The false Promise of  International Institutions, in: International Security, No. /199, p. 7. 
  Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of  Europe, Stanford, CA, 198. 
6  Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security, Cambridge 200. 
7  Ibid., p. . 
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Reflectivist Approaches: The Pluralist-Security-Community Approach and the States-based 
Constructivist Approaches
Before we continue with the analysis of  constructivist approaches, a few theo-
retical remarks deserve to be mentioned here. First, both theoretical and practi-
cal earthquakes that took place between the late 1980s and the early 1990s have 
brought about the shift from neo-utilitarianism to constructivism. As for the 
theoretical challenges, the so-called third debate resulted in a stronger focus on 
social practices and explanations for change in which constructivism emerged as 
the most viable alternative to neo-utilitarian approaches.8 Second, the demise of  
the Soviet Union and the former Communist states revealed the poverty of  exist-
ing approaches to explain or even foresee this fundamental shift in the real world.
Two strands of  reflectivist scholarship dealing with security and its regional 
anchor exist and will be examined in turn. The first type that is concerned here 
can be labeled the pluralistic security community approach. The centerpiece of  
Deutsch et al’s9 transactionist approach was formed around the idea that commu-
nication is the cement of  the group cohesion. In other words, more communica-
tion brings about more cohesion. Unlike realists and neo-realists, the pluralistic 
security community approach argues that states and even entire regions are em-
bedded in different environmental contexts. Hence, state interactions cannot be 
situated within one and universally applicable model of  the international system. 
The direct relevance for more recent constructivist scholars dealing with security 
represents the argument concerning the impact of  transnational forces on states’ 
behavior and deeper embedded collective identities. Adler and Barnett, in resur-
recting Deutsch’s intellectual legacy, hold that the security-community approach is 
informed by the logic of  community. They delimit the pluralistic community as a 
“transnational region comprising sovereign states whose people maintain depend-
able expectations of  peaceful change”0 and propose a three-tier approach to 
their studying. The first tier consists of  precipitating factors that encourage states 
to coordinate their policies; the second tier features structural elements of  power 
and ideas as well as international organizations and processes of  social learning; 
8  Nikola Hynek, Conditions of  emergence and their (bio)political effects: political rationalities, governmental pro-
grammes and technologies of  power in the landmine case, in: Journal of  International Relations and Development, 
No. 2/2008, pp. 9–120; Hynek, Andrea Teti, Saving Identity from Postmodernism? Disciplining Constructivism and 
Governing the ‘International’, in: Contemporary Political Theory (2009, forthcoming); Hynek, Sociální konstruktivis-
mus, in: Pavel Pšeja (ed.), Přehled teorií mezinárodních vztahů, Brno 200, pp. 129–1; Hynek, Anglická škola a teo-
rie mezinárodních vztahů. Obsahový vesmír, akademický svět a kritiky přístupu, in: Mezinárodní vztahy, No. 2/200, 
pp. 76–89; Mark Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate, in: Millennium: Journal of  International 
Studies, No. /1987, pp. 21–29; Mark Hoffman, Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four 
Voices in Critical International Theory, in: Millennium: Journal of  International Studies, No. 2/1991, pp. 169–18. 
9  Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community: North-Atlantic Area, New York, NY, 197. 
0  Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge 1998, p. 0. 
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and, finally, the third tier is centered at the development of  trust and (transna-
tional) collective identity.
The pluralistic security community approach has been complemented by state-
based approaches. These usually deal with the question of  how states can 
enhance their international power and credibility, rendering them particularly 
important for the study of  middle powers and small states. Role conceptions 
theory—adapted from social psychology and sociology—plays the central role in 
these approaches. Introduced to political science by Holsti, role theory can be 
conceived of  as an analytical framework stressing out the importance of  cogni-
tive and cultural factors. As Holsti maintains,
“A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of  the 
general kinds of  decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, 
and of  the functions, if  any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in 
the international system or in subordinate regional systems.”
Furthermore, according to Aggestam, role conception is a normative self-per-
ception of  expected foreign policy held by policymakers. Role conception thus 
indicates the intentionality of  an actor, and the main focus is directed to the ways 
in which actors themselves interpret different roles in the realms of  foreign and 
security policy. To mention but a few, a bridge/mediator, a partner, or a leader 
can be mentioned as role examples. The crucial notion in role theory is its recog-
nition by other states, aptly described by Andrew Cooper as “the kudos received 
from outsiders.”17
In order to illustrate the explanatory power of  the theories presented above, we 
will now turn to the case of  the Missile Defense system to be installed in the 
Czech Republic.
  Ibid.
  Hynek, Robert C. Thomsen, Keeping the Peace and National Unity: Canada’s National and International Identity 
Nexus, in: International Journal, No. /2006, pp. 8–88; Hynek, Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and 
Promises, in: Central European Journal of  Canadian Studies, No. 2/2006, pp. 12–1; Adam Chapnick, The Middle 
Power Project: Canada and the Founding of  the United Nations, Vancouver 200. 
  Christine Ingebritsen (ed.), Small States in International Relations, Seattle, WA, 2006; Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.), Small 
States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, Boulder, CO, 200.
  Kal Holsti, National Role Conceptions in the Study of  Foreign Policy, in: Stephen Walker (ed.), Role Theory and 
Foreign Policy Analysis, Durham, NC, 1987, pp. –. 
  Ibid., p. . 
  Lisbeth Aggestam, A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of  Identity in the EU, 
in: Aggestam, Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda, Houndsmills 
2000, pp. 86–11. 
17  Andrew F. Cooper, ‘Coalitions of  Willing’: The Search for Alternative Partners in Canadian Diplomacy, Paper pre-
sented at the Conference of  the Association for Canadian Studies, Grainau, Germany 2000, p. 12.
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Regional Expansion of the Missile Defense and the Role of the Czech Republic18
The idea to build the European pillar of  the US missile defense system has been 
a feature of  the country’s policy since the 1980s. The first preliminary consulta-
tions concerning the issue of  the recent anti-missiles shield took place during 
the summer of  2002. By then, the Czech Republic expressed its endeavor to 
harbor both components of  the system: the X-band radar as well as the inter-
ceptors. Poland, which was simultaneously consulted by the US, had a similar 
attitude. After these negotiations the exchange of  various technical data relevant 
for the placement and proper functioning of  the system followed. The develop-
ment accelerated during the summer 2006, when the US experts examined the 
territories offered by the Czech Republic. At that point it became clear that the 
facilities of  the system were to be split between Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Whereas Poland was selected for harboring the battery of  interceptors, the Czech 
Republic was asked to provide a suitable place for the X-band radar aimed at 
detecting, tracing and following possible attacking missiles from the Middle East, 
most probably Iran. The official request by the US government reached Prague in 
January 2007 and the official negotiations started in May of  the same year.
The issue of  the missile defense could be investigated from various perspectives. 
However, the following lines underline some aspects of  the negotiations solely 
from the Czech Republic vantage point. First of  all, it should be emphasized that 
the negotiations with the US government have been held on a strictly bilateral 
basis. Although the bilateral structure was an inevitable outcome of  the US pref-
erences, the asymmetry of  negotiation positions of  the two countries is striking 
(i. e. the Czech government being purely reactive for quite a long time). Moreover, 
at least since the visit of  the American Minister of  Defense, Robert Gates, in 
October 2007, it became publicly apparent that the US was conducting parallel 
negotiations with the greatest opponent of  the US missile defense, Russia, about 
Russian conditions for the presence of  the US system in Central Europe.19 In 
light of  critical mass media reactions and the majority of  the population oppos-
ing the US X-band radar being placed in the country, the Czech governmental 
representatives defended the country’s involvement by stressing gains in econom-
ic and military areas (it is still very unclear if  there will be any major gains of  this 
type for the country).
18  The following part is based on the research conducted by the team of  authors from the Institute of  International Re-
lations within the project of  analytical survey of  the Czech Foreign Policy in 2007 and on several additional interviews 
with the representatives of  the Ministry of  Defense, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and the Office of  Government.
19  Gates embarrassingly mentioned a possibility of  a Russian presence on the base on the press conference, which had 
thus far been a non-issue in the Czech discourse. 
 
New Faces Conference 2008 14
Panel I: Regional Leaders 
and 21st Century Security 
Challenges – Missile 
 Defence, Cyber Security 
and Peacekeeping
The only attempts to multilaterize the issue have been connected to Czech dip-
lomatic efforts to deal with the issue in NATO. However, the debate there has 
rather been reserved as there is open opposition to the plans by some members 
as well as indifference by others. This demureness has mostly been reflected in 
the non-existence of  a binding agreement concerning political obligations of  
NATO. This is in a contrast to the continuation of  a technical/military process in 
NATO which has been called for in a so-called “Feasibility study”, setting ma-
jor moves in the direction of  the NATO-developed and led anti-ballistic missile 
system (ALTBMD).
Some changes were expected from NATO’s Bucharest summit, held in April 
2008. The crucial issue for the Czech government has been the decision to link 
the US system to the NATO one. Yet, it seems to be clear that the strategic de-
bate within NATO is far from allowing for binding decisions. Nevertheless, the 
crucial importance for the Czech political theatre lies in the fact that the Green 
Party, which has been a member of  the current Czech government coalition, 
made its consent with the X-band radar placement conditional on further (and 
still quite undefined) NATO involvement. As the opposition in Parliament will 
most probably vote against the radar, the support of  the Greens is crucial. Due 
to the absence of  a domestic strategic debate, the Czech national discussion has 
so far been dominated by either staunch opponents or keen proponents. Most 
interestingly, many fundamental topics have been avoided.
In Lieu of Conclusion: The Paucity of Suitable Theories in Light of a “Supply-Driven” 
Leadership
What can we learn from and say about the Czech Republic’s position in the US 
missile defense project in light of  the theories outlined in the first part of  this 
chapter? Can the Czech Republic be considered a regional leader as far as the 
issue of  missile defense is concerned? What characteristics determine regional 
leadership as far as the position of  the Czechs in the issue is concerned?
As for the neo-utilitarian regional approaches to security, the main challenge 
to theoretically viable explanations represents the size and (relatively modest) 
military capabilities of  the Czech Republic, a small country. A neo-realist per-
spective, as put forward by Kenneth Waltz, would have problems to explain the 
Czech decision and the governmental approval for the placement of  the X-band 
radar since the theory would be unable to observe any major reconstitution of  
the balance of  power in terms of  power-distribution. In terms of  military—read 
nuclear—capabilities the international system remains similar to the past. As we 
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have seen in the theoretical section, the Cold War (with its simple and constrain-
ing macrostructure) has never ceased to exist due to the fact that no other coun-
try has emerged as a great power since 1990.
More interesting—however flawed—insights would be gained by bringing in a 
regionally-sensitive neo-realism as put forward by Stephen Walt. A country such 
as the Czech Republic would be expected to strategically bandwagon, that is, 
foster ties with the current hegemon, in situations where its own national security 
would be considered as deteriorating (e. g. in light of  imminent, or even prospec-
tive, threat). For Walt, this process would eventually lead to overcoming mutual 
distrust and the beginning of  an alliance formation. Since the Czech Republic has 
been a NATO member for some time and since this organization, unlike the EU, 
possesses some significant military capabilities, it would only seem logical that the 
Czech Republic would embrace missile defense through such a multilateral plat-
form. Empirically, nevertheless, none of  this actually took place. First, it was not 
the Czech Republic that felt acutely threatened (either by an explicit Iranian or an 
implicit Russian/Chinese threat), but it was rather the US. Second, since the US 
perception of  this threat was translated into the country’s pressure on the Czech 
Republic to harbor the radar, the band wagoning thesis does not hold water. It is 
also questionable, whether the Czech approval has meant an increase in opera-
tional options for the country or the opposite. More concretely, a reduction in 
the country’s options given that it has become tightly dependent on US decisions 
Till Blume, Mischa Hansel, Tim Strabbing and Nik Hynek
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regarding the radar and having faced hostile opposition from a number of  other 
NATO and / or EU members.
As for offensive realism, two points suffice to illustrate the inability to explain 
the dynamic of  missile defense in the light of  its theoretical premises. First, the 
US has never had greater military and technological superiority than in recent 
years. Hence, one would expect it to strike against Iranian nuclear capabilities in 
the first place. Missile defense is thus simply not an appealing solution for such 
a proponent of  offensive strategies. As a result, no cooperation on this issue 
would be expected from a small state. Second, even in the improbable event of  
the US asking the Czech Republic for consent in terms of  the radar installation, 
one would not only expect the US to dictate all the conditions. In addition, one 
would rule out the possibility of  the Czech side in eventually succeeding (at least 
partially) to transfer the issue onto a NATO platform against the will of  the Bush 
administration. This is due to the theory’s belief  in the non-existence of  an inde-
pendent power of  international institutions vis-à-vis the hegemonic interests of  
their members (i. e. the US setting the agenda within NATO as the most power-
ful member). Finally, the more logical option for the theory’s proponents would 
be the US decision to stop negotiations with the Czech Republic and transfer the 
radar to Poland which has been skeptical of  the multilateral NATO dimension 
and would support the agreement on a bilateral basis regardless of  NATO and 
EU opposition.
Liberal strands of  neo-utilitarian theories get to an explanatory impasse, too. 
These theories are ill-suited to explain military issues as they start with the prem-
ise of  the economic effects of  cooperation on states’ behavior. They would thus 
argue that it is difficult to see why an increase in economic help to Iran and other 
possible remedies should not be given priority over the missile defense system. 
Expectations of  a spill-over effect and complex social learning as an outcome of  
interaction are inherently present in these approaches. Moreover, these approach-
es would put into doubt that negotiations between the US and the Czech Repub-
lic would be conducted on a bilateral basis since multilateralism has been the sta-
ple of  these approaches. Even in light of  a partial transfer of  the issue to NATO, 
one would still face difficulties to explain why the US agreed to the NATO 
dimension in the first place. The fact that this decision has been tactical only 
and the US has not practiced substantive, but rather nominal multilateralism0 
within NATO does not make it significantly easier for these theories to explain 
the practical dynamics. Other liberal approaches, most notably globalist liberal-
0  John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of  an Institution, in: John G. Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The 
Theory and Praxis of  an Institutional Form, New York, NY, 199, pp. –7. 
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ism resting on the idea of  societal interdependency, would get into even greater 
difficulties since the role of  territoriality is reduced to a minimum, arguing that 
world politics is actually becoming more de-territorialized than anytime before. 
These approaches are particularly blind to the geopolitical dimension of  the third 
pillar as their understanding of  a region: both in its Euclidean-geographical and 
socially-cognitive senses.
Compared with the above approaches, Buzan and Wæver’s regional security 
complex theory looks promising in terms of  the ability to integrate the regional 
level of  security into a neo-realist analysis while adding some touches of  con-
structivism. It is precisely constructivism that adds the qualitatively most im-
portant added value to the traditional neorealist analysis. The theory’s insights 
are nowhere more visible than in the innovative idea of  so-called securitization. 
According to its proponents, constructivism is needed to distinguish between 
securitization and politicization and, who can securitize an issue and under which 
conditions. Securitization in that respect means the ability of  an actor, e. g. a 
government, to receive popular and parliamentary support for a security related 
decision and action.
What can one say about the empirical case from a securitization perspective? First, 
the way the US has securitized the Iranian threat suggests the authors are right in 
claiming that one needs significant material resources to successfully securitize a 
threat, that is, to receive support for the claim that Iran is a serious security threat. 
This claim is circulated in the international system and subsequently planted 
into other states’ national security discourses. Buzan and Wæver, however, show 
strong elements of  linear thinking in that they move back and forth along the line 
(with thresholds) on which segments of  a non-issue, a politicized issue and, fi-
nally, a securitized issue can be discerned. A successfully securitized issue, accord-
ing to them, cannot be made a non-issue, or, simultaneously, a politicized issue 
given that the process of  securitization elevates the issue to a level of  such grave 
seriousness that no questions about the reality of  the threat are allowed. As far as 
the empirical evidence suggests, the securitization process in the missile defense 
case has been rather uneven and certainly non-linear.
The problem with their definition can be termed here as the “problem of  the 
multidirectional nature of  (de)securitization”. Although the authors do acknowl-
edge that securitization can take place at different levels (the so-called “mixed 
  Jan A. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, London 2000.
  Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO, 1998. 
 
New Faces Conference 2008 18
Panel I: Regional Leaders 
and 21st Century Security 
Challenges – Missile 
 Defence, Cyber Security 
and Peacekeeping
securitization”), they are unable to explain how it has been possible for the US 
to concurrently securitize and desecuritize the issue not only at different levels 
but also at the same level. How could the authors account for the presence of  the 
(successfully securitized) US necessity to introduce the third pillar of  their mis-
sile defense system as far as the Czech and Polish audience is concerned while, 
simultaneously, down playing its possible impact on the strategic balance as far as 
audiences in Russia and China are concerned? This disparity can also be revealed 
at the technical level of  the issue: While the prospective Czech-based US X-band 
radar and Polish-based US interceptors are portrayed as properly tested, sophisti-
cated systems of  high accuracy in light of  the possibility of  an Iranian missile be-
ing shot at the US/Europe, the systems capabilities are repeatedly being kept low 
as far as their possible effect on the Russian nuclear arsenal is concerned. The 
theory’s proponents can thus not explain how a leading securitizing actor—the 
US—has been, at the same time, a leading desecuritizing actor. This is due to 
their blindness in recognizing the multiple arenas with different deployed objec-
tives/logics, which make the same actors to behave differently.
The constructivist turn has definitely brought the wind of  change as far as the 
style of  security theorization is concerned. As the last paragraphs demonstrate, 
nevertheless, it has suffered, too—despite its heuristic value—, from deficiencies 
when confronted with reality check. In concrete terms, Deutsch’s transaction-
ist approach to pluralistic security communities cannot explain why the Czech 
Republic and Poland have decided to work out the issue of  missile defense bilat-
erally with the US rather than through the two existing pluralistic security com-
munities of  which they are members, namely NATO and the EU. This is rather 
a surprising development since, according to Deutsch, an increase in security 
communication is also an indicator of  where and how issues are being solved. 
The density of  other security-related talks in which Czechs and Poles have taken 
part has definitely been much greater in NATO and the EU compared with the 
history of  direct bilateral negotiation of  the two countries with the US. The 
same can be said in regard to Adler and Barnett who argue that the existence 
of  external threat is one of  three precipitating conditions for the emergence of  
a security community. The two countries did not press (apart from the Greens in 
the Czech Republic) for a security-community approach though the security com-
munities have been existing and have had, at least in case of  NATO, their own 
missile defense strategy.
  Ibid., p. 18. 
  Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge 1998.
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What does the above development then tell us about the collective identities of  
actors? First, the idea of  mutual non-exclusion of  collective identities is not so 
clear-cut when examined against the background of  missile defense. Why, then, 
has there be so much open governmental opposition in the Czech Republic and 
Poland against the attempt to simultaneously work out the issue through more 
than one channel? This would make sense from a military-strategic perspective 
as the US national missile defense has been concerned with territorial missile 
defense (planned to take place largely outside the atmosphere through the use of  
ground-based exo-atmospheric interceptors), whereas NATO has been working 
on a theatre missile defense system ensuring security through the use of  PAC- 
(“Patriots”) and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems. The 
only explanation—and, thus, challenge to both Deutsch as well as Adler and Bar-
nett—has been the possibility of  being a member of  a pluralistic security com-
munity and, at the same time, not having too positive opinions about its possible 
actions and capabilities. As for the EU’s role, both the Czech and Polish govern-
ments have not seen any point in addressing the issue on this platform. This is 
understandable since the EU has not implemented or discussed any strategy ap-
pertaining to missile defense. However, the ideological opposition of  the recent 
Tusk and the past Kaczynski governments in Poland (and, to lesser extent, of  the 
current Czech government) towards NATO with its existing and complementary 
missile-defense strategies is surprising. It directly challenges Deutsch as well as 
Adler and Barnett on grounds of  their argument that, in order to have a func-
tioning pluralistic security community, mutual trust among members must exist. 
Hardly can one believe that this has been the case in the missile-defense issue, i. e. 
the issue in which the distrust among NATO members has further been exacer-
bated by skeptical French (the deterrence theory argument), Norwegian (domestic 
political cycle) and German (Neo-Ostpolitik) governments. Simultaneously, the 
opposite—i. e. that NATO is a dysfunctional community—is not true either. The 
suggestion is that the argument concerning the relationship between a commu-
nity collective identity and mutual trust of  its members is much more complex. 
Also, the Czech experience challenges Adler and Barnett’s argument about social 
learning always preceding successful identity formation. Had it not been for the 
Czech Green Party, a junior coalition government member, the missile defense 
would not have been channeled through NATO.
The issue of  collective identity brings the analysis to the latest form of  state-
based constructivist approaches focusing on the notion of  role conception. 
Additionally, these approaches directly tackle the question of  a security leader-
ship, here delimited as regional security leadership. The question that has been 
proposed is to what extent the Czech Republic can be understood as a regional 
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security leader in terms of  its role in missile defense? What can the scholarship 
that often investigates small states and their specific collective identities tell us 
about the above question? First, these approaches usually begin with a formula-
tion of  a role conception inside investigated states. The burden of  activity is thus 
placed on the government which formulates and consequently exports country’s 
roles outside, to the international system. This seems only logical when one 
speaks about states as leaders. Can the Czech Republic be considered a leader in 
the missile defense issue? It is argued that one’s answer depends on ideological 
beliefs and preferences: While for Germany and France as the core of  the Old 
Europe both the Czech Republic and (even more) Poland are usually labeled 
traitors and spoilers, for the US, however, the latter two countries are true leaders 
since they have understood the nature of  the existing threat and the necessity to 
do something about it. Regardless of  one’s own political beliefs, it is maintained 
that a key challenge state-based oriented constructivism faces is that the Czech 
Republic has actually not created any distinct role conception connected to the 
missile defense issue for itself, but rather has this role been supplied to it by the 
US. In methodological terms, the above approaches are flawed inasmuch as they 
are propositionally based on the “demand-driven” leadership while the reality of  
the issue strongly suggests the Czech Republic has become the object of  “sup-
ply-driven” leadership politics. Extending the argument one step further, the 
Czech Republic cannot be understood as a leader in the discussed issue because 
it has not actively carved a diplomatic niche for itself  in the missile defense 
problématique.
It is rather surprising that apart from Martha Finnemore, who introduced the 
concept of  supply-driven norms into IR, no other scholar working in construc-
tivist tradition has attempted to use this cardinal insight for security issues, includ-
ing the issue of  missile defense. To conclude, reflective approaches and also the 
securitization scholarship certainly have potential to move the theorization of  
regional security issues further, but they also need to rectify some of  the flaws 
that have been accompanying them. As for the issue of  missile defense and the 
role of  the Czech Republic, the key research focus for future studies on this topic 
should be directed at answering a question how a country can actually become a 
leader against its own will.
  For a concept of  supply-driven norms, see Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of  Norms: 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, in: International Organiza-
tion, No. /199, pp. 6–97.
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Space and Cyberspace1
Mischa Hansel
Introduction
The following analysis focuses on prerequisites rather than opportunities of  
regional security. It addresses the precarious relationship between regional secu-
rity, regional power and the inherently global domains of  space and cyberspace. 
Put simply, the very concept of  regional security is based on the prerequisite that 
geographical position matters. For example, the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) and the controversy on NATO enlargement went be-
yond the sheer numbers of  weapons systems or allies respectively. They focussed 
just as much on the geographical positions of  troops and new alliance members. 
Usually, distance increases security whereas proximity enhances the level of  
threat. This is true as well for economic aspects of  security. The economic well-
being of  societies depends on the protection of  its resources and markets from 
those areas where brute force determines the distribution of  goods.
The nature of  power-projecting forces, among other factors, increases or decreas-
es the prospects of  regional security and regional power centers. Conventional 
land power, sea power, and air power are unevenly distributed and constrained by 
directions, locations and jurisdictions. Even the effectiveness of  air power is, to a 
considerable extent, terrestrially determined. The efficiency of  the US Air Force 
is, for example, critically dependent on land-based regional air bases. It cannot 
gauge the air defenses of  potential enemies without violating the sovereignty of  
their airspace. Assets in space or cyberspace are different: they tend to be ubiq-
uitous and decisively encourage global interactions. Moreover, they are exposed 
to environments in which sovereignty is absent or problematic respectively. For 
all of  these reasons, it is quite difficult to selectively exclude actors (irrespective 
of  distance) from defensive or offensive postures in those domains. Conflict in 
space and cyberspace could therefore seriously challenge regional security and 
regional powers. On the other hand, regional powers cannot leave space and cy-
berspace untapped for both military as well as economic reasons. They are more 
1 I thank Esra Pakin, Alexandra Patin, Gloria Reyes, Thomas Jäger, John Akude and an anonymous reviewer for their 
comments and suggestions.
2 Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of  World Power, in: International Security, No. /198, 
pp. 9–11.
 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power, Space Power and Geography, in: Colin S. Gray (ed.), Geopolitics, Geography and 
Strategy, London 1999, pp. 76–79.
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and more drawn into a global strategic game, which is crucial to understand in 
order to manage its destabilizing influences.
The ensuing analysis is intended to adumbrate a few more specific thoughts on 
these issues. It is divided into three steps: First, I briefly illuminate the divergent 
perspectives of  key actors on space and cyberspace. Second, I show why and how 
both domains are becoming increasingly contested. Finally, I take into account 
the consequences of  this strategic constellation in terms of  regional security and 
international stability in general.
Perspectives on Space and Cyberspace
In order to keep costs and casualties low, the United States is at the forefront 
of  incorporating globalizing technologies into its war fighting capabilities. For 
instance, the percentage of  guided munitions (via lasers or GPS signals) rose 
from eight per cent in the 1991 Gulf  War to  per cent in the 1999 Kosovo air 
campaign. By the time Operation Iraqi Freedom took place, that figure had risen 
to 68 per cent. In 1991, the majority of  intra-theatre and inter-theatre communi-
cations (8 per cent) were already transmitted by satellites. However, 00 000 US 
soldiers in 1991 had seven-time less bandwidth at their disposal than 0 000 in 
Afghanistan had in 00. Finally, the Pentagon uses more than  million comput-
ers on 00 000 networks at 00 sites.7 Encompassing all these networks is the 
Global Information Grid (GIG).
By exploiting those space and cyberspace assets, conventional military power 
could be used more decisively, selectively, and efficiently than ever before. Attri-
tion strategies are superseded by precision warfare. At least, these are the ideas of  
the proponents of  what is called a revolution in military affairs (RMA).8 Most no-
tably, the risks of  American soldiers in combat are minimized. In the 1991 Gulf  
War, coalition forces lost no more than 27 soldiers while fighting against a huge 
Iraqi army. The Kosovo air campaign in 1999 was conducted without a single ca-
sualty among pilots. Only one western soldier died in conventional battles fought 
in Afghanistan in 2001 and only 172 in Iraq in 200.9 The underlying technologi-
 Martin Sieff, U. S. Space Assets Vital but Vulnerable, <http://spacewar.com/news/milspace-0x.html> (0/0/2008).
 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power, Space Power and Geography, in: Colin S. Gray (ed.), Geopolitics, Geography and 
Strategy, London 1999, p. 7.
6 William B. Scott, Milspace Comes of  Age in Fighting Terror, in: Aviation Week & Space Technology, No. 1/2002, 
pp. 77–78.
7 Peter Brooks, Countering the Art of  Information Warfare, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed101607a.
cfm> (0/0/2008).
8 A critical assessment is provided by Stephen Biddle, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the American Military Transformation, in: 
John Baylis et al. (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford 2007, pp. 27–29.
9 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of  War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq, Cambridge 200, p. 10.
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cal dynamic of  the RMA is spurred by the civilian information technology (IT) 
industry. Thus, there is a favorable synergy between economic prosperity and 
military advantages.0
Regional powers aligned with the United States are forced to adapt. Otherwise 
they risk political marginalization even when crises break out in their vicinity. 
This was the case when European NATO members lacked sufficient satellite 
images during the Kosovo crisis. Since European populations do not tolerate 
higher casualties or higher costs than American voters do and staying competitive 
in the global knowledge economy requires a vital IT and space industry, there are 
economic, military, and political incentives for European states to formulate and 
implement vigorous space and cyberspace policies. Hence, even if  their ambi-
tions were limited to the regional level, they nevertheless would have their stake 
in space and cyberspace.
Non-aligned regional powers, especially authoritarian ones, are pressed to selec-
tively embrace and partially deny the use of  global information infrastructure. 
Economic development requires participation. But the inclusion in global in-
formation flows threatens to undermine political control. Countermeasures are 
taken to solve this dilemma. 0 000 employees in Chinese security institutions are 
occupied with monitoring internet activity. In response to ever increasing internet 
usage, the tasks of  surveillance and interception are gradually being automated by 
software tools. Furthermore, foreign services providers are compelled to enable 
or take over part of  the censorship themselves. However, internet censorship is 
far from being confined to China alone. Recently, Pakistani efforts to block ac-
0 In the past, technologies developed for military usage like rockets or the precursor of  the internet gradually enabled 
civil applications as well. In case of  the RMA, the transfer tends to proceed the other way around—from the civil 
IT sector to the military (see Eliot Cohen, Technology and Warfare, in: John Baylis et al. (eds.), Strategy in the 
Contemporary World, Oxford 2007, pp. 11–19.) For an alternative view emphasizing a single body of  knowledge 
behind military and civil innovations see Barry Buzan, Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, Boulder, 
CO, 1998, pp. 20–2.
 Mischa Hansel, ‘(Although) it’s not Rocket Science’: A Theoretical Concept for Assessing National Space Policies in 
Europe, Köln 2007, pp. 10–11, 21–22.
 For space policies and capabilities in Europe see Theresa Hitchens, Tomas Valasek, European Military Space 
Capabilities, Washington, DC, 2006; Thomas Jäger, Mischa Hansel, Nationale Weltraumpolitiken im Vergleich: 
Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien und Großbritannien und die Kooperationsoptionen im Rahmen der Europäischen 
Union, in: Heiko Borchert (ed.), Europas Zukunft zwischen Himmel und Erde. Weltraumpolitik für Sicherheit, 
Stabilität und Prosperität, Baden-Baden 200, pp. 1–.
 James A. Lewis, The Architecture of  Control: Internet Surveillance in China, <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/
pubs/0706_cn_surveillance_and_information_technology.pdf> (0/0/2008).
 Mure Dickie, Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Evildoers? How the West’s Net Vanguard Toils Behind the Great Firewall of  
China, in: Financial Times, 02/1/2006.
 Reporters without Borders, The 1 Enemies of  the Internet and other Countries to Watch, <http://www.rsf.org/print.
php?id_article=161> (0/09/2008).
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cess to YouTube videos unintentionally caused an almost global blackout of  the 
popular website.
Escaping the sensors of  satellites passing above one’s territory is another chal-
lenge to political control. Not only secret services, but occasionally also human 
rights initiatives pursue their aims with the aid of  satellite photos.17 Sovereignty 
does not extend into space, for it is legally defined as a global common in analogy 
to the high seas. Thus, aside from attacking the satellite, states can only disrupt 
transmissions or conceal their secrets on the ground. For example, Iran and Libya 
are suspected to have jammed the transmission of  foreign satellite channels.18 
However, the primary problem with globalizing technologies from the perspec-
tive of  non-western powers is the overwhelming power western militaries gener-
ate from their incorporation.
Contested Spaces
Confronted with the superiority of  western capabilities of  warfare, non-western 
powers are driven to unconventional responses. They develop and signal asym-
metric warfare capabilities to deter interventions. Some states are looking to 
obtain weapons of  mass destruction. Being options of  last resort, they enable 
the protection of  national territory but not of  regional interests. Thus, there is a 
strong temptation to threaten the western ‘Achilles heel’ in space and cyberspace.
The Chinese test of  an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 seems to reveal such a strat-
egy.19 On January 11, 2007 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) destroyed an old 
weather satellite with a ballistic missile. This demonstration of  an advanced anti-
satellite capability produced a massive cloud of  space debris, indiscriminately and 
permanently threatening other spacecraft.0 There are recommendations for other 
anti-satellite techniques and systems found in Chinese professional journals, 
although the influence of  those ideas among the political leadership remains 
unclear. However, the testing and deployment of  a debris-producing anti-satellite 
 BBC News, YouTube Outage Blamed on Pakistan, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/7262071.
htm> (02/2/2008).
17 For example see the ‘Eyes on Darfur’-Project of  Amnesty International, <http://www.eyesondarfur.org/satellite.
html> (01/10/2008). Other cases are reported by Peter N. Spotts, Monitoring Human Rights? Get a Satellite, in: The 
Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0622/p0s0-usfp.htm> (0/09/2008).
18 Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2006, <http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2006.pdf> (01/09/2008).
19 Ashley J. Tellis, China’s Military Space Strategy, in: Survival, No. /2007, pp. 1–72.
0 Frank Morring, China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever, in: Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw021207p2.xml> 
(0/2/2007).
 Michael C. Pillsbury, An Assessment of  China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines, 
<http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2007/FINAL_REPORT_1-19-2007_REVISED_BY_MPP.pdf> 
(0/10/2008).
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weapon is a prime example of  how regional policies cannot escape their global 
implications when pursued in space and cyberspace. Such an action is probably 
meant to deter a future western intervention in a regional conflict scenario—for 
example with respect to Taiwan. Nonetheless, the security of  all space powers 
has been diminished in the aftermath of  the test.
The temptation to explore ways of  space warfare is made even stronger due to 
the fact that not only western militaries, but society as a whole is crucially de-
pendent on space systems. Telecommunications, traffic systems, transportation 
and energy sectors, as well as emergency services and financial transactions are 
enabled, managed, and monitored via those systems. Unsurprisingly, the United 
States regards the security of  space as a vital interest. Western militaries are 
amongst the actors utilizing various civil and commercial capacities. For example, 
commercial satellites transmitted 80 per cent of  all satellite communications 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both military and civil space assets are basi-
cally unprotected. Until now, the relative inaccessibility of  space is their most 
efficient form of  protection. In contrast, further protective measures are quite 
expensive. Incorporating defensive devices or extra fuel reserves into satellites en-
 The White House, U. S. National Space Policy, 8, <http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/usa/SpacePolicy2006.pdf> 
(0/10/2008).
 United States Air Force, Space Operations, Maxwell Air Force Base, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_
2.pdf  > (0/10/2008).
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abling them to repel or evade attacks adds 10–20 per cent to system costs. Being 
without efficient protection and following predictable paths, satellites have been 
described as “sitting ducks,” downright inviting attacks. Making things worse, 
the combination of  few and expensive satellites which characterizes most space 
system architectures provides only limited redundancy. Therefore, a lot of  dam-
age could be expected from but a few hits.
Experts vastly disagree on the vulnerability of  cyberspace. Grounded in the 
originally military purpose of  a network structure there is an inherently high 
degree of  redundancy working in favor of  the defender.27 But its very connectiv-
ity turns into a disadvantage as computer viruses and worms may unpredictably 
spread. The computer worm MyDoom, for example, which spread in January 
and February 00, at its peak slowed down global internet performance by 0 
per cent. The most damaging viruses and worms LoveLetter, Code Red, Blaster, 
and Sobig.F each inflicted an estimated economic damage between 2 and 1 bil-
lion US dollars.28 However, far from attempting to destroy or degrade the whole 
network structure, real attackers might secretly scan or disrupt specific networks 
and data while leaving cyberspace functional as a whole. PLA cyber warfare units 
which have been established since 00 are suspected to have spied on various 
Western governments’ and private sector networks.29 Regional security in eco-
nomic and military terms is threatened by such electronic attacks. Before the 
information age, sources of  economic strength like heavy industries and natural 
resources could only be targeted by physical force. They had to be conquered or 
destroyed in order to shift the balance of  economic power. Armies could ef-
fectively shield a region’s wealth. Nowadays, the economic well-being of  some 
regions (North America, Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia) increasingly rests 
on the knowledge which underlies competitive services and high-tech-products.0 
Inasmuch as such knowledge is stored in a virtual environment, it can be attacked 
 Paul Nordin, Hardness and Survivability Requirements, in: Wiley J. Larson, James R. Wertz (eds.), Space Mission 
Analysis and Design, Torrance, CA, 1992, p. 226.
 William Marshall et al., Space Weapons: The Urgent Debate, in: ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, 
Nr. 1/200, p. 28.
 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of  the Means and Motivations of  Selected Nation States, 
Hanover, NH, 200, <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf> (0/10/2008), pp. 12–1.
27 James A Lewis, Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.csis.org/
media/csis/pubs/0601_cscip_preliminary.pdf> (0/0/2008), pp. 6–7.
28 George Jones, Viruses and Worms, in: Informationweek, 07/10/2006. For a critical assessment of  such damage 
estimates, particularly the inclusion of  opportunity costs for individual firms, see James A. Lewis, Cybersecurity 
and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0601_cscip_
preliminary.pdf>, (0/0/2008).
29 John J. Tkacik, Jr., Trojan Dragon: China’s Cyber Threat, Washington, DC, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/
AsiaandthePacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf> (0/10/2008), pp. –7. See also Jürgen Dahlkamp et al., Prinzip Sandkorn, 
in: Der Spiegel, 08/27/2007.
0 Peter F. Drucker, The Age of  Discontinuity, Guidelines to our Changing Society, London 1969.
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by non-physical forces via cyberspace. Now, copying instead of  conquest is 
required for redistributing economic wealth by force. Therefore, physical protec-
tion alone can no longer safeguard regional resources and markets. On the other 
hand, cyber warfare units pose risks in terms of  military security. They could be 
employed to secretly probe the vulnerabilities of  military networks, providing the 
opportunity to use or distort critical data in times of  conflict.
Even individual attackers are powerful in cyberspace, unlike in space: indeed, 
basic access is dead easy. Attackers can effectively conceal their identity by vari-
ous means. Cyber-attacks are barely inhibited by physical borders, contrary to 
law enforcement. A really comprehensive and global cooperation would have to 
overcome the basic reluctance of  authorities towards data exchange. Another 
advantage for attackers is the low degree of  material resources and technological 
sophistication they need to construct their warfare instruments or detect soft-
ware vulnerabilities. Vast networks of  already contaminated computers, allowing 
remote control without their owner’s permission and knowledge are rented or 
sold. Called bot nets, they cost just 200 to 00 US dollars per hour. The mas-
sive attacks on the internet root servers in February 2007 might have been cyber 
criminals simply advertising their bot nets. The latter could be used to carry out 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, turning out web sites and costumer 
services by overwhelming them with requests. In May 2007, DDoS attacks were 
directed against the websites of  Estonian ministries, banks, telecommunication 
companies, and news organizations. The attacks were admittedly related to a po-
litically controversial move by the Estonian government to relocate a Soviet war 
memorial some days earlier.
However, to gather secret information or to harm physical infrastructures by 
electronic means requires more sophisticated tools. Suitable hacking tools and 
 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of  the Means and Motivations of  Selected Nation States, 
Hanover, NH, 200, <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf> (0/10/2008), pp. 120–
. However, the characteristics of  cyberspace favouring easy access and anonymity are entirely contingent on code, 
i. e. the software and hardware that cyberspace is made of. The features of  cyberspace are therefore not conclusively 
given. Cyberspace is totally constructed: a future code of  cyberspace might prevent anonymity rather than support it 
(see Lawrence Lessig, Code, Version 2.0, New York, NY, 2006).
 The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, adopted by the Council of  Europe, stands out as a first step towards 
harmonisation of  national laws and encouragement of  joint actions. See <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
Treaties/Html/18.htm> (0/08/2008).
 Susan MacLean, Report Warns of  Organized Cyber Crime, in: itWorldCanada, 08/26/200, <http://www.
itworldcanada.com/a/IT-Focus/9c78aa-df7-21-a08-ddd1ab898fb.html> (0/10/2008).
 Aaron Mannes, James Hendler, Net Attack, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, online edition, 0/06/2007, <http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB11809962798092270.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia> (0/07/2008).
 Peter Finn, Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic, in: The Washington Post, 0/19/2007.
 Aaron Mannes, James Hendler, Net Attack, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, online edition, 0/06/2007, <http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB11809962798092270.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia> (0/07/2008).
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information on short-term security leaks are also sold on the internet.7 Prices 
for information on current computer vulnerabilities range from 000 to 000 
US dollars.8 Knowledge of  short-term vulnerabilities of  new software is sold at 
online auctions.9 Aside from virtual attacks on virtual targets, physical targets can 
be attacked by virtual means. The 200 “Slammer” internet worm, for example, 
infected the control system at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio for 
several hours. 0 Such instances demonstrate the potential vulnerability of  com-
puter systems monitoring and controlling critical infrastructure while being con-
nected to local networks or even the internet itself.
Based on these threats, American officials warned of  a “Space Pearl Harbor” or 
“digital Pearl Harbor” in cyberspace while calling for defensive countermeasures. 
Expecting an irrevocable extension of  conflict into these new domains, they also 
recommended offensive capabilities. Accordingly, the US National Space Policy 
from 2006 claimed both, taking necessary actions to protect US space assets and 
to “deny, if  necessary, adversaries the use of  space capabilities hostile to U. S. 
national interests”. Whereas former space strategies did also reveal such an 
intention, even though in a more diplomatic tone, the 00 policy goes further 
by explicitly rejecting any new restrictions by international law. To be sure, there 
are no hints that American offensive capabilities would be accompanied by claims 
of  a legitimate rule over near earth space. Space will remain a global common 
despite American space power, just like the high seas have despite British naval 
power in the 19th century. Nevertheless, moving from words to action would 
seriously transform the practice of  the current space regime. As a matter of  fact, 
the financial and technological capabilities of  accessing the space will no longer 
7 John Christensen, Bracing for Guerrilla Warfare in Cyberspace, in: CNN Interactive, 0/06/1999, <http://www.cnn.
com/TECH/specials/hackers/cyberterror/> (0/10/2008); Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: 
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL211_2007111.pdf  > (0/10/2008), pp. 9–10.
8 Bob Francis, Know Thy Hacker: The Dollars and Cents of  Hacking, in: Infoworld, 01/28/200, <http://www.
infoworld.com/article/0/01/28/0OPsecadvise_1.html> (0/10/2008).
9 Tim Green, Web Site Auctions Software Vulnerabilities to Highest Bidder, in: Network World, 0/28/2007, <http://
www.networkworld.com/news/2007/08207-wabisabi.html> (0/10/2008).
0 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, 
November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL211_2007111.pdf  > (0/10/2008), pp. 21–22.
 Space Commission, Report of  the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization, Washington, DC, 2001, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/executive_summary.pdf> 
(0/10/2008), p. 21.
 Richard Clarke (National Security Council) quoted from CNN.com, U. S. Cyberspace Chief  Warns of  ‘digital 
Pearl Harbor,’ 12/08/2000, <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/12/08/security.summit.ap/> 
(0/06/2008).
 The White House, U. S. National Space Policy, 8, <http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/usa/SpacePolicy2006.pdf>, 
(0/10/2008).
 After resigning from the ABM-Treaty in 2002 the USA is no longer restricted by any space related international treaty 
except the Outer Space Treaty of  1967. However, the OST outlaws just the orbital deployment of  weapons of  mass 
destruction. It does not forbid conventional weapons in space.
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be sufficient to guarantee its utilization; rather US acquiescence may become 
necessary.
Offensive techniques which provide temporary and reversible effects are pre-
ferred. Few operational systems like the Counter-Communication-System (CCS) 
are known. However, by recently hitting an inoperable spy satellite with a 
modified SM- the United States reminded that their missile defense system 
could serve anti-satellite functions as well. Defensive measures aim to improve 
situational awareness through new space observation systems.7 Additionally, the 
U. S. military is trying to enhance redundancy by distributing functions between 
numerous smaller and cheaper satellites. Less costly and more flexible launching 
options are being developed to reduce the time and costs of  reconstitution after 
attacks.8
A similar mixture of  offensive and defensive approaches characterizes American 
cyberspace efforts. In order to strengthen the defensive side, the Cyber Security 
Tracking, Analysis and Response Center (CSTARC), the Cyber Warning and 
Information Network (CWIN), and the National Cyber Alert System (NCAS) 
were established.9 U. S. military employed Computer Network Attacks (CNA) for 
the first time in Haiti in 199. 0 The classified 2006 National Military Strategy for 
Cyberspace Operations reportedly states that “offensive capabilities in cyberspace 
offer both the U. S. and our adversaries an opportunity to gain and maintain the 
initiative.” Moreover, General Kevin P. Chilton, head of  the U. S. Strategic Com-
mand, declared in a congressional hearing that “capabilities are being developed 
‘to operate, defend, exploit and attack in cyberspace’.” The 00 Information 
Operations Roadmap signals offensive intentions even more bluntly: “Networks 
are increasingly the operational center of  gravity, and the Department must be 
prepared to ‘fight the net’.” Responsible military units include the Joint Func-
 Taylor Dinerman, The Bush Administration and Space Weapons, in: The Space Review, 0/09/200, <http://www.
thespacereview.com/article/7/1> (11/27/2006).
 Marc Kaufman, Josh White, Spy Satellite’s Downing Shows a New U. S. Weapon Capability, in: The Washington Post, 
02/22/2008.
7 Amy Butler, Secret Steps: U. S. Government Mobilizes to Deal with Asat Problem, in: Aviation Week & Space Technol-
ogy 20/2007, pp. 9–0.
8 Department of  Defense, Plan for Operationally Responsive Space, Washington, DC, 2007, <http://www.responsives-
pace.com/ors/reference/ORS_Plan.pdf  > (01/1/2008).
9 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, 
November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL211_2007111.pdf  > (0/10/2008), pp. 1–2.
0 Ralf  Bendrath, Krieger in den Datennetzen, 06/17/2001, <http://www.heise.de/tp/r/artikel/7/7892/1.html> 
(0/10/2008).
 Walter Pincus, The New Art of  War, in: Washington Post, 0/0/2008.
 Ibid.
 Department of  Defense, Informations Operations Roadmap, Washington, DC, 200, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_01_06_psyops.pdf> (0/10/2008), p. 6.
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tional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint 
Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC).
Blurring Lines
After outlining increasing incentives and opportunities for preparing and waging 
space and cyber attacks the analysis turns to the consequences for regional and 
international stability. The more space and cyberspace become centers of  gravity 
in strategic terms, the more the significance of  position, direction, and distance 
is undermined. First of  all, this refers to the deployment of  offensive capabilities: 
Due to orbital motion one can hardly exclude specific assets from threats. As far 
as cyberspace is concerned, one cannot detect where and against whom a hacker 
is currently operating. In some cases, even the effect of  weapons lacks discrimi-
nation: the diffusion of  computer viruses seems unpredictable and escalatory, 
constituting an act of  war simultaneously waged against all actors. In a similar 
vein, the development, testing, and demonstration of  debris producing, i. e. ‘dirty’ 
anti-satellite capabilities automatically transforms near-earth space into a globally 
contested domain. Owing to higher risks and, hence, higher insurance rates com-
mercial actors might abandon the space business quite rapidly. Perhaps the same 
logic applies to cyberspace. Thus, the extension of  conflict into these new do-
mains would coincide with the loss of  viable economic opportunities therein. But 
conflict in these realms also undermines other demarcations: between public and 
private action and, most fundamentally, between the state of  war and the state of  
peace. Because legal restrictions are unclear and responsibilities could be plausibly 
denied, these very ambiguities might provide additional incentives for attacking 
space and cyberspace assets.
Civil societies’ dependence on space and cyberspace has already been mentioned 
as well as the usage of  civil capacities by the military. Private and public spheres in 
cyberspace, however, might become even more intermingled. Searching for profits, 
cyber criminals usually blackmail time-critical online business like e-commerce or 
online-casinos by threatening to undertake denial-of-service attacks or to disclose 
security leaks. But is it certain that no state will ever pay them for their services? Ev-
ery real-world crisis in recent years has had its counterpart in cyberspace: Western 
and Serbian hackers, Palestinian and Israeli hackers, Indian and Pakistani hackers, 
Chinese and American hackers, and Russian and Chechen hackers attacked each 
others’ websites and defaced them with propaganda. In the case of  the attacks 
on Estonian websites, officials suspected Russian authorities of  being involved in 
 Walter Pincus, The New Art of  War, in: Washington Post, 0/0/2008.
 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of  the Means and Motivations of  Selected Nation States, 
Hanover, NH, 200, <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf> (0/10/2008), pp. 1.
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the attacks. One should at least acknowledge that the combination of  numerous 
skilled computer experts alongside a limited job market has created a huge and 
probably hireable hacker community in Eastern Europe. Indeed, Russia’s hacker 
community is as large as the ones in China or the USA even though Russia has 
far fewer Internet users.7 There are reports that Russian intelligence services had 
already pressured convictable cyber criminals to work for them.8 Other cases add 
to the picture: Chinese strategists have been thinking of  embedding civilian hackers 
into cyber warfare for years,9 outlining something like a “People’s War with com-
puters”.0 The PLA organizes competitions for computer hackers to identify and 
recruit talents. To some observers this looks like a new levée en masse, this time in 
cyberspace. An Indian computer security consultant accused Pakistani intelligence 
services of  paying hackers in the USA and Great Britain 00 to 10 000 US dollars 
to deface Indian websites. Obviously, there is an evolving grey zone between cyber 
crime, cyber protest, state-sponsored, and state-led cyber warfare and cyber-espio-
nage, making it almost impossible to know whether one is being attacked by private 
actors or states and whether law enforcement or the military should respond.
In space and cyberspace it is difficult to determine what constitutes a weapon and 
the threshold of  war initiation. Due to their dual-use nature, some space capabili-
ties could implicitly serve counter-space functions, as well. Twenty eight states 
have orbital or sub-orbital launch capabilities. This is a prerequisite for kinetic 
energy anti-satellite weapons. At least 0 states have already employed micro-satel-
lites, modifiable into covert anti-satellite devices. In terms of  cyberspace, CNA-
software tools are neither identifiable nor quantifiable. Offensive tools are needed 
to test defensive ones and can be limitlessly duplicated. Offensive and defensive 
capabilities are hard to distinguish, a situation which seriously aggravates the 
 Peter Finn, Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic, in: The Washington Post, 0/19/2007.
7 There are 28 million internet users in Russia compared with 10 million in China and 210 million in the USA. See Clif-
ford J. Levy, Russians Let Hackers Loose on the West, in: International Herald Tribune, 10/22/2007.
8 Ruth Alvey, Russian Hackers for Hire: The Rise of  the E-Mercenary, in: Jane’s Intelligence Review, 07/01/2001.
9 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of  the Means and Motivations of  Selected Nation States, 
Hannover 200, <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf> (0/10/2008), p. 29–8.
0 Ibid., p. 29.
 Tim Reid, China’s Cyber Army is Preparing to March on America, Says Pentagon, in: The Times Online, 09/08/2007, 
<http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article20986.ece.> (0/07/2008).
 Audrey K. Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization. The New Levée en Masse, in: Parameters, No. 2/2006, pp. 77–87.
 Suelette Dreyfus, Hacktivism Through the Eyes of  an Infiltrator, in: The Age (Melbourne), 08/0/200.
 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, 
November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL211_2007111.pdf  > (0/10/2008), p. 8.
 Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2007, Waterloo (Canada) 2007, <http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2007.pdf> 
(01/09/2008), pp. 8–9, 128–10.
 Olivier Minkwitz, Ohne Hemmungen in den Krieg? Cyberwar und die Folgen, HSFK-Report, No. 10/200, Frankfurt 
a.M. 200, <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=9CB800-71A9-010-
12A-F97E26CD&lng=de> (/10/2008), p. .
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security dilemma.67 To be able to employ computer network attacks in war de-
mands the probing and manipulation of  foreign networks in times of  peace.68 Far 
from being merely cyber espionage (something even allies do to each other), these 
preparations resemble terrorists’ sleeping cells in societies.69 Therefore, it seems 
only logical to conclude that “peace really does not exist in the information age,” 
as a former National Security Agency (NSA) director stated.70 Moreover, interna-
tional law hardly keeps pace with the information age. Does the term ‘use of  force’ 
only relate to actions resulting in physical damage and human suffering on earth? 
How should one differentiate between military and civilian targets? Diverging 
interpretations on these issues may contribute to the escalation of  international 
crises. 71 There is also little agreement on what constitutes a proportional reaction 
to a CNA or anti-satellite attack.72 Are air strikes a legitimate response? As long as 
there is no international consensus on these matters, the grey zone between public 
and private action seems to be extended into a grey zone between peace and war.
Conclusion
In order to reduce their vulnerabilities, western powers should consider some 
costly remedies and trade-offs: first of  all, they should abstain from offensive 
intentions and rather strengthen their defensive capacities. Instead of  being a 
normative plea, this conclusion is based on the sheer self-interest of  Western 
powers because they have the highest stakes in space and cyberspace and could 
therefore expect the most severe losses in the case of  an arms race and ensuing 
warfare. Enhancing protection and redundancy may hamper economic efficiency 
and innovation.7 If  those measures could, however, keep incentives for space 
and cyberspace attacks below a certain threshold, they would certainly be worth 
undertaking. Primarily, they preserve regional security by enabling the separation 
from military and economic threats and are, moreover, necessary in safeguarding 
the economic viability of  space and cyberspace in the long run.
67 Robert Jervis, Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma, in: Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis (eds.): International Politics. 
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, New York 2007, pp. 177–197.
68 Olivier Minkwitz, Ohne Hemmungen in den Krieg? Cyberwar und die Folgen (HSFK-Report, No. 10), Frankfurt a. M. 
200, <http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/report100.pdf>, p. 22.
69 Johannes Ulrich, expert with the SANS Technology Institute, quoted from Robert Marquand, Ben Arnoldy, China 
Emerges as Leader in Cyberwarfare, in: Christian Science Monitor, 9/1/2007, p. 1.
70 Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, quoted from U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Cyber Operations and Cyber 
Terrorism, Fort Leavenworth 200, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup2.pdf>, p. IV–1.
71 Duncan B. Hollis, Rules of  Cyberwar?, in: Los Angeles Times, 10/8/2007.
72 James Adams, Virtual Defense, in: Foreign Affairs, No. /2001, p. 110.
7 This may require comprehensive protection of  military and even commercial satellites. It may also be necessary to 
closely monitor industrial collaborations and limit dependence on foreign computer software to forestall the leakage 
of  strategic knowledge and the penetration of  critical networks. See John J. Tkacik, Jr., Trojan Dragon: China’s Cyber 
Threat, Washington, DC, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf> 
(/10/2008), p. 7–12.
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India’s Look East Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
Monika Barthwal
Introduction
India’s rise as an emerging power on the international stage has captured the 
world’s attention in the st century. This rise has been signposted by its impres-
sive economic growth, its nuclear deal with the US and its growing presence in 
regional and international forums. In a regional context, India has been working 
steadfastly to build a greater economic role for itself. Simultaneously, India is also 
seeking a significant strategic role within Asia, in terms of  establishing itself  as 
a key political and security actor. While it has rekindled earlier visions of  India 
as a pan-Asian leader, this renewed phase of  greater engagement within Asia is 
fuelled by a new-found pragmatism in Indian foreign policy.
This chapter argues that although India’s ‘Look East Policy’ or LEP has allowed 
it to forge closer economic alliances with ASEAN countries, it has so far failed 
to achieve one of  its key aim in recent times—to establish India as an integral 
part of  the Asian security architecture. It begins with a brief  analysis of  the 
background within which the LEP was adopted, and outlines the key aims of  
the policy. The paper then examines to what extent India has pursued its LEP 
successfully with respect to its economic and strategic goals. While taking into ac-
count the progress India has made in achieving the former, it highlights the chal-
lenges India faces in pressing on with the strategic objectives embedded in the 
LEP, including Chinese resistance to India’s closer strategic ties with countries in 
Asia. It concludes that unless India is able to outline a clear role for itself  within 
the existing Asian security architecture, it will remain limited to being perceived 
as a South Asian power, rather than a Pan-Asian one.
Background
The early 1990s saw a distinct shift in India’s strategic and economic vision. In 
1991, the Indian economy awoke from a long phase of  protectionism, import-
substitution and heavy regulation to begin a period of  steady deregulation, priva-
tization and the opening up of  markets, creating room for foreign direct invest-
ment and greater movement of  market forces. Almost simultaneously, India’s 
foreign policy adopted a primarily Asian focus as embodied within the ‘Look East 
Policy’ or LEP. The central aim of  this policy was to re-establish traditional ties 
within Asia to build closer economic relationships with countries in Southeast 
Asia.
Monika Barthwal
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India’s LEP came in the context of  a rapidly changing global order. Independent 
India under Nehru’s leadership in the 190s and 190s championed the cause of  
decolonization in Southeast Asian colonies. Nehru saw a natural leadership role 
for India in Asia, and professed to a ‘non-aligned’ foreign policy. Through the lat-
ter, he asserted India’s right to pursue its own interests without domination from 
either the US or the Soviet Union. Despite this assertion, there was a clear and 
evident preference for the latter, particularly as the US fostered closer relations 
with India’s arch-rival Pakistan.
China’s invasion of  India in 1962 was a huge blow to Nehru’s international-
ist idealism, and eventually led to a shift in India’s foreign policy to focus on its 
immediate neighborhood. Bilateralism became the new mantra for the Indian 
state in South Asia. The war with Pakistan in 196 and later skirmishes along the 
Indo-Pakistan border across the Rann of  Kutch in the west further entrenched 
the importance of  Pakistan in India’s foreign policy. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war 
has been widely viewed as the turning point India’s perceptions of  its role within 
the region. India’s win was decisive, and led to the independence of  East Paki-
stan as Bangladesh. Even as Nehruvian principles continued to be proclaimed as 
sacrosanct in Indian foreign policy-making, a distinct deviation became obvious 
in the following years. As Bradnock points out, with “[t]he break-up of  Pakistan 
and the signing of  the Indo-Soviet Treaty of  Friendship [in 1971] began new 
phases in India’s relations both with its immediate neighbours and with the wider 
world” as it emerged as “the unchallenged power within the South Asian region 
and potentially a force to be reckoned with further afield.” In 197, India con-
ducted its first nuclear tests, further entrenching its status as the dominant power 
in South Asia.
The Cold War and India’s strategic and ideological alignment (despite its claims to 
formal nonalignment) with the Soviet Union resulted in a strong divide between 
India and countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The latter saw the communist 
Soviet Union as a distinct threat, following the Soviet-backed invasion of  Laos 
by the North-Vietnamese forces in 199. The formation of  the Association of  
South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, was essentially a reaction to the communist 
threat perceived from the Soviet Union and China. The organization came into 
being in 1967, and preceded the tremendous economic transformation ASEAN 
1 Devna Rastogi, Reena Sekhri, Indian Foreign Policy, Security and Economic Issues, <http://www.ipcs.org/India_ 
articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=21&country=1016&status=article&mod=a> (16/07/2008).
2 Richard Bradnock, India’s Foreign Policy since 1971, London 1990; Barry Buzan et al., South Asian Insecurity and the 
Great Powers, London 1986.
 Sumit Ganguly, India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up, in: World Policy Journal, No. /200, pp. 1–7. 
 Richard Bradnock, India’s Foreign Policy since 1971, London 1990, p. 2. 
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countries underwent in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, these burgeon-
ing economies had captured the world’s attention.
The rise of  China as an economic giant was another defining feature of  this 
changing global order. Between the 190s and late 1980s, China and India 
shared largely hostile relations, especially in light of  friendly relations between 
China and Pakistan, the Indo-China war of  1962 and border disputes over com-
mon borders in Kashmir and Northeast India. When India forged closer military 
ties with the Soviet Union during the Cold War China strengthened its strategic 
relationship with Pakistan. Pre-occupied with aligning itself  with the Soviet 
Union to counter China’s military power, India missed the opportunity China 
grasped simultaneously—to build extensive economic relations with the states 
of  Southeast Asia.
The collapse of  the Soviet Union signaled an end of  the era of  Soviet dominance 
in India’s security and economic policies. As the edifice upon which India had 
modeled its socio-economic policies crumbled, India found itself  to be an eco-
nomically stagnant and inward-looking state which had not only missed the boat 
as far as the economic boom in Asia was concerned, but also had little to show 
in terms of  close relations with countries in the wider region. Its own immediate 
neighborhood of  South Asia was an economically poor and politically chaotic 
mess, and the relationships with its neighbors had become stagnant. India’s lead-
ers realized that rather than championing the cause of  the “Third World” and 
limiting its focus towards South Asia, India had to pursue its own self-interests 
to surge ahead and carve out a place for itself  in the wider regional and interna-
tional arenas. This pragmatic turn in India’s foreign policy has since resulted in 
India seeking an expansion in its relations with all major powers including the US, 
Japan, China and Europe. High economic growth was identified as the key path 
to this goal, and, by searching for foreign direct investment the most pragmatic 
option was to “look East” towards Southeast and East Asia.
To ASEAN countries, India was the natural counterweight to Chinese influence 
and power in Asia. In fact, the organization had twice—in 197 and in 1980—se-
riously considered India as a possible dialogue partner before India actively 
sought engagement with ASEAN. On both occasions, India opted to stay out. 
Notwithstanding the initial rejection, ASEAN countries welcomed India’s move 
when it eventually announced its LEP and desire to forge closer bilateral and 
multilateral relations with ASEAN.
 C. Raja Mohan, India’s New Foreign Policy Strategy, Draft paper presented at a Seminar by China Reform Forum and 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beijing, 26/0/2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
Mohan.pdf> (16/07/2008).
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India’s LEP 1992–2008
India’s LEP has since been implemented in two parts or phases. The first phase 
“was ASEAN-centred and focused primarily on trade and investment linkages.” 
It began with the launch of  the LEP and lasted throughout the 1990s which 
saw a rapid growth of  India-ASEAN relations. The turn of  the century marks 
the beginning of  the second and current phase of  the LEP, which is embedded 
within an extended vision of  Asia, stretching from “Australia to East Asia, with 
ASEAN at its core.” It embodies India’s desire for greater engagement within the 
region, moving on from trade and investment to “wider economic and security 
issues, including joint forces to protect the sea-lanes and coordinate counter-ter-
rorism activities.” This includes establishing free trade arrangements (FTAs) with 
ASEAN as a whole and, additionally, bilateral agreements with member countries, 
as well as deepening relations with Australia, Japan and South Korea in the light 
of  economic, strategic and political considerations.7
Integration within ASEAN’s Institutional Regime and India-ASEAN Trade
India has made significant advancement in embedding itself  within the institu-
tional framework of  ASEAN. It has progressed from being a sectoral level part-
ner of  ASEAN in 1992 to a member of  the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 
1996.8 It reached summit-level interaction with the organization in 00, the high-
est level within the ASEAN framework. Summit meetings have provided India 
with the opportunity and platform to outline its LEP priorities, policy goals and 
its own vision of  the role India can play in the region.9 They have provided the 
space for India and ASEAN countries to continue discussions, formalize existing 
areas of  cooperation as well as to introduce new potential areas to the agenda.
Trade between ASEAN states and India has increased from US$2. billion in 
1990 to around US$1 billion in 2006/07. However, compared to the level of  
trade and integration China has achieved with ASEAN countries, this progress is 
still considerably slow and limited. China became ASEAN’s fourth-largest partner 
in 2007, with total bilateral trade reaching $202. billion0—almost seven times 
more than that between India and ASEAN. Institutionally, China, as an ASEAN 
6 Yashwant Sinha, Resurgent India in Asia, speech at Harvard University, 29/09/200, <http://www.kashmirtelegraph.
com/100/five.htm> (0/10/2008). 
7 Sukh Deo Muni, C. Raja Mohan, India’s options in a changing Asia, in: Ram Rattan Sharma (ed.), India and Emerging 
Asia, New Delhi 00, p. . 
8 The ARF includes ASEAN member countries and all its dialogue partners, i. e. China, South Korea, Japan and now 
India. It is the main instrument of  ASEAN for discussing security and strategic issues in the region.
9 Vibhanshu Shekhar, Asean Summit 2007: Setting India’s Agenda in: IPCS Policy Brief, No. 6, November 2007, 
<http://ipcs.org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No6-VibhanshuShekhar.pdf> (0/0/2008).
0 China, ASEAN become fourth-largest trade partners in 2007 in: China Daily, 29/02/2008, <http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2008-02/29/content_697860.htm> (0/10/08). 
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dialogue partner, has also been far more active than India, despite the fact that 
India was the first of  the two to achieve this status. As dialogue partner since De-
cember 199, India has established 1 bilateral mechanisms with ASEAN. China, 
on the other hand, became full dialogue partner in June 1996 but has managed to 
establish 27 China-ASEAN institutional mechanisms. Moreover, the mechanisms 
it shares with ASEAN are the most active and productive of  such mechanisms 
existing between ASEAN and other dialogue countries.
Strategic Ties with ASEAN
If  the defining feature of  the LEP has been the push for closer economic ties 
with Southeast Asian countries, its cornerstone is the desire to bring India out of  
its limited South Asian context and establish a strong strategic position in a wider 
regional and international one. The second and current phase of  the LEP has 
concentrated on its foundational aims to follow the broader vision of  integrating 
India within the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. To this effect, India has 
successfully become a member of  the ARF in 1996, which is the main instrument 
for discussions on security and strategic issues. The discussions take place in two 
forums within the ARF—the ARF Senior Officers’ Meetings (ARF-SOM) and 
the Intersessional Support Group meetings on Confidence Building Measures 
 Ranjit Gupta, India’s ‘Look East’ Policy, in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities, New Delhi 2007, p. 7.
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(ISG on CBMs). Since becoming a member, India has been participating in 
both groupings on issues such as drug-trafficking, terrorism and counter-terror-
ism as well as maritime piracy. At the second India-ASEAN summit in October 
200, for example, India and ASEAN signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation 
in Combating International Terrorism. India also signed the ASEAN Treaty of  
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), expressing its adherence to the ASEAN goal of  
regional peace and stability. 
On the bilateral front, India has been working hard to foster closer ties with sin-
gle ASEAN countries. It has engaged in talks with Vietnam to work out a Memo-
randum of  Understanding on defense cooperation and has signed an agreement 
with Singapore on a long-term arrangement for conducting joint training and ex-
ercises between the countries air forces. In January 2008, India and Malaysia an-
nounced a pact to intensify bilateral defense cooperation, which included a team 
from the Indian Air Force and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd going to Malaysia to 
undertake the training of  Royal Malaysian Air Force pilots and technicians. Both 
sides also agreed to increase naval exercises between the two countries as well as 
discuss other security issues concerning the region. Bilateral defense cooperation 
between India and Japan has also increased over recent years including fields such 
as maritime security, research and development and exchange of  information 
on technology aspects. Meanwhile, India and Indonesia had their first-ever Joint 
Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) meeting in Jakarta in June 2007. India 
has also consistently expressed willingness to undertake anti-piracy patrols in the 
Malacca Straits, if  such a wish is expressed by countries in the region.
Evaluating the Success of the LEP…
…in Economic Terms
On the economic front, India seems to have made considerable progress in 
linking its own economy to the vibrant economies of  Southeast Asia. Trade has 
grown impressively, and India continues to work to forge trade agreements with 
all ASEAN countries. Her FTA with Thailand in 200 and a Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore in 200 are some of  
the key achievements for India in this realm. Despite these positive developments, 
 The latter is supported by track II institutions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific  
(CSCAP) and the ASEAN Institutes of  Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS).
 The Joint Declaration stipulates cooperation in (a) exchange of  information, (b) legal and enforcement matters, 
(c) institutional capacity augmentation and (d) training. During the meeting on Law Enforcement in Bali in August 
00, India proposed sharing of  intelligence and coordinated actions among the law enforcement agencies in combat-
ing terrorism.
 Treaty of  Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm> (07/0/2008).
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however, there are some hurdles which inhibit India’s path to greater economic 
cooperation.
India has been negotiating an India-ASEAN FTA for the last three years. It has 
faced considerable difficulties in reaching a collective agreement with ASEAN 
countries, with disagreements over various issues as such tariff  reductions and a 
list of  certain goods. In India, domestic support for giving further concessions 
to ASEAN over several contentious issues is low, particularly over issues like 
India’s highly sensitive list of  goods and existing tariff  barriers, and the issue of  
rules of  origin. India has also defended its deadline of  2018 before eliminating 
tariff  barriers, arguing that its own small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will 
otherwise get exposed to external competition from ASEAN SMEs too early. If  
India sticks to its 2018 deadline, it will face competition from Chinese, Japanese 
and South Korean SMEs as these will already be present in the Southeast Asian 
market by 0.
In addition, India has announced many policy initiatives to facilitate integra-
tion with ASEAN countries over the past years which have failed to get past 
the planning stages. As part of  their CECA, India and Singapore signed Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRA) in goods and services, and agreed to mutually 
recognize degrees and technical qualifications of  each other’s institutions. The 
MRAs included liberalization of  visa regimes on both sides on 127 categories of  
professionals. Almost three years later, however, little has been done to bring into 
effect these relaxations and recognitions to allow easier movement of  profession-
als between the two countries.
…and in Terms of Strategic Aspects
India’s economic advances towards ASEAN countries have been made in the 
broader context of  integrating itself  within the region as a key strategic player 
and establishing itself  as a part of  the Asian security architecture. Its achieve-
ments in terms of  becoming a member of  the ARF and signing various joint 
agreements and treaties with ASIAN in the realms of  terrorism, drug trafficking 
and piracy are indicative of  a positive perception of  India as a strategic player 
in Asia by countries in the region. They consider India to be a crucial balancing 
factor in the security dynamics of  the region, most notably vis-à-vis China. India 
not only provides an alternative for ASEAN countries of  not becoming overtly 
dependent on China as their key trade partner, but also balances to an extent the 
political and strategic power Beijing projects within the region.
 Yogendra Singh, India-Singapore CECA Enters Second Phase in: IPCS, 1/01/2008, <http://www.ipcs.org/
whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=297&status=article&mod=b> (10/0/2008). 
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Nonetheless, India still has some way to go before it can be viewed as a credible 
player in the region’s security architecture. While bilateral agreements to share 
security information, expertise and conduct joint defense exercises are all impor-
tant in integrating India further within the region, India still needs to convince 
Southeast and East Asian countries that it can be a significant security actor in 
Asia. This is not an easy task, and India faces several impediments on its path to 
establishing itself  as a credible force in terms of  strategic matters.
First, India still continues to struggle in positing herself  within the traditional 
geographical paradigm of  ‘Asia’ as it is understood in countries of  Southeast 
and East Asia. In this understanding, Asia stretches from Japan to Myanmar, and 
includes the ASEAN countries. Countries like Malaysia have used this view to 
argue against the inclusion of  India as a member of  the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). Such a view has also served to delay India joining the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2006.
Historically, India has had little involvement in the region’s security flashpoints 
such as Taiwan, the North Korea nuclear issue and territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. This means India is excluded from talks and negotiations on 
the most pivotal security issues marking the region and bearing on the security 
concerns of  countries in the region. Indeed, India’s single political involvement 
in the region was in the 1970s and 1980s when, under Cold War dynamics, India 
supported Vietnam and its puppet regime in Cambodia. By the late 1980s, India 
was involved in international efforts to bring a peaceful resolution to the situa-
tion in Cambodia, and played a small but important role in ensuring the political 
settlement which came about after the Paris Conference in October 1991.
China’s influence and power in the region plays a crucial role to the extent to 
which India can extend its own ambit of  influence. While Sino-Indian relations 
have been on the up-swing, China continues to view India as a non-regional 
power in East Asia. In early 200, before the first EAS meeting, China actively 
lobbied against India’s inclusion (as well as that of  Australia and New Zealand) 
in EAS. Once these efforts had failed, Beijing insisted on dividing the East Asian 
Community (EAC) into a core group (ASEAN+ or APT) and the peripheral 
states (consisting of  India, Australia and New Zealand). Ultimately, it was decided 
that, although the APT would be the main driving force behind the EAC, the 
EAS summits would be held in ASEAN countries and it would be ASEAN lead-
ing the APT, rather than China.
 Ranjit Gupta, India’s ‘Look East’ Policy in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities, New Delhi 2007, p. 9. 
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The vision of  a polycentric Asia as preferred by ASEAN and India is also not a 
very palatable thought for Beijing as it implies opposition to China’s dominance 
in the region. This is despite the assessment made by strategic circles in China 
that India will continue to have little impact on the key regional security issues 
Taiwan, the South China Sea islands and North Korea. Thus, it will continue to 
be viewed within East Asia as predominantly an Indian Ocean power. Nonethe-
less, China cautiously observes India’s growing ties with countries such as Viet-
nam, Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar, with the Chinese media arguing that 
India is trying to hem in China by building up closer military ties with the coun-
tries surrounding China. The joint military exercises held by India, Japan and the 
US off  the Japanese coast in 2007 and the Malabar multilateral naval exercises 
between India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore in the Bay of  Bengal in 
2007 have added to Chinese anxiety in the region.
China also has reservations about the growing intimacy between the US and 
India on nuclear matters. Beijing has strongly criticized US-Indian nuclear coop-
eration and argued that it could potentially create a domino effect of  proliferation 
and competition.17 However, while there are many in the US who make the same 
argument, it is generally seen in the US interest to have a strong and powerful 
democratic India in Asia as a counterweight to communist China’s economic 
and political clout in the region. The US has supported an increased profile for 
India in the international community via the G0 and has encouraged it to take 
a leadership role in the establishment of  a Community of  Democracies with the 
support of  the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Democracy Caucus.18
Competition for influence and power—economic and strategic—will remain a 
defining feature of  Sino-Indian relations in the years to come. As the US contin-
ues to be cautious towards China, India needs to continue its pragmatic stance 
and capitalize on forging closer bilateral economic and strategic ties with the 
Asian giant. An economic and strategic relationship with China will serve India’s 
interest in Southeast and East Asia and is more likely to invite Chinese support 
for India’s regional goals. Stronger support within ASEAN countries for a greater 
Indian role in the region is also fundamental, if  India is to assuage China’s doubts 
about India’s strategic intentions within the region. To this end, India should use 
its soft power to further her relations with ASEAN, i. e. through education, cul-
17 C. Raja Mohan, Parag Khanna, Getting India right: Mutual Interests and Democratic Affinity, in: Policy Review, Febru-
ary/March 2006, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/291806.html> (26/02/2008). 
18 For more, see US Department of  State, The Community of  Democracies, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10790.htm> 
(16/07/2008). 
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ture, tourism and diplomacy with ASEAN states.19 Moreover, unlike China, India 
shares no historic animosities with these countries. There is no history of  bilat-
eral disputes or territorial claims in the region.0 This provides the leverage for 
India to offer assistance and expertise in many realms such as higher education, 
human resource development, information and technology, processes of  democ-
ratization and nation-building.
India also needs to demonstrate that it can play a more stabilizing role in its own 
backyard to strengthen its image as a potential leader within Asia. The volatilities 
in countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal reflect poorly on 
India’s ability to bring stability and security to Asia. To its credit, India has made 
efforts to improve its bilateral ties within the region over the last decade. Since 
200 it has been involved in talks with Pakistan to normalize relations between 
the two countries. It has set aside its reservations in involving extra-regional pow-
ers in the affairs of  South Asian states, and is now “working closely with the great 
powers in resolving the political crises in Nepal and Sri Lanka. India’s unilater-
alism in the region is increasingly being replaced by a multilateral approach.” 
Finally, as India continues to strive for a broader engagement in Asia in the eco-
nomic and security realms, it needs to develop a comprehensive strategic vision 
for itself  within the region. This vision should be in accordance with her new-
found pragmatic approach of  reconciling foreign policy objectives with national 
interests. Once India marks out a concrete role for herself  within the wider Asian 
security architecture, she will be able to lay claims to regional power status in the 
wider region on more credible grounds.
19 Baldas Ghoshal, Some New Thoughts on India’s Look East Policy, IPCS Issue Brief, October 2007, <http://ipcs.
org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No.pdf> (11/0/2008).
0 Ranjit Gupta, India’s ‘Look East’ Policy in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities, New Delhi 2007, p. 67. 
 C. Raja Mohan, India’s New Foreign Policy Strategy, Draft paper presented at a Seminar by China Reform Forum and 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beijing, 26/0/2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
Mohan.pdf> (16/07/08).
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Understanding China’s ‘Non-Intervention Policy’: Studying 
the Case of Myanmar
LI Hak Yin
Introduction
China’s non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule 
of  many authoritarian regimes. When the international community attempted 
to a launch humanitarian intervention in Sudan or raised the concern of  human 
rights abuses in Myanmar, China held firmly to its non-intervention policy by 
preventing such a move in the United Nations. It invoked the respect of  other 
countries’ territorial integrity and sovereignty as the primary reason. Expected 
to be a responsible great power, China has aroused the concerns of  many in the 
international community with the implications of  its non-intervention policy.
Discussions of  China’s non-intervention policy as well as Sino-Myanmar relations 
after the Cold War are, indeed, limited in current academic literature. Regarding 
China’s stance on humanitarian and multilateral intervention, Allen Carlson may 
be the first to have studied China’s changing attitude. Carlson finds that China 
opposed international intervention during the Cold War because both the United 
States and the Soviet Union were regarded as using intervention to expand their 
hegemonic influence in other regions. After the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, in 
order to break the international isolation and build up a more positive national 
image, China has become a “reluctant peacekeeper” by accepting the interna-
tional intervention in Kosovo and East Timor. Recently, China also sent a 1000 
peacekeepers to Lebanon. However, Carlson’s work could not explain the incon-
sistency of  China’s stance on international interventions, especially its rejections 
regarding Darfur, North Korea and Myanmar. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and 
Andrew Small also notice the problem of  China’s non-intervention policy which 
they regard as “China’s new dictatorship diplomacy.” The authors argue that in 
facing the various interests in Darfur, North Korea and Myanmar and the de-
mand to be a “responsible stakeholder,” China has attempted to strike a balance 
by pressuring the authoritarian regimes to make some changes in order to satisfy 
international demand while protecting those regimes from international interven-
tion. For example, China supported the United States in suspending an important 
1 The author would like to thank Prof. Zheng Yongnian and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this 
paper.
2 Robert Zoellick, United States urges China to be responsible world citizen, <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/
Archive/200/Sep/22-29078.html> (22/09/200).
 Allen Carlson, Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral 
Intervention, in: Pacific Affairs, No. 1/200, pp. 10–2.
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North Korean account in a bank in Macau; China persuaded Sudan to accept the 
joint peacekeeping forces of  the United Nations and African Union; and China 
warned Myanmar that Beijing may withdraw its support if  there is no progress 
on political reforms. The only critique to such a rationale being behind China’s 
non-intervention policy or “new dictatorship diplomacy” (in their words) is that 
energy security and economic interests such as the imports of  oil and natural 
resources cannot tell the whole story.
About Sino-Myanmar relations, scholars such as Jürgen Haacke and Ruukun Ka-
tanyuu, instead, focus their work on the bilateral relations between Myanmar and 
the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Magnus Petersson stud-
ies the relationship between ASEAN and the European Union (EU) in the con-
text of  Myanmar.7 Marie Lall8 and Ian Holliday9 examine Myanmar relations with 
India and Myanmar relations with the United States respectively. The remaining 
literature focuses on Myanmar domestic affairs such as the rule of  the military 
junta, ethnic conflicts and the difficulties of  democratization as one can see in 
the works of  Peter Carey,0 Robert I. Rotberg, Robert H. Taylor and John 
Perry. Although Liang Chi-Shad presents a general summary on Sino-Myanmar 
relations starting from 198 and Sheng Lijun examines the Chinese anti-drug 
policy in Myanmar, both accounts do not satisfactorily address the motivations 
driving the Chinese non-intervention policy toward Myanmar.
This paper seeks to explain the Chinese non-intervention policy through a com-
prehensive study of  Chinese interests at regional, geo-strategic and international 
levels by using the case of  Myanmar. Moreover, this paper observes that the Chi-
nese non-intervention policy does not necessarily preclude intervention, as China 
 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Andrew Small, China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy—Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?, 
in: Foreign Affairs, No. 1/2008, pp. 0–2.
 Jürgen Haacke, Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of  a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or 
Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture, in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. 2/200, pp. 188–216.
6 Ruukun Katanyuu, Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN—The Association’s Role of  in Myanmar’s National 
Reconciliation and Democratization”, in: Asian Survey, No. 6/2006, pp. 82–8.
7 Magnus Petersson, Myanmar in EU-ASEAN Relations, in: Asia-Europe Journal, No. /2006, pp. 6–81.
8 Marie Lall, Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of  Pipeline Diplomacy, in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, No. /2006, 
pp. 2–6.
9 Ian Holliday, Rethinking the United States’s Myanmar Policy, in: Asian Survey, No. /200, pp. 60–621.
0 Peter Carey (ed.), Burma-The Challenge of  Change in a Divided Society, London 1997.
 Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Burma—Prospects for a Democratic Future, Washington, DC, 1998.
 Robert H. Taylor (ed.), Burma—Political Economy Under Military Rule, London 2001.
 John Perry, Myanmar (Burma) since 1962: The Failure of  Development, Aldershot 2007.
 Liang Chi-Shad, Burma’s Relations with the People’s Republic of  China: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine 
Cooperation, in: Peter Carey (ed.), Burma—The Challenge of  Change in a Divided Society, London 1997, pp. 71–90.
 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: Asian Perspective, No. 
2/2006, pp. 97–126.
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has indeed intervened in Myanmar politics. Therefore, this paper further argues, 
that the Chinese non-intervention policy is simply a natural response to China’s 
interests and concerns in Myanmar.
Chinese Multi-level Interests in Myanmar
Regional Interests—Stop the Spread of HIV/AIDS
Low education level, drug use and long time military conflict all contribute to the 
high infectious rate of  HIV/AIDS in Myanmar; a prime concern for Chinese 
Health policy. As early as 1992, there were over 100 000 HIV infected people, 
and the number quadrupled to around 00 000 in 1996. According to Myanmar 
official figures, 0 000 people aged between 1 and 9 were infected in 200, 
but many believe there have been likely more infected.17 To make the situation 
worse, the Myanmar military government rejected even non-governmental assis-
tance in combating the spread of  HIV/AIDS. Dr. Hervé Isambert, the program 
manager of  Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), points out that the Myanmar mili-
tary government has imposed many constraints on their work in Mon and Karen 
states, from which the French sector of  MSF was forced to withdraw in 2006. 
Fearing potential intervention and disclosure of  the internal chaos of  Myanmar 
to the outside world, the Myanmar military government remains suspicious of  
such foreign organizations.18 Yet with increasing economic interactions between 
China and Myanmar and the spread of  HIV/AIDS along the Chinese-Myanmar 
borders the issue becomes more difficult to conceal. Responding to this rising 
threat, China passed the Yunnan AIDS Prevention and Control Law in 200 by 
providing condoms in many public places where migrants are highly concentrat-
ed.19 However, according to the 00 China Health Yearbook, Yunnan still has 
the third highest AIDS’ incidence and mortality rate in China,0 indicating that 
Myanmar remains a serious challenge for China, particularly in Yunnan Province.
Regional Interests—Crack Down on Cross-Border Gambling
Cross-border gambling is another factor in enabling the diffusion of  AIDS, drug 
trafficking and money laundering across the China-Myanmar border. Since gam-
bling is illegal in China, many Chinese routinely travel to Macau, one of  China’s 
 Martin Smith, Burma’s Ethnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral Problem in the Regional Context, in: Peter Carey 
(ed.), Burma—The Challenge of  Change in a Divided Society, London 1997, p. 11.
17 David Fullbrook, Myanmar’s HIV/AIDS security threat, in: Asia Times Online, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Southeast_Asia/HL02Ae02.html> (02/12/2006).
18 Hervé Isambert, Why the French section of  MSF has ended its activities in Myanmar, MSF article, <http://www.
msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=61E1EB-0DF-C82-2770E897606F08&component=toolkit.
article&method=full_html> (0/0/2006).
19 See the website of  China AIDS, <http://www.china-aids.org/english/News/News27.htm> (0/02/200).
0 Ministry of  Health of  the People’s Republic of  China, 2006 China Health Year Book, <http://www.moh.gov.cn/
open/statistics/year2006/p28.htm> (29/12/2006), p. 28.
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special administrative regions, seeking fun. However, not only Macau, but also 
the border regions of  Myanmar such as Mong La and Maijuyang have developed 
into gambling paradises for many Chinese. In 00, the Chinese government 
claimed that, in response, 80 of  these casinos near China-Myanmar borders were 
forced to cease operation, satellite channels for online gambling were blocked 
and visas for Chinese to Myanmar became highly restricted. However, despite 
these restrictions, Wang, a former casino employee in Maijuyang, claims “what-
ever you need we can take care of, gambling, drugs, girls—all of  which can be 
arranged.” Indeed, this elucidates the difficulty of  controlling the border areas 
for the Myanmar military government and the Chinese government, which, at 
the time, is more concerned with fighting local insurgences such as the Kachin 
army. Despite these difficulties, China continues to launch further counter-mea-
sures against border gambling operations by cutting off  electricity, water and 
telecommunication to the casinos on the China-Myanmar borders, where, com-
pared to 200, only 28 out of  19 remain in business. Because of  the likelihood 
that some of  the casinos will go underground, it can be expected that China will 
continue to keep a close eye on the China-Myanmar border areas.
Regional Interests—Dealing with Drug Trafficking
Part of  Myanmar is known as the Golden Triangle producing great amounts 
of  opium, heroin and amphetamines for the world drug market, for which the 
Chinese-Myanmar borders have been one of  the major drug trafficking routes. 
Many local insurgencies, such as the Kokant Alliance Army (Shan State, Region 
I), United Wa State Army (Shan State, Region II), National Democratic Alliance 
Army (Shan State, Region IV), Mongu National Protection Army (Shan State, 
Mongu), New Democratic Army (Kachin State, Region I) and Kachin Protec-
tion Army (Shan and Kachin State), are involved in the planting, production and 
transportation of  drugs. These local insurgencies are all located in Shan and 
Kachin States, which share the border with China and Thailand and China and 
India, respectively. Although the total hectares of  opium and poppy cultivation 
in Myanmar have sharply decreased from 16 800 in 199 to 27 700 in 2007 and 
some local insurgencies such as the United Wa State Army have expressed their 
determination to cease drug cultivation, the figures increased once again in 2007 
 Casino bordering SW China closed due to crackdown on gambling in China, in: People’s Daily Online, <http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/20007/0/eng200070_1927.html> (0/07/200).
 Chinese players try their luck at Myanmar casinos, in: Taipei Times, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archi
ves/2007/10/0/2008178> (0/10/2007).
 China wins big in crackdown on border casinos, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKPEK02920070
17?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0> (17/0/2007).
 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN cooperation against illicit drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: Asian Perspective, 
No. 2/2006, pp. 102–10.
 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Myanmar’s Wa: Likely losers in the opium war, in: Asia Times Online, <http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FA2Ae06.html> (2/01/200).
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contrary to the continuous fall in the previous seven years. Shan State is given 
particular attention because it accounts for 92 per cent of  total opium and poppy 
cultivation in Myanmar in 2007,27 arousing the concern of  Myanmar’s neighbors. 
Worse still, is the evolution of  China from a drug transit country to a consumer 
market. The drug-addicted population in China was only 18 000 in 1991, but the 
number had risen to 900 000 by 2001.28 Indeed, cracking down on drug traffick-
ing is not only in the interest of  China, but also of  Thailand and other ASEAN 
members.
Given the aforementioned regional concerns, China has attempted to safeguard 
the stability in Myanmar. Fearing the collapse of  Myanmar into a failed state in 
which the spread of  AIDS, cross-border gambling and drug trafficking are inten-
sified, China has rejected any international intervention which, as demonstrated 
in the cases of  Iraq and Afghanistan, have the propensity to produce the oppo-
site results of  what the intervening country had intended to achieve.
Strategic Interests—a Free Route
China regards Myanmar as an important geo-strategic country mainly because of  
concerns of  a potential Myanmar blockade in the Malacca Strait. According to 
Tang Wenlin, China pays close attention to the development of  its relations with 
Southeast Asian countries because, in case the Malacca Strait were blocked in a 
potential conflict in Taiwan, the Indochina Peninsula would become the only free 
route between China and the Bay of  Bengal.29 Adding to this the fact that over 
8 per cent of  oil coming to China currently passes through the Malacca Strait,0 
it becomes apparent that China would find it necessary to diversify its import-
ing route. Upon consideration of  its geographical proximity, Myanmar naturally 
becomes the most suitable country through which to transfer oil and natural 
gas from Africa and the Middle East to China. Indeed, construction of  an oil 
pipeline between Myanmar’s Sittwe, a city next to the Bay of  Bengal, and China’s 
Kunming has started in 2007 with a forthcoming natural gas pipeline being 
constructed sometime thereafter. In addition, China reached an agreement with 
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar and 
Thailand, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/2007-opium-SEAsia.pdf> (10/10/2007), p. 1.
27 Ibid.
28 Chin Ko-lin, Sheldon X. Zhang, The Chinese Connection: Cross-border Drug Trafficking between Myanmar and 
China, Final Report for the US Department of  Justice, <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2182.pdf> 
(0/07/2007).
29 See the comment of  Tang Wenlin, in: Ming Pao Daily, 18/11/2007. Tang is the director of  Southeast Asia Research 
Center, Guangxi University.
0 The risk of  Malacca Strait and China’s strategy on energy, in: The Sun (Hong Kong), 12/0/2006.
 Construction of  China-Myanmar oil pipeline expected to start this year, in: Xinhua News, <http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2007-0/21/content_6008196.htm> (21/0/2007). The gas pipeline will carry 170 billion cubic meters 
from Middle East to China in the next 0 years.
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ASEAN to build the Trans-Asian Railway, one line of  which will travel from Chi-
na’s Kunming to Myanmar on its journey to the final destination of  Singapore. 
Although the Trans-Asian Railway will be completed as late as 201, through its 
conception, China shows its interests to develop a new transport line from Myan-
mar that will allow China to import not only oil and natural gas, but also other 
materials on a safer route and forego the passage through the potentially risky 
Malacca Strait. Therefore, China has to keep Myanmar free from international 
intervention in order to prevent the infiltration of  foreign influence in the region, 
which could block the remaining free and shorter transport routes between China 
and Africa as well as the route between China and the Middle East.
Strategic Interests—Stability
Considered as indispensable strategic positions in maintaining territorial integrity, 
the Chinese border areas have aroused great concern, especially with the recent 
American attention towards Myanmar. M. Taylor Fravel finds that China treats its 
frontier areas as “buffer zones” or “protective screens” in which ethnic unrest is 
“a source of  direct conflict with neighbors or pretext for external intervention,” 
potentially triggering unrest in other areas, including the inland areas. These eth-
nic conflicts have long been a serious problem for Myanmar which is composed 
of   ethnic groups, seven states for non-Burmese groups and seven divisions 
within core Burmese groups. Missionary scholars even suggest that one of  the 
ethnic groups, Karen, “were a lost tribe of  Israel.” Some of  these Burmese eth-
nic minorities share the same Tibeto-Burmese language system with one of  the 
China’s ethnic groups, the Yi living in the Yunnan Province. Thus, China must 
make two strategic considerations in dealing with the ethnic conflict in Myanmar 
as to the question whether (i) intensified ethnic conflicts, such as local Myanmar 
insurgencies declaring independence, will pose a trigger-effect near the China-
Myanmar borders, particularly in the Yunnan Province, and, whether (ii) the 
ethnic conflicts in Myanmar will lead to foreign intervention and an international 
presence afterwards? It would appear that China has no choice but to tolerate the 
Myanmar military government, even though it has brought China many troubles 
and been a significant source of  pressure, because of  its ability to keep various 
local insurgencies in peace through the cease-fire treaty, through which China can 
prolong the stability in its border areas.
 Trans-Asian Railway, in: Ming Pao Daily, 09/0/2007.
 M. Taylor Fravel, Securing borders: China’s doctrine and force structure for frontier defense, in: Journal of  Strategic 
Studies, August–October 2007, p. 711.
 Ian Holliday, National unity struggles in Myanmar: A degenerate case of  governance for harmony in Asia, in: Asian 
Survey, No. /2007, p. 8.
 Ashley South, Karen Nationalist Communities: The Problem of  Diversity, in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
No. 1/2007, p. 8.
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International Interests—Assurance to Neighboring Countries
The Chinese non-intervention policy not only serves to keep Chinese borders 
free of  foreign influence, but also helps to convince neighboring countries of  
China’s peaceful development. By holding firm to the non-intervention policy—
meaning that China will not manipulate the affairs of  other countries—China 
shows its commitment to not causing any harm or promoting any conflict in 
the region. Indeed, the Chinese non-intervention policy seems to be a prompt 
response to the idea of  a “Chinese threat” held by many Southeast Asian coun-
tries. By signing the Treaty of  Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN and rec-
ognizing the non-intervention clause, China has demonstrated its sincerity and 
commitment to peaceful and harmonious inter-Asian relations and became the 
first non-ASEAN country to sign the treaty. Through this policy, China assures 
its neighbors that, although China’s national strength is growing, China has no 
intention to alter the current regional order and status quo. The case of  Myanmar 
will serve as the testing ground for the consistency of  Chinese action with its 
non-intervention policy. If  China is forced to intervene in the affairs of  Myanmar 
due to mounting international pressure, many of  its neighboring countries will, 
indeed, question whether Chinese action was a forced response to external pres-
sures and internal turmoil in the region or rather the start of  a Chinese initiative 
to dominate regional affairs as it grows more powerful. The pressure from the 
west for intervention and China’s reluctance highlights the conflicting interests 
between the west and China in the handling of  Myanmar. The West regards 
intervention towards Myanmar as a humanitarian issue; however, China consid-
ers the intervention as an issue of  China’s image, position and commitment to its 
neighboring countries.
International Interests—Counteracting the American Unilateral Move
For China, recent American trends towards unilateralism and unilateral interven-
tion pose a particularly credible threat that America will possibly intervene in Tai-
wan, North Korea, and Myanmar because of  the countries’ potential influence in 
shaping regional order. Indeed, the worst scenario for Chinese leaders would be 
the expansion of  American containment policy from Japan, Taiwan and Australia 
to North Korea and Myanmar.
However, China is not alone in facing the threat of  a unilaterally acting America. 
Indeed, the expansion of  NATO, the series of  Color Revolutions near its border, 
the American unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 
and the implementation of  an American Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East-
ern Europe all pose serious threats to Russia. Furthermore, the American support 
of  Pakistan threatens the national security of  India. American regard of  Pakistan 
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as a major non-NATO ally because of  its support in combating terrorism has en-
abled the country to purchase American F-16 fighter jets, further threatening the 
fragile regional security balance between India and Pakistan. This American move 
is naturally regarded as an intervention in the Indo-Pakistani conflict; a move 
strongly opposed by Indian leaders out of  concern for a maintained balance of  
power in South Asia.
However, although Russian and Indian responses to American regional influence 
and intervention have been widely neglected, China’s non-intervention policy 
towards Myanmar has caught the world spotlight. Not only the Chinese, but also 
the Russian and Indian responses to Myanmar reflect their dissatisfaction with 
American unilateralism and interference. The Chinese and Russian joint veto to 
the American-sponsored resolution in the UN Security Council criticizing human 
rights conditions in Myanmar on 12 January 2007, is particularly significant as it 
marked not only the fifth time that China had cast a veto in the Security Council, 
but, perhaps more significantly, the first time in  years that China and Rus-
sia had cast a double veto. Since the 1990s, the Chinese and Russian statements 
on a multipolar world and non-intervention policy had been regarded merely 
as rhetorical since neither country carried out any substantive policy to limit 
or counteract the American influence;7 however, beginning with the dual veto 
China and Russia have shown their resolve to put their non-intervention policy 
into real practice. On a visit to Myanmar during 19–21 January 2007, Indian Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, commented on the Sino-Russian joint 
veto, “that [it] is their internal matter … we don’t believe in exporting our ideol-
ogy. We are a democracy and we want democracies to flourish, but it is for them 
to decide,” thus giving implicit support to the veto against America’s resolution.8 
The Indian response should be a surprise to the United States not only because 
India is the biggest democratic country in the world, but also because the United 
States has developed intimate relations with India through military exercise, arma-
ment sales and the controversial nuclear cooperation over the last years.9 Indeed, 
China and India have regional interests in Myanmar; however, the consistent 
Chinese, Russian and Indian reactions to Myanmar can also be seen as protests 
towards the growth of  American unilateralism.
 Peter Baker, Bush: U. S. to sell F-16s to Pakistan, in: The Washington Post, 26/0/200.
7 Richard Weitz, Why Russia and China have not formed an anti-American alliance, in: Naval War College Review, 
No. /200, p. 9.
8 C. S. Kuppuswamy, India-Myanmar relations: visit of  the External Affairs Minister, South Asia Analysis Group—
Paper no. 2112, < http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers22/paper2112.html> (26/01/2007).
9 India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty yet, but the United States still offers nuclear cooperation to India, 
including the transfer of  nuclear technology and nuclear materials.
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China’s “Non-intervention Policy”
China’s non-intervention policy has become a controversial topic not only be-
cause the debate between China and the West regarding the Chinese underlying 
rationale, but also because ambiguities in the definition of  non-intervention. 
Karin Fierke studies diplomatic interventions in more than military terms and 
such also addresses the moral, legal, economic, cultural and therapeutic aspects 
which cover just war theory, humanitarian intervention, armament sales and cul-
tural propaganda.0 Clearly, Chinese leaders have a different approach toward the 
understanding of  intervention. Generally, Chinese leaders regard non-interven-
tion policy as non-interference in the internal affairs of  other countries; however, 
Chinese leaders have never clarified the means of  intervention: whether they be 
political, economic or military. It is unlikely that China would accept any form 
of  military intervention because of  “its past humiliation under western imperial-
ism” and its belief  that the country “will not impose its will on others and will 
not allow others to impose theirs on China.” Yet the question remains; should 
political or economic influence be regarded as means of  intervention under the 
Chinese non-intervention policy? Jason Qian and Anne Wu differentiate between 
Chinese and Western approaches on Darfur by the fact that “China’s strategy is 
one of  humanitarian and development aid plus influence without interference, in 
0 Karin M. Fierke, Diplomatic Interventions: Conflict and Change in a Globalizing World, Basingstoke 200.
 Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework of  Analysis, London 1999, p. 108.
Discussant Nikolas Win Myint from the United Nations
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contrast to the West’s coercive approach of  sanctions plus military intervention.” 
Given these differences in intervention approaches—or even: ideologies—it is 
necessary to distinguish between ‘soft’ interventions like humanitarian and devel-
opment aid and ‘hard’ interventions like economic sanctions and military interfer-
ence, the former of  which being more a matter of  political and economic influ-
ence than intervention. Given this definition and upon examination of  China’s 
policy measures along its border, it becomes clear that China’s relationship with 
Myanmar is one of  soft interventions. Thus, China’s non-intervention policy does 
not entirely preclude intervention of  any form.
Soft Intervention—Cross Border Missions
China’s soft intervention in Myanmar is, in many ways, a natural response to drug 
trafficking along China-Myanmar borders. To a certain extent, China is forced to 
intervene in Myanmar because the Burmese military government is only able to 
control some 92 out of  the total 1997 kilometers long border with China while 
the other borders remain under the control of  various local insurgencies. For 
China, this means that the Burmese military government cannot enforce suf-
ficient border control measures to crack down on drug trafficking near China’s 
border. With many local insurgency groups striving for autonomy, China will not 
be able to rely on the Myanmar military government to manage the affairs of  
local insurgencies. Therefore, besides cutting off  electricity and telecommunica-
tions to local insurgents such as in the case of  Mong La, China has developed 
programs with the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of  the 
Greater Mekong Sub-Region to offer police training to Myanmar and Laos. With 
the cooperation of  Myanmar and Laos, it has even operated cross-border police 
missions to suppress drug trafficking and Chinese police in Yunnan even pro-
vides training to the police in Myanmar. In the case of  Myanmar, hard interven-
tion, like economic sanctions or military intervention would not help to improve 
the situation since the source of  the drugs comes from various local insurgents 
rather than the military government of  Myanmar. Due to its inability to exert 
control over local pockets of  resistance and insurgency, China is forced to con-
duct some soft interventions along the Chinese-Myanmar borders. If  China does 
not take any action, drug trafficking might become a disastrous regional problem.
Soft Intervention—Shaping Foreign Policy
Apart from its involvement in the country’s internal affairs, China has also played 
a great role in shaping the foreign policy of  the Myanmar military government. 
 Jason Qian, Anne Wu, China’s Delicate Role on Darfur, in: The Boston Globe, 2/07/2007.
 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN cooperation against illicit drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: Asian Perspective, 
No. 2/2006, pp. 11–116.
 Ibid, pp. 108–111.
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China is believed to be largely responsible for the rapprochement between 
Myanmar and North Korea on 26 April 2007. After terminating its relations with 
North Korea in 198 when the South Korean president was nearly assassinated 
by a North Korean plot in Rangoon, diplomatic relations were finally restored 
in April last year. Indeed, it was the Chinese ambassador to the Union of  Myan-
mar, Guan Mu, which accompanied the North Korea delegation after the meet-
ing with Myanmar, two hours after the restoration deal had been announced. 
Since North Korea is eager to import rice from Myanmar and Myanmar is eager 
to break its international isolation, the rapprochement reveals the mutual inter-
est of  both countries in a symbiotic relationship. However, China must not be 
overlooked as a beneficiary as well. The development of  a stable and gradually 
open Myanmar which can foster a peaceful regional order is certainly in China’s 
best interest. In examining China’s effort to break the isolation and encouraging 
Myanmar’s trade with other countries, Feng Zhongping explains that China could 
not accept measures of  hard-intervention such as regime change by military 
means because, “China thinks the most important thing is not to organize elec-
tions, but to help develop the economy.”
Soft Intervention—Pressuring the Myanmar Military Government
However, Chinese soft-intervention is not limited to the realm of  economics and 
international trade, but also can be seen in the critical role the Chinese govern-
ment played in convincing the Myanmar military government not to suppress 
the mass demonstrations in Rangoon in September 2007. Before the outbreak 
of  mass demonstrations, China’s State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met with the 
Burmese Foreign Minister, and special envoy of  Than Shwe, U Nyan Win, Chair-
man of  the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Noticing the grow-
ing social discontent over economic hardships in Myanmar, Tang addressed the 
issue saying that “Myanmar could resume domestic stability in the earliest time 
possible.”7 Furthermore, one Southeast Asian diplomat commented on China’s 
action privately saying that the Myanmar military government was under im-
mense pressure from the Chinese government and this was the main reason that 
the Myanmar military government remained extremely reserved in its reaction to 
the mass demonstrations.8 Underlying China’s action in the mass demonstrations 
was the knowledge that any radical response of  the Myanmar military govern-
ment will not only affect Myanmar, but also the Chinese government. Chinese 
 Xinhuanet, <http://big.xinhuanet.com/gate/big/news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-0/27/content_608.htm>, 
(27/0/2007).
 Quentin Peel, China’s path through the dense jungle of  diplomacy, in: Financial Times, 27/09/2007.
7 State Councilor Tang Jiaxua Meets with Special Envoy of  SPDC Chairman of  Myanmar in the website of  Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/277/279/
t61.htm> (1/09/2007).
8 Ming Pao Daily, 2/09/2007.
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leaders perceive the situation in Darfur to be similar, which caused some Western 
diplomats to propose a boycott for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Although 
believing that the social chaos and political instability in Myanmar should be the 
internal affairs of  the Myanmar military government, China is aware of  the effect 
of  this instability on its own domestic politics and thus, the issues of  Myanmar 
have become part of  Chinese affairs as well.
Although China ultimately failed to stop the Myanmar military government’s 
bloody suppression of  the mass demonstrations, China still attempted to intro-
duce remedies to ease the anxious political atmosphere in Southeast Asia. First, 
China encouraged the Myanmar military government to accept the visit of  the 
UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari. Regarded as one of  the most closed and 
isolated countries in the world, Myanmar certainly did not easily grant permission 
for the visit of  a UN special envoy. When discussing the Myanmar issues with the 
Chinese government, the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, commented 
that China placed enormous pressure on the Myanmar military government to 
accept the visit of  the UN special envoy. This can clearly be seen in the fact that 
the Chinese ambassador to the Union of  Myanmar, Guan Mu, picked up the UN 
special envoy at the airport in Rangoon.9 Under Chinese pressure, the Myanmar 
military government even appointed Labor Minister Aung Kyi to hold a dialogue 
with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.0 Chinese soft-interventions above 
are, in fact, necessary in order to safeguard its strategic and international inter-
ests in Myanmar. China could not allow the situation in Myanmar to deteriorate 
further simply because of  the fear of  international intervention, particularly from 
the America. Because of  its rejection of  hard interventions, China has to use 
other means to stabilize the social order in Myanmar.
Conclusion
Clearly the motives behind China’s non-intervention policy are not simply eco-
nomic since there exists a plethora of  reasons for China to ensure stability in 
Myanmar. However, China certainly does not believe that hard intervention could 
solve the problems in Myanmar. Still, a failed Myanmar will pose even more chal-
lenges to the region. It is thus understood that China is willing to defend Myan-
mar from international intervention because of  its own strategic interests in the 
region such as the maintenance of  both, a free transport corridor into the Indo-
china Peninsula and a buffer to China’s borders. However, China’s non-interven-
tion policy is not a regional policy. It is, indeed, part of  the new world order of  
9 BBC Chinese.com, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_7020000/newsid_702000/7020.stm> 
(29/09/2007).
0 Ming Pao Daily, 1/10/2007.
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China, in partnership with India and Russia, constraining the growing American 
unilateralism.
By considering the above-mentioned interests of  China in Myanmar, we can un-
derstand the inconsistency of  China’s stance on international intervention. China 
can accept international intervention in Kosovo, East Timor and Lebanon under 
the aegis of  the UN since China does not have regional and strategic interests 
there. Besides, as long as those international interventions are carried out by the 
UN, China feels more comfortable as those interventions are not dominated by 
particular great powers for expanding their spheres of  influence. In contrast, any 
political change and instability in Darfur will definitely upset China’s energy secu-
rity, while those in North Korea and Myanmar will even threaten China’s strate-
gic planning and national security which is why China blocked the international 
interventions in these places, but not others.
China’s non-intervention policy is based on the principle of  non-interference 
by military means, yet this does not preclude the fact that China still conducts 
soft-interventions in order to solve regional problems in the Myanmar region. 
Indeed, similar Chinese soft-interventions have also taken place in Darfur and 
North Korea. China has long been accused of  supporting authoritarian regimes 
through its non-intervention policy; however, in the case of  Myanmar, China has 
already developed contact with opposition groups not supporting the authori-
tarian government of  Myanmar, mostly to ensure Chinese interest in case of  
the government’s fall. Non-intervention policy neither means that there is no 
intervention nor that China supports the current regime. Rather, China has urged 
the Myanmar military government to develop its economy, solve ethnic conflicts 
and reestablish a democratic system. A stable Myanmar will be in the best interest 
of  China. To be clear, however, China’s non-intervention policy serves it various 
interests in and through Myanmar irrespective of  the particular regime or leader-
ship there.
 Ming Pao Daily, 26/09/2007.
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Regional Security Dynamics in the Middle East
The Problematic Search for a Regional Leader
Farhan Hanif  Siddiqi
Introduction
The paper is based on an analytical exposition of  “potential” regional leaders in 
the Middle Eastern region. The following seven countries compete for regional 
leadership in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, Egypt and 
Turkey. Before moving on to an exhaustive analysis of  these countries, it is im-
portant to clarify the distinction between regional leaders and regional hegemons.
The concept of  regional hegemony implies domination and coercion. It exempli-
fies a scenario where one or more than one state exercises its power over other 
states in the region. One should note that the crucial term here is domination. An 
inherently negative term, domination militates against the idea of  regional peace 
and long term stability. Regional hegemons, by exercising their power over other 
states, destroy the basis of  cooperation and stability giving way to an insecure 
regional order with the potential and risk of  war as an imminent reality and fact 
of  life.
On the other hand, a regional leader is not a regional hegemon and thus by ex-
tension does not dominate, uses force or coerces other states in the region. The 
essential quality of  a regional leader is its acceptance as a leader by other states 
in the region. Such an acceptance is not pragmatically induced nor a function 
of  band-wagoning. Rather it involves an intersubjective understanding of  each 
other’s identity and a consequent relocation of  a common framework of  action 
and policies. The European Union here is a classical example. The regional leader, 
whose stability and prosperity is essentially linked with the regional sub-system, 
strives to maintain a close working relationship with other countries that in turn 
recognize and accept the leader as legitimate.
With such a conceptual benchmark between the essential qualities of  a regional 
leader and a regional hegemon clarified, it is possible to move towards an analy-
sis of  the Middle Eastern region. Any analysis of  regional leaders in the Middle 
East region needs to invoke the argument that since regional leaders are benign 
entities, their potential as leaders requires an analysis of  not only their respective 
military strength, which is indispensable for regional leaders, but also their inter-
nal strength as strong states with political stability and democratic governance. 
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The normative framework of  political stability and democratic governance in the 
post-Cold War era and specially the War on Terror has acquired immense im-
portance as a criterion to judge the political development of  nation-states. States 
which measure up to such a criterion are privileged compared to states which 
range from the quasi-democratic to outright tyrannical governments; the latter 
being a reality for most states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Israelis, for 
example, continue to emphasize that they are the only democracy in the Middle 
East, which bestows them an advantage over the monarchical kingdoms and dic-
tatorships which litter the Middle Eastern socio-political landscape.
In addition, to the regional and domestic dynamics, the search for a regional 
leader in the Middle East is mediated by the variable of  international security. 
International security impacts on the rise of  regional leaders in the Middle East 
with respect to three issues: the War on Terror against Al-Qaeda, the alleged 
nuclear weapons program of  Iran and the democratization of  the Middle Eastern 
countries. The salience of  the three issues is directly interwoven with the role of  
the United States as the foremost military superpower in the world and its pro-
pensity for agenda setting.
It will be argued, that the three variables combined—that is, domestic, regional 
and international security—makes it difficult for the rise of  regional leaders in 
the Middle East. Unfortunately, in the Middle East, the contemporary security 
epitome is tainted with regional hegemons, including Israel and Iran, whose 
regional ambitions contradict rather than complement each other. The transfor-
mation in roles from regional hegemons to regional leaders is what is required 
in the contemporary Middle Eastern security structure to guarantee peace and 
development in the longer run. Such a transformation entails, amongst other 
things, an intersubjective acceptance of  each other’s identities and interests. The 
monstrosity of  the said task, that is, the intersubjective domain of  shared under-
standing attests to the problematic of  searching for regional leaders in the Middle 
East. Though Egypt and Israel with different cultures and belief  systems have 
come close to each other since the Camp David Accords (1979), and the current 
Syria-Israel talks on peace between the two countries stand as an additional good 
example, the prospects for a regional leader to emerge still look dim if  one takes 
into account the rivalries and conflicts between the different states of  the region.
In addition to the three levels of  analysis, ethnic peculiarities play an equally 
important role in the Middle Eastern region. The Arab Middle East includes 
within its fold powerful non-Arab states, which have challenged and continue to 
challenge the Arab world for supremacy in the region. Iran, Israel and Turkey, 
Regional Security Dynamics 
in the Middle East: The 
Problematic Search for a 
Regional Leader

 
New Faces Conference 2008
the three major contenders for regional supremacy are non-Arab, a factor that in 
myriad ways militates against their propensity to become the leading countries of  
the region. With such an analytical framework, the article is structured along the 
following lines: the framework of  regional security will be analyzed in the first 
instance to introduce the reader to the security dynamics at play between differ-
ent countries in the region. It is important in the first instance to understand how 
the Middle Eastern security system is structured and how different countries are 
placed in it. Secondly, international security imperatives will be detailed upon 
to assess the impact on the rise of  regional leaders. The last section will look at 
domestic security determinants with reference to the establishment of  democ-
racy, fundamental freedoms and protection of  minorities within the said Middle 
Eastern states.
Regional Security in the Middle East: Definition and Framework
In security terms, ‘region’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of  
security relations exists among a set of  states whose fate is that they have been 
locked into geographical proximity with each other. Buzan further contends that 
regional security dynamics can be best understood with respect to the pattern of  
amity and enmity among states. Basing his argument on constructivist lines in 
which identities play an influential role in determining the security structure of  a 
region, the pattern of  amities and enmities in the Middle East in the postwar era 
were shaped by the presence of  Israel, which was a cause of  inter-Arab unity.
The virtual hostility of  Arab countries to the existence of  Israel dominated 
regional politics in which Egypt and Syria emerged as two leading countries of  
the region. Their defeat at the hands of  Israel in the Six-Day War of  June 1967 
heralded a new regional security complex whereby Egypt, in the post-Nasser era, 
abandoned hostility towards Israel in favor of  a more amicable relationship with 
the Jewish State. The Egyptian U-turn in the 1970s along with the Islamic Revo-
lution in Iran in 1979 paved the way for a newer hybrid mix of  both amities and 
enmities.
A geographical delineation of  amities and enmities in the Middle Eastern region 
can be constructed as follows: In the Persian Gulf  region, Iran, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia are the principal states with Saudi Arabia and Iraq acting in unison against 
revolutionary Iran since the 1980s. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was perceived 
as a threat by the Wahhabis of  Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand, it sent jitters 
into neighboring Iraq, home to a Shia majority. The result was an eight-year war 
1 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, 
CO, 1991.
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between Iran and Iraq, the longest in the post-war era, resulting in the deaths of  
a million people.
Iran and Saudi Arabia locked horns with each other as Wahhabi Islam contended 
with Shia Islam for predominance and influence in the region. Saudi Arabia 
became one of  the principal suppliers of  arms and armaments to the regime of  
Saddam Hussain during the Gulf  War between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988). Rivalry 
between the two states was also manifest in Afghanistan in the 1990s, where Saudi 
support to the Taliban regime was seen as detrimental to the interests of  the Ira-
nian State. This rivalry was also played out, unfortunately, in Pakistan, where sectar-
ian parties emerged, boosted by their respective client states, that is, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, leading to much sectarian violence and bloodshed especially in the 1990s.
Of  these three states, it must be noted that Saudi Arabia stands in a weaker posi-
tion compared to Iraq and Iran mainly due to its lack of  military strength. The 
Saudi State remains dependent for its security on the United States and has not 
engaged in any major combat operations against another regional state. Iraq, on 
the other hand, is going through a transitional phase as it attempts to restructure 
its society and politics after the fall of  Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its potential as a 
regional power, thus, is increasingly circumscribed. Iran retains great potential be-
cause of  the sheer size of  the state as well as its military strength, but its domestic 
politics along with its ethnic and sectarian identity tends to prevent its rise as a 
regional leader acceptable to other states of  the region.
Iran’s ethnic and sectarian identity (Persian and Shia), stands in contradistinction 
to the predominant Sunni and Arab states in the region. During the 1990s, the 
Taliban movement in Afghanistan of  which Saudi Arabia was one of  the major 
supporters—one of  the three countries besides Pakistan and the UAE which had 
recognized the Taliban regime—was denounced by Ayatollah Khamenei in 1998 
as juhul, a Quranic term meaning “ignorant”. On other occasions, moreover, 
Khamenei has asserted that Persian, not Arabic is the “true” language of  Islam. 
This dichotomy between Persian-Arab/Arab-Persian thus has been a constant ir-
ritant in Iran-Arab relations stymieing the growth of  Iran as a regional leader.
The Persian Gulf  can be contrasted with the Eastern Mediterranean consisting 
of  Israel, Syria and Egypt as the principal states. Egypt has since the 1970s come 
closer to Israel while Syria finds itself  locked in a strategic rivalry with the state 
2 Fred Halliday, Iran and the Middle East: Foreign Policy and Domestic Change, in: Middle East Report, Autumn 2001, 
pp. 2–7.
 Ibid.
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of  Israel, which has played out frequently in Lebanon. Israel is without doubt 
Middle East’s foremost military power as has been demonstrated during the 
1967 and 197 Arab-Israeli Wars. Arab efforts in defeating Zionism have come 
to naught and the Israeli state has geographically expanded at the expense of  its 
Arab neighbors. However, as in the case of  Iran, the non-Arab facet of  Israeli 
identity impacts negatively on its acceptance as a regional leader.
Israel’s status as a regional power was most clearly demonstrated after the 1967 
War when in a matter of  six days, Israel was able to circumvent the supremacy 
of  powerful regional states including Egypt and Syria. Though Egypt has moved 
closer to Israel since the 197 War and a general trend towards rapprochement 
with Israel took shape in the 1990s amongst Arab countries, Israel and its status 
as a regional leader remain in doubt. This is due to its repression of  the Palestin-
ian populace, which makes any move towards better relations between Israel and 
other Arab states a chimera. The Arab-Israeli divide with its historical anteced-
ents bordering on and including religious hostility as well as ethnic differentiation 
make Israel’s position as a regional leader highly precarious.
Syria, on the other hand, retains a pariah status and although Syria under Hafez al-
Asad supported the American-led invasion against Saddam Hussain in 1991 and 
was an integral part of  the Arab-Israeli peace process, relations with Israel—es-
 The process reversed after the initiation of  the Second Intifada in September 2000.
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pecially vis-à-vis Lebanon—cast a negative shadow over its capability as a re-
gional leader. Lastly, Turkey, another non-Arab country, has become a key player 
in contemporary regional dynamics, most specifically in terms of  its interest in 
Iraq with respect to the Kurdish ethnic question. However, Turkish interest in 
the Middle East has remained largely peripheral and the Turkish ruling elite sees 
itself  as part of  a larger European entity in the future.
This is most manifest in the Arab-Israeli dispute in which Turkey has consistently 
adopted a policy of  effective neutrality, with periodic verbal support for the Pal-
estinians. Turkey recognized the state of  Israel in 199 and has never withdrawn 
this recognition. Turkey’s recent overtures to join the European Union are a 
good indicator of  where the state sees itself  in the future. However, the Turkish 
polity is a central part of  the Western security structure in the Middle Eastern 
region and remains important in terms of  the strategic bases that it provides to 
the United States. These bases were utilized effectively during the Second Gulf  
War in 1990–91 as well as in the late stages of  Operation Iraqi Freedom in 200. 
Turkey’s non-interest in the Middle East remains despite the ascendancy of  a new 
government with supposed Islamist tendencies. Prime Minister Recep Tayyib 
Erdoğan has identified Europe as a top priority and introduced reforms which 
paved the way for the opening of  membership talks in October 00.
International Security Dynamics and the Middle East
International security dynamics relative to the Middle East impact in three ways: 
the fight against Al-Qaeda and its various cells, Iran’s nuclear arsenal and the 
democratization of  the undemocratic regimes in the Middle East.
The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 resonat-
ed with the Huntingtonian prediction of  a ‘clash of  civilizations’ between the West 
and Islam. Highly controversial in its formulation and with theoretical and meth-
odological weaknesses, the thesis became a tool to vilify the Arab world as archaic 
in opposition to the civilized and progressive West.7 The clash of  civilizations the-
sis fell flat on the face when Arab states allied themselves with the United States 
rather than Al-Qaeda and did not oppose the American invasion of  Afghanistan, 
although Syria did object to the American invasion of  Iraq in 200. Saudi Arabia 
came under some hefty criticism from conservative elements within the Pentagon, 
 The BBC website does not include Turkey as a Middle Eastern country rather news on Turkey can be found in the 
section on Europe.
6 William Hale, Turkey, in: Yezid Sayigh, Avi Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East, New York, NY, 1997, 
pp. 20–278.
7 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of  Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, New York, NY, 1996.
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as fifteen of  the nineteen hijackers on 9/11 were Saudi citizens. However, on Sep-
tember 12, 2001 Crown Prince Abdullah discreetly shipped an extra nine million 
barrels of  oil to the United States in order to foil the oil price hike in the wake of  
the attacks. Furthermore, a senior Saudi prince donated a gift of  $10 million to 
victims of  the World Trade Center, which was later refused.8 The Saudi gesture 
was a strong reminder that it valued its relationship with the United States rather 
than the Islamists, which were seen as a threat to the Saudi monarchy.
The fight against Al-Qaeda, however, impacts negatively on the state of  Iran, 
which is seen as a supporter of  terrorism by the United States although no 
evidence of  a nexus between the Iranian state and Al-Qaeda exists. On the same 
lines, Syrian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon is equated with the issue of  ter-
rorism, which once again does not bode well for the Syrian state and its regional 
status. However, other countries such as Egypt, Israel and Turkey stand to gain a 
dividend as the War on Terror provides fertile grounds for these states to con-
demn domestic opposition as part of  a wider global agenda which calls for an 
end to extremism and politics of  terrorism at the sub-state level.
Secondly, the issue of  Iran’s nuclear weapons program has also attracted wide 
attention and the United States has been in the forefront of  attempts to curb 
what it believes is Iran’s propensity to develop nuclear weapons. Ironically and 
very surprisingly, an American national intelligence estimate in December 2007 
absolved Iran of  producing nuclear weapons stating that the program had been 
stopped in 200. However, on a recent visit to the Middle East, President George 
W. Bush reminded the Arab world of  the threat which emanates from Iran and its 
revolutionary regime. Iran insists that its nuclear energy is for peaceful purposes 
and that it does not intend to build nuclear weapons, a posture verified by its 
cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The issue, it 
seems, is compounded to a large extent with the ascent in power of  a hard-line 
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who on more than one occasion has called 
for the destruction of  Israel and the West. His regime is thus seen as a threat by 
the United States and Israel. The United Nations Security Council’s unanimous 
vote and passing of  Resolution 180—with Indonesia abstaining—was a further 
blow to Iran’s nuclear program. The sanctions call for the foreign assets of   
Iranian companies to be frozen, and imposes travel bans on five Iranian officials.9
A third interwoven theme along with the threat of  Al-Qaeda and Iran’s nuclear 
program is that of  the democratization of  the Middle East. From Egypt to the 
8 Peter Mansfield, A History of  the Middle East, London 200.
9 UN approves new sanctions in Iran, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/727902.stm> (10/0/2008).
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Arabian Gulf, the Middle East is ruled by leaders, which may be characterized au-
thoritarian and despotic. President Bush in his recent visit to the Middle East called 
for democratic reforms in countries like Egypt as well as the six Persian Gulf  
States.0 The call for democracy was punctuated with the assertion that the demo-
cratic system was the best guarantee in defeating extremism. Furthermore, in his 
meeting with Hosni Mubarak, President Bush expressed hope that Egypt would 
move towards greater democracy. Democracy and democratization have thus be-
come important signposts, which countries in the Middle East cannot ignore. That 
some international pressure exists on states in the Middle East to democratize is 
most evident in the case of  Saudi Arabia which has allowed municipal polls in the 
last three years notwithstanding the country’s refusal to allow for national elections.
Domestic Security Environment and Regional Leaders
The search for a regional leader is complicated further by the domestic security 
environment of  individual states. It is important to understand the internal char-
acter of  states concerned, because weak states with unstable socio-political struc-
tures have more vulnerabilities and therefore face different and more complicated 
security problems, than strong states. Powerful countries or leaders do not only 
possess military strength but also combine this with stable political structures, the 
latter alluding to both formal and substantive democracy including periodic elec-
tions, fundamental freedoms of  citizens and protection of  minorities.
Starting with Saudi Arabia, the state falls far short of  both formal and substan-
tive democracy. Fundamental freedoms remain the prerogative of  the monarchy, 
which rules the country with an iron grip. The little democracy allowed in recent 
years, including holding of  municipal elections, does not hide the simple fact that 
the Saudi State remains largely authoritarian with no participation for the masses 
in the political process. There is still a long way to go before democracy (entailing 
the presence of  political parties and parliamentary politics) is established in the 
Saudi Kingdom.
In Iran, the recent elections and the manipulation of  the electoral process in 
favor of  candidates deemed compatible with President Mahmud Ahmadinejad 
and his conservative policies signifies that in Iranian polity clerical authorities 
dominate the political system. The conservative forces representing the religious 
establishment are well entrenched in sections of  the security forces, the judiciary 
and the constitutional bodies.
0 Bush ends Mid-East tour in Egypt, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/719080.stm> (10/0/2008). 
 Barry Buzan, op. cit. (note ).
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Iraq, a post-conflict society, is going through the travails of  establishing a legiti-
mate order, which is not only democratically stable but also ethnically diverse. 
The present political system dominated by the Kurds and Shia attests to the mul-
tiplicity of  actors in Iraqi society, which need to be co-opted in any socio-political 
set-up. As things stand, it will take years before the Iraqi state acquires a stable set-
up beset as it is by both Al-Qaeda violence against the United States and sectar-
ian violence between Shia and Sunnis.
Israel comes closest to a democracy in the Middle East but its policy with respect 
to the Palestinians is a moot point. Without the resolution of  this erstwhile prob-
lem, Israel’s democracy is at best controversial. The fragility of  Israel’s domestic 
security is a direct consequence of  its relations with the Palestinians. The younger 
generation of  Palestinians under the guise of  Hamas is radically opposed to Is-
rael and its existence as a sovereign state.
Egypt remains in a state of  emergency since 1981. This state of  emergency—one 
of  the longest in the contemporary world—comes at the expense of  Egyptian 
citizens who are denied fundamental freedoms. Hosni Mubarak’s regime has 
to contend with a large amount of  social discontent and the rise of  Islamists 
who pose a major challenge to the incumbent regime. Despite the opposition, 
Mubarak has continued to rule Egypt with an iron hand and restricted the role of  
opposition parties and politicians.
Syria under Hafez al-Assad remained a one-party state and though attempts at 
political liberalization have been made with Bashar al-Assad in power, Syria is not 
much different today than it was before. There has been an Islamic opposition to 
the regime in the name of  the Muslim Brotherhood, which stands outlawed, and 
a major disturbance in the Kurdish region was also witnessed in March 00. 
The Kurds remain politically and socially marginalized and real power in Syria 
rests with the Presidency.
Turkey’s democracy remains precarious at best with the Army exercising a major 
influence over the political process; however, it is Turkey’s treatment of  its minor-
ity Kurdish population that has brought it increased international condemnation. 
The ethnocentricity of  the Turks in the socio-political system has condemned 
the Kurds to the status of  an inferior and lower-ranked group, which has found 
itself  at the mercy of  the Turkish Army not only within Turkey but also Iraq.
 Anders Strindberg, Syria Under Pressure, in: Journal of  Palestine Studies, No. /200, pp. –69.
 Joan Smith/Kocamahhul, In the Shadow of  Kurdish: The Silence of  Other Ethnolinguistic Minorities in Turkey, in: 
Middle East Report Summer 2001, pp. –7.
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Conclusion
The paper has argued that the search for a regional leader in the Middle East is 
problematic. The domestic, regional and international imperatives of  security in 
the Middle East make the quest for regional leaders difficult. All three dimen-
sions, it must be stated, are not mutually exclusive and they tend to combine in 
myriad ways. For example, democratization in the region (a factor in assessing 
domestic security) is directly linked with the global role of  the United States (an 
international security imperative). Similarly, the role of  the United States (an 
international security imperative) elevates the stature of  countries like Israel and 
Saudi Arabia at the same time that it denigrates others such as Iran and Syria (a 
factor in determining regional security). Moreover, the democratic imperative in 
the contemporary world makes it important for regional leaders to embrace de-
mocracy as the only legitimate political system within their socio-political domain. 
To be developed politically is to be democratic. Countries will have to measure 
up to this standard in order to be accepted as regional leaders. Lastly, and most 
importantly, for regional countries to emerge as regional leaders, hegemony in a 
Gramscian sense, that is, implying acceptance rather than outright domination, 
needs to play out. If  such an acceptance is missing the region will be beset with 
rivalries and conflicts leading to increased long term regional instability.
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Working out Gaza: Options for Regional Cooperation and 
the Role of Regional Leaders1
Ksenia Svetlova
Introduction
During the last three years which passed since Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian 
Authorities’ parliamentary elections there has been hardly a day when Gaza has 
not been in the news. The territory has been referred to by the Israeli and inter-
national press as a “ticking bomb,” “on the verge of  explosion,” “wasp’s nest,” 
“ghetto,” and so forth. News from Gaza drew public attention due to latest de-
velopments in the overpopulated 0 kilometers long strip which has always been 
rich of  conflicts and problems. The history of  contemporary Gaza dates back 
to 198, when Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini, tried to proclaim the 
first independent Palestinian state on this territory. Hajj Amin was deported and 
arrested, and eventually the state was never proclaimed. During the next 19 years 
Gaza was ruled by Egypt, being an imposition on Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime 
and posing a security threat to Israel as Palestinian fidayyun (militants) crossed 
easily into Israeli territory, carrying weapons and explosives. Underdeveloped and 
poor, crowded with refugees, Gaza was already on the verge of  explosion as early 
as 1967. The situation aggravated after the Six-Day War when Gaza was occupied 
by the Israeli army and its residents received the peculiar status of  non-citizens 
lacking any political rights whatsoever. During the last two and a half  years that 
have passed since the disengagement by the Israelis in 00, Gaza reached a state 
of  almost impossible dead-lock. In the Middle Eastern context Gaza is not just a 
narrow strip of  land situated between Egypt and Israel. The developments inside 
Gaza not only influence both countries inevitably but also Middle East as a whole 
since the Palestinian question continues to be one of  highest importance. In a 
way, Gaza is the first domino in a regional game: when it falls, it drags the rest of  
the dominoes into a fall.
The goal of  this paper is to display how Gaza did become a regional problem and 
regional responsibility during the second half  of  0th century and how a pos-
sible solution for Gaza might look like. It is argued that only by regional efforts 
and the cooperation between regional leaders a right formula can be found which 
is, then, exemplified by highlighting a few possible directions for this kind of  
cooperation.
1 This paper has been written in summer 2008 and therefore  does not include an analysis of  the recent war in Gaza in 
early 2009.
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The Gloomy Picture
According to a recent report by eight British-based human rights organizations, 
the situation in Gaza strip has reached its worst point since the Six-Day War in 
1967. The report finds that more than 1.1 million people, about 80 percent of  
the population in Gaza, are now dependent on food aid while the overall unem-
ployment is close to 0 percent. The hospitals are suffering from power cuts of  
up to twelve hours a day, and the water and sewage systems have been close to 
collapse, with 0–0 million liters of  sewage pouring into the sea on a daily basis. 
There are no food shortages yet, but some food brands are unavailable or scarce 
and the prices of  food have increased dramatically. At the same time, there is 
no shortage of  weapons and explosives that pour into the strip through under-
ground tunnels that connect the Palestinian part of  Rafah with the Egyptian part 
of  the city. An average of  20–0 Qassam rockets per day had been falling on the 
Israeli town of  Sderot until the truce in June 2008, seriously injuring dozens of  
its residents, among them small children.
In the early months of  2008 more than 10 Palestinians died in air strikes (0 
civilians, 8 combatants and 16 with unknown status), while  others died from 
various diseases, unable to reach Israeli or Egyptian hospitals due to the closure 
of  the border. Since June 2007 so far 10 Palestinian patients died due to the 
Israeli imposed siege on the Gaza strip. The situation in Gaza also affected the 
process of  negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, as both parties 
declared they are not able to negotiate during military escalation.
Gaza: Whose Problem?
After the disengagement in the summer of  00 the Israeli government has 
proclaimed that “Israel is through with Gaza”, yet it seems that Gaza is still very 
much connected to Israel by the umbilical cords of  economic dependence (elec-
tricity, water, gas) as well as military presence and surveillance (air, water and land 
borders). Numerous solutions for Gaza have been discussed, tried and rejected 
until now—from military re-occupation of  Gaza by the Israeli army to power cut-
offs—,yet none of  them seem to have resulted in tangible or successful results. 
According to international law, Israel, as a controlling force on Gaza borders and 
an entity which ruled Gaza for 7 years, still has several obligations and duties 
2 MenaReport, Humanitarian situation in Gaza Strip worst since 1967, <http://www.menareport.
com/en/business/22189>.
 Ynet, הערכה: 400 קסאמים נפלו בנגב מתחילת השנה, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,70,L-0860,00.html>.
 Interview with Sarit Michael, Betzelem. 0/1/2008.
 IMEMC, Two Palestinian patients die due to the Israeli siege on Gaza, death toll due to the siege hits 10, <http://
www.imemc.org/article/2697>.
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towards the population of  Gaza, although there is a legal dispute on the question 
whether Israel is still an occupying force or not. It thus seems that unless the 
situation in Gaza improves, Israel can neither enjoy the security it seeks nor make 
progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, thereby continuing to be attached 
to it by previous obligations.
Yet, Gaza cannot be perceived as merely an Israeli problem. Although Egypt does 
not have any legal duties concerning Gaza, as Israel does, it has much deeper 
historical and religious ties with Gaza population. The dramatic developments 
on the Rafah border in January 2008 proved that Egypt is not immune to de-
velopments in Gaza, too. The border was broken easily by Hamas activists who 
had prepared the breakout for months; nearly half  a million Palestinians poured 
through the hole in the wall into the Egyptian part of  Rafah and Al-Arish. The 
first attempt to stop the flow of  “shoppers” from Gaza was met with angry dem-
onstrations held by members of  the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, following the 
declaration of  the Egyptian president that he would not be able to give the order 
to shoot at hungry people.7
The border was closed only after a few days, during which a few Hamas mili-
tants carrying weapons infiltrated the Sinai Peninsula, while hundreds of  Muslim 
Brotherhood members expressed interest in traveling to Gaza and join the anti-
Israeli resistance. A few Palestinians, all members of  the Hamas, were arrested by 
the Egyptians, and the military wing of  the organization threatened to carry out 
suicide attacks in the Sinai which would have hurt the Egyptian tourism industry 
immensely.
Like Israel, Egypt has been concerned by the growing influence of  Iran in the 
strip. Today, Iranian money pays the salaries of  Hamas leaders and activists, and 
allows for the acquisition of  weapons and explosives. Egypt and Israel are also 
equally concerned by the appearance of  Al-Qaeda cells in Gaza.8
Obviously, Israel and Egypt, Gaza’s immediate neighbors are expected to be 
the most interested parties when it comes to working out any solution for Gaza. 
Other countries in the Middle East are, however, also concerned since no regime 
can stop the flow of  information and horrific pictures from Gaza which are 
broadcast into every living room by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Today Gaza is 
6 Human Rights Watch, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/200/01/1/isrlpa9806.
htm>.
7 Ehud Yaari, Egypt working to contain Gaza, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC0.php?CID=271>.
8 Robert Zelnick, How Iran could help end the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.
zelnick.iranisraelpalestine.html>.
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just as much the problem of  Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan as it is 
a concern of  Egypt and Israel. Moreover, the Gordian knot of  Gaza is way too 
complex and tangled to be untied by one party alone. Therefore, only regional 
cooperation will allow for finding a right and feasible solution for Gaza that will 
eventually put an end to the spiral of  violence and the suffering of  the civilians. 
Also, it is important to understand that the complexity of  problems requires the 
solution to be complex as well, as there are at least a number of  different levels 
which need to be addressed. These need to be approached simultaneously in 
order to achieve some kind of  progress. There is the security level, the political 
level, the humanitarian level and the legal level—a puzzle of  interconnected and 
interdependent pieces which do not allow for an approach addressing one issue 
after the other.
Attitudes and Terminology
In January 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the Palestin-
ian Territories the world was taken by surprise. For the first time in history of  
the contemporary Middle East an Islamic movement had come to power as a 
result of  transparent and democratic elections. Soon after the US tried to topple 
the Hamas regime, unsuccessfully one has to say,9 the international community 
decided to boycott Hamas and forbade Abu Mazen and the Egyptians to negoti-
ate with Hamas as well. This disregarded the fact that Hamas is the sovereign in 
Gaza and in charge of  the lives of  the 1. million Palestinians living there. How-
ever, during the time rumors were constantly spread by various sources that both 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah were holding separate talks with 
Hamas. Only recently the taboo on contacts with Hamas was removed by the 
Americans, although unofficially, which allowed the Egyptians to negotiate a pos-
sible cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. The Egyptians had already quite suc-
cessfully negotiated about the re-establishment of  the border in Rafah and the re-
turn of  the Palestinians to Gaza with Hamas in January 2008. I believe that a new 
standard should be introduced and implemented by the regional powers as well 
as by the international community if  the situation in Gaza remains as it is. This 
would mean that contacts with the Hamas government will be allowed in cases 
where humanitarian aid and the transfer of  Palestinian patients to Israeli territory 
is needed or an exchange of  prisoners is concerned. This measure will not only 
improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza but also prevent Hamas from using 
the rumors on “negotiations” or “contacts” as a bargaining chip. At the same 
time, it is important to stress that the standards of  the international community 
towards Hamas should not be altered and no normal ties be established with the 
organization until its leaders will meet the three Mideast Quartet requirements: (i) 
9 Yediot Ahronot (Israel), /1/2008
Working out Gaza: Options for 
Regional Cooperation and the 
Role of Regional Leaders
1
 
New Faces Conference 2008
recognition of  Israel’s right to exist, (ii) adoption of  previous Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements and (iii) a renouncement of  violence and terrorism.
Economics
Food supplies and electricity: Although there is a legal dispute in Israel on 
whether Gaza is still considered an occupied territory, there is no dispute on the 
question of  basic responsibilities towards the population of  the strip. Currently 
Gaza is dependent on Israeli electricity, gas and humanitarian aid which come 
through Israeli checkpoints, mainly Kerem Shalom. At the same time, Israel is 
a country which has engaged in military conflict with Hamas, the ruling party 
of  Gaza, and has proclaimed the latter as a “hostile entity.” Each act of  hostil-
ity by Hamas is almost immediately followed by a closure of  checkpoints. Food 
supplies rot in trucks and patients do not receive necessary medical treatment. 
Many international humanitarian organizations suggested in the past that the 
situation will improve, if  they were allowed to bring aid into Gaza via the Rafah 
border (controlled by Egyptians) instead of  Karni (controlled by Israelis). The 
Israeli and the Egyptian sides have been reluctant in this respect, suggesting that 
terrorist organizations would use the shipments of  aid in order to bring further 
weapons and explosives into Gaza. However, if  an agreement of  this sort were to 
be reached by Israel, Egypt and the UN—which would safeguard the aid ship-
ments—the risk of  starvation or deprivation of  food in Gaza would be signifi-
cantly reduced.
Neslihan Kaptanoglu from Turkey and Ksenia Svetlova from Israel
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Electricity and fuel: Currently Gaza acquires the electricity from the Israeli 
energy company “Hevrat Hashmal” although it could equally use the cheaper 
electricity coming from Egypt following the Jericho example (Jericho has recently 
started using Jordanian instead of  Israeli electricity0). In principal the Egyptians 
declared that they are in favor of  connecting Gaza to the Rafah district power 
station and the Egyptian electricity grid. Yet, no progress has been made in this 
direction until now.
Freedom of  movement: Although the international economical boycott on 
Gaza began following the Hamas takeover in the strip, most of  its population 
has been denied freedom of  movement for more than seven years now, unable 
to work in Israel, study in the West Bank and visit relatives in Egypt. This tactic 
of  strangulation has not proven to be very effective, a fact which is now recog-
nized by Israeli leaders as well as by the international community. In this context, 
questions of  legality arise. The Syrian government does not recognize Israel 
and provides support to numerous militant organizations, including Hezbollah, 
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Has this fact in any way affected the freedom of  
movement by Syrian citizens? If  the answer is “no,” then it is clear that some sort 
of  agreement must be negotiated for the Palestinians which are currently de-
nied a basic human right. Israelis fear a reopening of  the Rafah crossing, even a 
temporary one intended to channel humanitarian relief  to the strip. According to 
them, an international peace force will not be able to provide for effective sur-
veillance and may eventually also fail to prohibit an Egyptian takeover of  respon-
sibility for Gaza. Regardless of  the stepping down of  the Hamas government in 
Gaza the freedom of  movement between Gaza and the rest of  the world must 
be negotiated immediately and not after another party has come to power. After 
the disengagement in 00 the construction of  an airport and the seaport were 
already discussed and planned. It is recommendable that the parties—Palestinians, 
Israelis and Egyptians—continue the work on these plans as soon as possible. 
Until that moment the mentioned parties as well as Jordan will have to agree on 
the most efficient procedure to allow the residents of  Gaza to cross the borders 
for religious, medical and educational purposes.
Security
Security has always been a key issue for the Israeli side which claims that Gaza 
poses a real threat to southern Israeli cities and villages. During the years of  the 
Intifada, al-Aqsa, dozens of  Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists committed suicide 
bombing inside Israeli cities and currently dozens of  Qassam and Grad rockets 
fall on the Israeli cities of  Sderot and Ashqelon every day. Each act of  hostil-
0 Jordan: Electricity supplies to Jericho begin today, <http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA200802207>.
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ity causes an act of  retaliation by the Israeli army, resulting in numerous deaths, 
injuries, pain and horror, which in turn causes angry reactions and a desire for 
retaliation. The Palestinian president Abu Mazen had many called times for 
calm, urging the military organizations in Gaza to stop “the useless rocket fire 
on Israeli cities.” It is ironic that despite the harsh blockade the only abundant 
supply in Gaza consists of  weapons of  any kind, including artillery weapons 
and rockets. These weapons are acquired by Palestinian militants from Egyptian 
dealers under the blinking eye of  Egyptian border patrols and are brought to 
Gaza by underground tunnels. What if  the stream of  weapons from Egypt were 
to stop? For this to happen all the tunnels had to be closed from the Egyptian 
side of  the Filadelfi route, patrols in this area had to be multiplied and measures 
taken against weapon dealers further sharpened. The economic blockade did not 
have any effect on the continuation of  fighting in Gaza so far and the ability of  
militants firing rockets. It is, however, most likely that the weapon blockade will 
have the desired effect. There is no doubt that Egypt bears the responsibility for 
stopping the flow of  weapons. Not least, since these pass through its territory 
but also because Qassam rockets were fired on Egyptian territory during the riots 
at the Rafah border.
Diplomacy
It is common knowledge that the Hamas leadership consists of  three lev-
els. There is a level of  local leadership, currently represented by Ismail Haniya, 
Mahmud Az-Zahar and Sayiid Siam in Gaza. The second level is the level of  
“foreign” leadership by Khaled Mashaal and Musa Abu-Marzouq—both Hamas 
leaders who reside in Damascus, Syria. The third level comprises Hamas leader-
ship in Israeli jails, which is constantly informed by and consults with leaders 
in Gaza as well as those based in Syria and elsewhere. Different statements and 
attitudes among the leaders of  the Hamas are the reflection of  differences in op-
tions between these three levels of  leaders. One party may proclaim a cease-fire, 
while the other may not agree to it. Neither Israel, nor Egypt or Jordan is able 
to hold negotiations with all three parties, due to a variety of  reasons. Egypt and 
Jordan maintain a very complex relationship with Hamas leaders abroad since 
both countries repeatedly denied them entry visas while Israel’s official stance is a 
general refusal to talk to Hamas. However, there is at least one party which enjoys 
an equally good and stable relationship with all parties involved, that is, Qatar. 
The emirate of  Qatar could hence serve as a regional negotiator for Hamas on 
a variety of  issues ranging from daily necessities of  life such as food delivery to 
more complex issues like the brokerage of  a cease-fire deal. Sheikh Hamad Bin 
Khalifa as-Sani suggested that his country were to perform these negotiations, yet 
 Jihad Watch, Abu Mazen: Little Jihad is over, big Jihad starts, <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/0098.php>.
 
New Faces Conference 2008 4
Panel III: Regional 
Leadership in the Middle 
East – Energy, WMDs and
Terrorism
his suggestion was in vain as many other parties kept fighting for the prestigious 
role of  negotiator. Yet, a neutral country such as Qatar which enjoys normal rela-
tionship with all parties in question could most probably achieve a greater success.
Conclusion
It is certain, that the key to success in finding the right solution for Gaza lays in 
enhancing regional cooperation, building up trust and strengthening transparency 
among the parties, all of  whom share a joint interest. That is, the improvement 
of  the grave situation in the Gaza strip. It is obvious that these developments will 
not take place without a great deal of  international efforts, strong political will 
and concrete steps on the ground. A regional forum on Gaza must be created, in 
which Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Mid-
dle East and beyond will participate. This forum must be formed of  economists, 
security officials, diplomats and representatives of  civil society of  each country. 
A detailed and meticulous timetable has to be worked out after an agreement on 
key issues will be reached. Naturally, such a step might be considered a “normal-
ization” step and, therefore, be renounced by more radical elements among the 
Palestinian Authorities, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt or Jordan. To avoid further 
complications, this forum must strictly focus on Gaza issues, without sliding into 
overall negotiations over other regional issues. This would be a first regional at-
tempt to improve the situation on the ground in the Gaza strip.
It is important to remember that the proposed solution is designed for the par-
ticular situation in which Gaza is still ruled illegally by an Islamist organization 
which came to power as a result of  a military coup. Should the situation change 
and Gaza will again be controlled again by the Palestinian Authorities, the original 
Road map plan—which was accepted by the international community as well as 
by Israelis and Palestinians—must be reactivated.
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The African Peace and Security Architecture
Chrysantus Ayangafac
Introduction
It has become generally accepted—by scholars and laypeople alike—that Africa 
is a dark continent riddled with poverty, corruption and conflict. There is little 
doubt Africa has had its own fair share of  problems, yet these problems are not 
unique to the continent. Rather, Africa’s security and governance predicament 
is an unfortunate result of  a development process upon which the Continent 
has embarked. Development is a conflict-stimulating process. Thus, rather than 
discard African conflicts as irrational ventures, the present political strife on the 
Continent should be viewed as inseparable from the developmental path the 
Continent has chosen. This assertion does not seek to validate conflicts on the 
Continent, nor is it a vindication of  the developmentalist approach with which 
many scholars judge African conflicts. In short: analyses of  peace and security in 
Africa have suffered from reductionism, oversimplification and banal analogies. 
Epithets, anecdotes and caricatures have replaced a sober analysis of  peace and 
security challenges in Africa. Thus, conflict prevention, management and resolu-
tion strategies based on assumptions and generalizations are to be questioned.
In response to bourgeoning demands by the Continent to address its own con-
flicts within the context of  limited capacity, international indifferences and 
disengagement from African conflicts, the African Union (AU) was founded in 
2002 in Durban, South Africa, as the prime African institution to address ques-
tions of  peace and security on the continent. The inception of  the AU in 00 
was greeted with much fanfare and optimism. Though there was skepticism, even 
ardent African pessimists conceded that the AU marked a significant paradigm 
shift in regard to conflict prevention and management, thus providing the conti-
nent with a plausible chance of  solving its problems in the future.
However, while there is consensus that the AU has made some progress in 
enhancing human security on the continent, the persistence of  conflicts in Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia, as well as the recent political crisis in Zimbabwe and 
the repeated outbreak of  violence in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo 
(DRC), seems to suggest that the AU is still grappling with how to solve the 
Continent’s crises. Within this context, one is tempted to ask what one can one 
make of  the AU seven years after its inception? Is there a need to re-organize and 
re-energize the AU given contemporary African and global political and eco-
Chrysantus Ayangafac
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nomic realities? What explains the varied success of  the AU, and how can the AU 
seek to preserve both stability and peace? In tackling these questions, the paper 
seeks to analyze the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It begins by 
interrogating what is APSA; then outlines its central argument and sketches out 
its theoretical framework. The paper then moves on to explore the nature and 
causes of  conflict in Africa. Later it examines how the AU has responded to Af-
rican conflicts, and highlights some of  the challenges faced by the AU in prepara-
tion for an uncertain future.
Overview of the African Peace and Security Architecture
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) refers to a well-ordered 
blueprint and neatly assembled structures, norms, capacities and procedures 
aimed at averting conflict and war, mediating for peace and maintaining human 
security on the Continent. The underlying rationale for APSA is to enable the 
continent to nip a conflict in the bud rather than reacting to conflict. As a result, 
conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution is the underlying principle of  
the APSA. The following institutions constitute the APSA:
– At the center of  this architecture is the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council.
– Panel of  the Wise: The Panel is an advisory, early-warning mechanism aimed 
at stemming conflict before it breaks out. The Panel is composed of  five 
highly-respected African personalities selected by the Chairperson of  the 
Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned.
– Continental Early Warning System: the Continental Early Warning System 
is meant to collect and analyze country data on the basis of  an appropriate 
‘early warning indicators module’ so as to enable early response to a crisis.
– African Standby Force: The African Standby Force (ASF) is a preventive 
mechanism aimed at preventive deployment and humanitarian assistance as 
a means to avert overt conflict. The ASF shall be composed of  a multi-dis-
ciplinary contingent with civilian and military components in the country of  
origin. It will be ready for deployment on short notice for the purpose of  
executing missions decided by the PSC and authorized by the assembly.
– Military Staff  Committee: The Military Staff  Committee is composed of  the 
Chiefs of  Defense Staff  or their representatives (of  the countries serving 
on the PSC). The Committee advises and assists the Council in all questions 
relating to military and security requirements.
1 Article 1 (1) of  the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of  the Peace and Security Council of  the AU.
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– Peace Fund: The Peace Fund is supposed to be made up of  financial appro-
priations taken from the regular budget of  the Union, as well as voluntary 
contributions from member states and other sources within Africa, including 
the private sector (civil society and individuals) and appropriate fundraising 
activities. At the heart of  the APSA is the African Union Peace and Security 
Council.
– African Union Peace and Security Council: a perusal of  articles 6 and 7 of  
the PSC Protocol will reveal that the PSC is the custodian of  peace and 
security on the Continent. The PSC is a standing decision-making organ for 
the prevention, management and resolution of  conflicts. The PSC is a col-
lective security and early-warning group that facilitates timely and efficient 
response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. According to article  of  
the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council is composed of  1 Members—
elected in a non-discriminatory manner—of  which ten serve for two years 
and five for three years. The Permanent Representatives of  the Council meet 
at least twice a month, and the Ministers and Heads of  State and Govern-
ment meet on an annual basis.
Although the AU has succeeded in arresting conflict in some instances, despite 
this impressive institutional configuration, it is still grappling with how to cope 
with incidences of  conflict on the Continent. Thus the question arises why the 
AU has succeeded in resolving some crises and failed in resolving others?
Deficiencies of the AU and Implausibility of Key Theorems Regarding African Conflicts
The central argument of  my analysis is that although the African Union has de-
signed a comprehensive peace and security architecture to address issues of  peace 
and security on the Continent, the institution lacks the political will (and capacity) 
to deal with the structural causes of  conflict on the continent. As a consequence, 
for most of  its seven-year existence, the organization has been reduced to react-
ing to the symptoms of  conflict, rather than focusing on eliminating the deeper, 
structural causes of  conflict on the Continent.
Dealing with the structural causes of  conflict is an issue that calls for interroga-
tion of  the institutional and political governance of  African states, the rules of  
the political game, the political security of  African politicians, and the distribu-
tion of  resources (who gets what, when and how?). The central point here is that 
the weakness of  the APSA should be considered a reflection of  African domes-
tic politics. In simple terms, if  skewed institutional governance is the structural 
2 Article 21 (2) of  the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of  the Peace and Security Council of  the AU.
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causes of  conflict on the continent, how do we expect members of  the AU PSC 
with a poor governance record to pronounce on certain conflicts?
African domestic politics is a two-level game, and the AU is an extension of  
domestic African politics. The APSA is an institution whose member states make 
up the most critical part. Thus, the PSC must be seen as an institution to harmo-
nize and coordinate the interests of  the member states. As a consequence, the 
actions and omissions of  the PSC are purely based on the prerogative or political 
calculations of  its members. As such, one has to question the political incentives 
for member states to ensure the success of  the APSA. Certainly, if  the benefits 
of  enforcing APSA provide political benefit and security to African leaders, these 
leaders will be more amenable to it. Hence adhering to and strengthening the 
APSA seems good insofar as it entails a commitment to overcome the problem 
of  political uncertainty. It is nonetheless important to ask how AU members ac-
tually view APSA. The answer so far is that, to a large extent, APSA is perceived 
as an instrument/institution that provides opportunities to African leaders rather 
than one that imposes restrictions of  any sort. The enforceability of  its mandate 
is therefore contingent on the political rationalities of  the AU’s members and a 
consensus or majority among leaders. Against this backdrop, APSA is increasingly 
reacting to the symptoms of  conflict rather than its structural causes, thus peace 
is increasingly being discounted for some sort of  stability.
Nature and Causes of African Conflicts
Before addressing how the APSA has responded to some of  the conflict on the 
continent the aim of  this section is to debunk some of  the myths surrounding 
the structural causes of  conflicts in Africa. Many theses have been forwarded to 
explain conflict on the African continent. Among the most prominent and com-
monly-posited reasons we find ethnicity and greed.
Ethnicity and African Conflicts
The crisis in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda and Sudan are usually conceived as 
conflicts between various ethnic groups in those countries. The American jour-
nalist Robert D. Kaplan has argued that African conflicts are essentially a result 
of  a Hobbesian State of  nature that is brutish and primitive in its operations. 
Seen in this light, conflicts in Africa are short of  any moral underpinnings, and 
must be understood in terms of  untamed natural forces.
 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, in: The Atlantic Monthly, No. 2/199, pp. –76; Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of  Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order. New York, NY, 1996.
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A major limitation of  ethnicity as a cause of  conflict in Africa is that there is 
a lack of  consensus and clarity as to what constitutes the exact ethnic or tribal 
make-up of  the African population. This is because ethnicity and tribalism is not 
simply a question of  objective data (as, on the other hand, languages, culture and 
religion are). Ethnic identity is merely a question of  perception, rather than an 
absolute phenomenon. It is also janus-faced in the sense that identity entails a 
component of  both, (voluntary) self-definition and attribution of  specific traits 
by outsiders. While some African conflicts might be perceived as taking an 
ethnic character, ethnicity is not a cause of  conflict but means to a (political) end. 
It is primarily instrumentalized or used as a mobilizing force for African elites 
to pursue their political agenda. Thus, personal interests of  elites are framed in 
ethnic terms and the bells of  ethnic solidarity are rung to rally support even at 
the risk of  invoking the animosity of  another group considered to be the enemy. 
Applying this primordial argument to the case of  South Africa one has to won-
der why the country has not descended into chaos, notwithstanding the fact of  it 
being a patchwork of  numerous races and ethnicities. Furthermore, ethnicity is a 
reality not only in Africa. Instead of  shying away from these realities, it is impera-
tive that the continent develops institutions to engender healthy competition and 
 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 199–199: History of  a Genocide, London 199.
 Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good 
Governance, London 1999, p. 9.
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accommodation and at the same enhances and conserves its diversity and ethnic 
and cultural riches.
The Greed and Grievance Thesis
Increasingly conflicts in Africa are also perceived as a result of  greed. Bannon 
and Collier argue that war occurs if  the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large 
relative to its cost. Greed is the desire by parties of  a conflict to steal, plunder 
or exploit for private gains. Rebels have an incentive to challenge government 
because engaging in conflict offers the opportunity for extortion, which can then 
finance and sustain a war. They argue that greed rather than grievance is the 
root cause of  conflicts and the factor sustaining it. Supporting this analysis, Keen 
argues that, “War has increasingly become the continuation of  economics by 
other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of  
creating an alternative system of  profit, power and even protection.”7
Conflicts in Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of  the Congo, the Demo-
cratic Republic of  the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan seem to have 
validated this position. It is perceived that natural resources did not only ignite 
conflicts in these countries, it also fuelled and sustained them. While this thesis 
might seem plausible considering that natural resources have played an important 
role in sustaining the war-fighting capabilities in those countries, natural resource 
do not in themselves cause conflict.
The greed thesis is therefore conceptually and theoretically false. While natu-
ral resource abundance may increase the stakes in regard to state control in the 
absence of  a viable alternative for accumulation; African politicians work within 
a more complicated social, economic and political context. Consequently, the 
origin and evolution of  institutions and politically-influential strategies both 
provide political actors with opportunities and simultaneously constrain them. 
Consequently, no matter how damaging the struggle for natural resources might 
be or how this exacerbates political instability and conflict, natural resources are 
unlikely to stimulate civil war on their own in the absence of  a correspondingly 
detrimental political and social context.8
6 Ian Bannon, Paul Collier (eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Washington, DC, 200; 
Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, New York, NY, 200. 
7 David Keen, The Economic Functions of  Violence in Civil Wars (Adelphi Paper 20—International Institute for 
Strategic Studies), London 1998, pp. 1–17; William Reno, Shadow States and the Political Economy of  Civil Wars, 
in: Mats Berdal, David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO, 2000, 
pp. –68; Daniel Compagnon, Somali Armed Movements, in: Christopher Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas, Oxford 
1998, pp. 7–90; Stephen Ellis, Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency, in: Clapham (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1–178; Ibrahim Abdullah, 
Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of  Sierra Leone: A Revolt of  the Lumpen proletariat, in: Clapham 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 172–19.
8 Matthias Basedau, Context Matters—Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa (Deutsches 
Übersseeinstitut, Global and Area Studies, Working Paper No. 1), Hamburg 200.
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Politics inherently involves activities associated with conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation, and always involves the use, production and distribution of  resourc-
es at local, national and international levels.9 Therefore, the politics of  resource 
distribution is at the heart of  contemporary conflicts in Africa; as Harold D. Las-
well already noted in the 190s, politics is a question of  who gets what, how and 
when.0 Consequently, conflict in Africa is a function of  a governance crisis the 
continent is presently facing. In the absence of  a viable private sector, the state in 
Africa has become the principal actor of  accumulation. Consequently the absence 
of  strong institutions to manage elite contestation has made violence an option 
for some politicians to accede to power.
Why has the APSA registered a Mixed Success in Averting and Resolving Conflicts?
From the onset it is important to state that it would be churlish to accuse the 
AU for its failure to halt some conflicts on the continent since the first instance 
of  conflict prevention, management and resolution remain the member states. 
However, having cited resolving conflict on the continent as one of  its principal 
objective and mandate, one needs to ask whether the AU is properly designed 
and equipped to carry out such an objective?
Since its creation, the AU (sometimes with the help of  the international com-
munity) has achieved some spectacular successes in averting and resolving con-
flict. From the Togo to Comoros, Madagascar, Kenya and Burundi, the AU has 
managed to resolve or prevent conflict. However, in countries like Chad, Sudan 
Somalia and, recently, DRC the institution is still grappling with how to resolve 
conflicts in these countries. What does account for those mixed results?
Most importantly, the APSA is simply a set of  institutions for coordination and 
cooperation, as a result African states have not entirely ceded their sovereignty to 
the APSA or cut back on their more narrowly defined national interests. Con-
sequently member states still retain a large degree of  autonomy as they engage 
with the APSA. Thus, adherence to the APSA by member states is determined 
by domestic political calculations balancing political benefits and political costs. 
Member states will thus adopt a certain course of  action if  the perceived benefits 
outweigh the costs. Policy prescription or matters of  principle will merely figure 
as justification for such a course of  action.
9 Rok Ajulu, African Security: Can Regional Organizations Play a Role?, in: Shannon Field (ed.), Peace in Africa: 
Towards a Collaborative Security Regime, Johannesburg 200, pp. 267.
0 Ibid. [Hier erwartet man einen Verweis auf  Laswell!!! Der Säzzer]
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In determining the potential cost and benefit, the political security of  the leaders 
of  member states is critical. For example, the government of  Zimbabwe has time 
and again argued that some African countries cannot take a moral high ground in 
criticizing it’s the country’s governance record. The point here is that one cannot 
expect the leaders of  Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Chad and Gabon to criti-
cize the governance record of  Zimbabwe because their own poor governance 
record—though less poor than Robert Mugabe’s—, if  they are to fear a backlash 
in their own backyard. This by no means concludes that the AU is simply made 
up of  dictators who are willing to protect each other from criticism. As a matter 
of  fact, the AU suspended the membership of  a country like the Central African 
Republic because of  an unconstitutional change of  government. However com-
mendable, why did the AU not adopt the same position in regards to the crisis 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe? There is little doubt Kenya and Zimbabwe provide a 
more difficult case because AU members take cognizance of  the political rami-
fications these countries have on the overall political economy of  the continent. 
One might therefore conclude that the AU always opts for a quick fix solution 
and a power-sharing agreement, hoping that the belligerents will sort out their 
differences once the stakes are high. Seen in that light, the problem in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe is not one of  greedy elites who want to get their hands on power, far 
from that. The problems in these countries rather lie in the structural weaknesses 
of  political institutions to manage elite contestation and from the absence of  
mechanisms which insulate political contestation by preventing the contestation 
flaring up into violence.
Within this context, one of  the principal weaknesses of  the APSA is the absence 
of  minimum barriers to ensure policy coherence and consistency. The most im-
portant condition to qualify for AU membership is to be an African country. But 
what about the values espoused by African renaissance? It seems that article  
(2) of  the PSC protocol which lays out eligibility criteria for the PSC is then only 
worth the paper it is written on. The absence of  minimum institutional and gov-
ernance standards to gain entry to the PSC therefore means that the PSC faces 
the problem of  information costs and time consistency.
Also one of  the potential costs of  dealing with the structural causes of  conflict 
by the PSC is the nature of  some African conflicts. Some African conflicts are 
regional in character involving more than one African state. As such, resolving 
the structural causes of  these conflicts will have huge repercussion on the politi-
cal survival of  other leaders. For instance, it is widely perceived that the collapse 
of  the regime in Chad will have a domino effect on the region as it might affect 
the regimes in the Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Republic of  Congo 
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and Gabon. As a consequence, the regional character of  the conflict in Chad has 
more often been over-emphasized over the skewed governance process which 
is at the heart of  the conflict. The implication for this situation has been that 
peace is more often discounted in favor of  stability. The EU forces in East-
ern Chad are an example of  how the regional character of  the crisis in Chad is 
over-emphasized.
Another element that plays into the political calculus of  leaders in regard to ad-
hering to APSA is the potential economic costs vis-à-vis prospective benefits in 
carrying out peace support operations. Peace support operations demand enor-
mous resources which some African states are unable or unwilling to commit if  
their perceived national interest is not at stake. For the time being, five countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) account for some 7 percent 
of  the AU budget. While financial constraints might have been lessened due to 
contribution from Africa’s development partners like the EU through its Afri-
can Peace Facility, much still needs to be done to ameliorate the AU’s financial 
capacities.
To a large extent, AU’s financial woes could be explained by the fact that many 
AU members are more interested in the regional economic groupings, cognizant 
of  the fact that their national interests can be better articulated and preserved 
within a regional setting. This reasoning is grounded on the belief  that security is 
increasingly taking a regional character on the continent and will, thus, eventually 
lead to the existence of  a regional security complex. It is against this background 
that the AU has recognized regional economic communities as the building 
blocks of  the APSA.
Conclusion
This paper set out to argue that despite some impressive successes, the AU is 
increasingly reacting to the symptoms rather than engaging with the structural 
causes of  these conflicts. As a result, the AU is more involved in attempts to 
stabilizing a conflict situation than in trying to engender lasting peace. The paper 
further pointed out that the principal weakness of  APSA should be seen in the 
weakness of  African states. Weak states make weak institutions. As such, the 
skewed democratic processes in members states have provided little incentives 
for states to adhere to the principles of  the APSA, especially with regards to 
addressing issues of  good governance, the rule of  law and the respect of  hu-
man rights. Since the structural causes of  conflict in Africa are to be seen in the 
absence of  strong institution to manage elite contestation, issues of  political and 
 
New Faces Conference 2008 84
Panel IV: Regional and 
Multilateral Approaches 
to Peace and Security in 
Africa
institutional governance are becoming increasingly difficult for APSA to pro-
nounce. Especially when considering the fact that APSA is barely more than a set 
of  institutions whose most critical and important components are the member 
states. Since the APSA does not represent a separate body of  political power and, 
therefore, does not possess a robust enforcement capacity, member states of  the 
AU still retain a large space for maneuver in cheating on these institutions. Thus, 
until there is some policy coherence amongst member states and political and 
economic incentives to adhere to and enforce APSA, the continent will continue 
to experience mixed results when it comes to its potential in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution.
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Peace and Security in West Africa: Supporting  
Regional Organizations
Till Blume and Matthias Mayr
 “The large countries should learn that strong 
leadership must induce followership […]” 
David Malone
Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping in West Africa
West Africa has received far stronger international assistance for post-conflict 
recovery and statebuilding since the beginning of  the st century as compared 
to the 1990s. Regional organizations have been relatively prominent in West 
Africa as well; globally, the number and extension of  regional organizations has 
increased considerably. The division of  labor within nation states, among regional 
leaders and international organizations is only in its early stages. It is clear, how-
ever, that regional organizations, together with international actors and organiza-
tions are likely to take over an increasingly important role—especially if  interna-
tional peacekeeping becomes more and more difficult. 
In West Africa, regional organizations represented the main actors behind re-
gional peacekeeping interventions before 00, but their record is not entirely 
positive in terms of  promoting peace and stability. To analyze the contribu-
tions of  such regional organizations, we shall revisit the regional interventions 
in Liberia in order to shed light on the weak organizational capacity and control 
of  the operations throughout the 1990s. We intend to re-emphasize the main 
sources of  success for regional organizations: finances, manpower, and political 
legitimacy. The necessity of  these factors in carrying out successful interventions 
can be evidenced by looking at United Nations peacekeeping operations, which 
are deployed throughout the region with support from lead countries and other 
international organizations and have enjoyed considerable success. 
The Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS), which carried 
out most interventions in West Africa during the 1990s, is one of  the largest 
sub-regional organizations on the continent. As mentioned, its record of  peace-
1 David Malone, The African Union: Triumph of  Hope over Experience, in: Globe and Mail, 07/06/200. 
2 A. Sarjoh Bah, Bruce Jones, Peace Operation Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrange-
ments, in: CIC (ed.), Annual Review of  Global Peace Operations 2008, New York, NY, 2008, pp. 21–0; Richard 
Gowan, The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08, in: International Peacekeeping, No. /2008, pp. 
–69.
 The lead nations are: in Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom; in Côte d’Ivoire, France; in Liberia—after some hesitation 
and only in cooperation with many other partners—the United States.
Till Blume
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keeping interventions is, at best, mixed. The main conclusion of  this paper is that 
regional organizations must be supported—more than they currently are—by 
international and bilateral donors. The reason is that interventions in general and 
by regional organizations specifically, are more likely to be successful if  sufficient 
financial, military, and political means are provided. And, furthermore, if  they 
achieved legitimacy through the management and direction of  the respective 
regional organization’s headquarters—not those of  its main member states. This 
has huge influence on the legitimacy and perception of  interventions in the re-
spective conflict area. Regional peacekeeping interventions need to be perceived 
as legitimate and impartial in order to be successful, both on the ground and in 
the region as a whole.
As stated, the three factors deemed crucial for a successful intervention are politi-
cal legitimacy, military capacity, and financial funds. Regional organizations could 
easily provide the umbrella for providing security and peace, if  they receive the 
backing they need—from member states or the international community—in or-
der to develop their own political, military, and economic capacities. We advocate 
reinforcing the political legitimacy of  regional organizations as they assist with 
conflict management, peacekeeping, and peace-building missions. Agreements 
between member states for funding and military support and with international 
organizations for hybrid arrangements should be encouraged. Furthermore, ‘lead 
countries’ should be encouraged to hand over the implementation of  peacekeep-
ing and peace-building missions to regional organizations. 
The case study of  ECOWAS interventions in Liberia within the framework of  
the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) serves to illustrate the difficulties 
regional hegemonic powers, such as Nigeria, face when involved in implementing 
peace operations. Nigeria is the most powerful nation in West Africa, but has a 
shaky reputation among its neighboring states. Though ECOMOG interventions 
were partly successful in preventing more bloodshed, they also served to create 
more conflict (at least in Liberia). They ultimately failed to implement their man-
date due to lack of  diplomatic capacity, funding and equipment. The main prob-
lems can be clearly identified as a lack of  finances, the lack of  political legitimacy 
among ECOMOG deployments, which resulted in a politically-biased perception 
of  the regional interventions in Liberia besides the lack of  proper military equip-
ment and manpower. 
After a presentation of  the argument and a short history of  regional and inter-
national interventions in West Africa, a case study on the Liberian conflict and 
Nigerian involvement will reveal the pitfalls and dilemmas of  regional leaders in 
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conflict prevention. Policy recommendations for the support of  regional organi-
zations are given at the end of  the paper. 
Mapping the Argument: Dimensions for Regional Interventions in Fragile States 
Regional organizations in Africa—such as the AU in Darfur or ECOWAS in West 
Africa—are strongly supported by the international community. There are three 
ways in which regional organizations need to be supported in order to make the 
success of  regional interventions more likely: Regional organizations need to be 
perceived as honest brokers (political dimension), they need to have the mili-
tary means to prevent spoiling behaviour (military dimension), and they need to 
possess the management and funds to be able to finance interventions (financial 
dimension). 
This, certainly, is never possible without contributions from member states, and 
it is essential that military and financial support come from these member states. 
However, regional organizations can improve legitimacy in the political dimen-
sion through their own actions. If  regional hegemonic powers carry out interven-
tions, they have, by definition, interests in the intervention area; they often do 
not contribute to a positive perception of  regional leaders in the conflict area. If  
regional organizations use associated secretariats and organizational bodies (like 
the EU, African Union and ECOWAS) as political support systems, they can be 
more easily perceived as neutral than in their role as dominant member states. 
ECOWAS since 1975
ECOWAS was founded by 1 member states (with Cape Verde joining in 1976 
and Mauritania withdrawing in 2000) in 197 as a result of  initial organizational 
plans drawn by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1960. The 
founding document highlighted four main goals: to promote trade among mem-
ber states, to improve physical infrastructure, to strengthen production structures, 
and to enhance monetary cooperation. ECOWAS is unique in that it transcends 
the linguistic and cultural divisions imposed by the former colonial powers, that 
is, the United Kingdom, France and Portugal. The region is considered one 
of  the more ambitious economic groupings in Africa, as it boasts a per capita 
income that, in 2000 ($ 2), was far higher than East Africa ($ 2) or Central 
Africa ($ 270). 
 Adebayo Adedeji, ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey, in: Adekeye Adebajo, Ismail Rashid (eds.), West Africa’s Secu-
rity Challenges. Building Peace in a Troubled Region, Boulder, CO, 200, p. 22.
 Ibid., pp. –.
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The security pillar in ECOWAS gained momentum in the early 1990s, but despite 
a revised ECOWAS treaty and Nigerian efforts in 199, functioning security 
mechanisms in ECOWAS were not developed. In fact, such mechanisms were 
not developed until the 1997 ECOWAS Summit, where the Nigerian proposal 
for a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeep-
ing, and Security was drafted. Due to a clash between Nigeria and Senegal at the 
ECOWAS summit in 1998 (which occurred because of  francophone concerns 
about Nigeria’s dominating role), the resolution was not implemented until 000. 
Nevertheless, ECOWAS has changed significantly since the early 1990s, when Ni-
geria promoted regional conflict resolution mechanisms to gain political influence 
in the region, seeing itself  at the centre of  West African politics. The ECOMOG 
forces deployed to Liberia in 1990, to Sierra Leone in 199, and even to Guinea-
Bissau in 1999, lacked both political and financial support, and were logistically 
ill-equipped to carry out their mandates properly. 
The problems of  ECOWAS interventions in West Africa in the 1990s were 
mainly in regard to financing, modes of  deployment, the composition of  the 
ECOMOG force, the command and control of  operations, and the lack of  
involvement of  the ECOWAS secretariat in managing the implementation of  the 
mandate. As one consequence, the commanders on the ground, who had little 
diplomatic experience, had to manage the missions, and the bulk of  staff  and 
funds were largely provided by Nigeria.
The following section details the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and shows 
how the three dimensions identified above were not addressed properly. Further-
more, political steering from the ECOWAS secretariat was largely absent. Due to 
a partial cooperation with rebel groups, the perception of  Nigerian troops in Li-
beria was relatively negative. What would have been necessary was a peacekeeping 
force that was equipped with sufficient funds and logistical capacity. Furthermore, 
leadership from a political organization independent of  Nigeria would have 
increased legitimacy and political support in Liberia and among other ECOWAS 
member states.
ECOMOG in Liberia—ECOWAS, Nigeria, and a Failed State 
Liberia is a special case in West Africa: the country has experienced 1 years 
of  civil war, in which most neighboring countries were involved. The 1990 
6 Gani J. Yoroms, ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective, in: Issue: A Journal of  Opin-
ion, No. 1/199, pp. 8–91. 
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 ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was the first peacekeeping mission of  a re-
gional African organization.7 
The Political Dimension
From the beginning, the Nigerian military contingent was the largest contribu-
tion to ECOMOG, especially after a Nigerian General replaced the first Gha-
naian Force Commander. Over the years, Nigeria has provided 80 per cent of  
 ECOWAS troops since the first regional peace operations started. Nigeria had 
a strong national interest in participating in the ECOMOG force in Liberia, but 
was not the only interested country in the region. Most other countries, such as 
Burkina Faso, were involved in the Liberian conflict behind the scenes.8 Due to 
Nigeria’s perception as a regional leader and mounting concerns that the nation 
was acting only out of  self-interest, Nigerian soldiers were never perceived as 
honest and neutral brokers, neither in Liberia nor in Sierra Leone. This percep-
tion worsened, when Nigeria started to support various factions in the Liberian 
civil war in order to gain control of  certain areas. On the one hand, this was due 
to Nigeria’s inability to defeat the rebels and the necessity of  restoring some 
degree of  order, which resulted in military stalemates and subsequent appease-
ment.9 On the other hand, however, ECOMOG forces were themselves seeking 
coalitions with rebel factions and were involved in looting the country, at least in 
Liberia.0 
One contributing factor was the proliferation of  ethnic factions in Liberia. How-
ever, ECOMOG was already hampered from the onset: poor diplomatic efforts 
on the part of  ECOWAS member states during the crisis contributed to the 
failure of  the mission. Although the members argued for an immediate inter-
vention to counter economic difficulties resulting from the flood Liberian and 
other West African refugees into member countries, the conflicting interests 
of  such member states also complicated the negotiation of  sound mandates and 
provision of  sufficient equipment. Francophone countries in ECOWAS blocked 
reasonable and sustainable proposals for force levels within other nations.
7 Heinrich Bergstresser, Denis M. Tull, Nigeria als regionale Ordnungsmacht in Westafrika, Berlin 2008.
8 Adekeje Adebajo, Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), op. cit. (note ), p. 29.
9 Ibid., p. 292.
0 The acronym ECOMOG was soon translated into “Every Car Or Moving Object Gone”. Compare Stephen Ellis, The 
Mask of  Anarchy. The Destruction of  Liberia and the Religious Dimension of  an African Civil War, New York, NY, 
00.
 Clement E. Adibe, The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership, in: Third World Quarterly, No. /1997, 
p. 7.
 Interestingly, Nigeria and Ghana, the two major powers in West Africa are mentioned here explicitly by the former 
Ghanaian Foreign Minister Adibe, ibid.
 Adebajo, op. cit. (note 8), p. 298. ECOMOG consisted of  troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Senegal, 
Mali, and Guinea. 
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The Military Dimension
Nevertheless, a military intervention seemed to be the primary choice of  action. 
Due to the first Gulf  War, international involvement in the early 1990s was low in 
West Africa. The international community deferred the responsibility for peace-
keeping to regional organizations. For the first time, the international community 
demanded “African Solutions for African Problems,” a framework proposed to 
excuse the inability to assemble the necessary diplomatic backing and military 
means to intervene. Led by Nigeria, the original ECOWAS troops were provided 
by Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. Soon, Nigeria handled the inter-
vention alone. While in the beginning of  the mission the dispatched ECOMOG 
troops were by no means capable of  ensuring stability and often had difficulties 
defending themselves properly, the contingents’ size was doubled within the 
first month of  the mission from ,00 to 7,000 troops, and further increased in 
1992 to 11,26 soldiers. Nevertheless, troop morale, equipment, and logistics 
remained inadequate and had to be improved through the presence of  UNOMIL, 
sponsored by American firms (see below). 
The Financial Dimension
Nigeria contributed massively, both in military and financial terms, to ECOMOG 
and ECOWAS achievements. It spent more than $  billion on ECOMOG in 
Liberia between 1990 and 1996, but even scholars sympathetic to the overall 
mission argue that a large amount of  money spent on ECOMOG went into the 
pockets of  Nigerian generals.17 The ECOMOG interventions in the early 1990s 
were financed by the main troop contributors, mainly Nigeria and Ghana.
As a result, ECOMOG and Nigeria largely failed to create peace and stability in 
the country. The strong personal and economic interest of  Nigerian force com-
manders on the ground, as well as the perception of  the country as a regional 
hegemonic power, served to damage its reputation during peacekeeping efforts 
and further jeopardized ECOWAS efforts to act as a regional organization. 
Nigeria and ECOMOG
The problem was not that Nigeria was contributing—without its support, noth-
ing would have happened. The problem was how Nigeria steered and imple-
 Adedeji, op. cit. (note ), p. .
 A military failure of  ECOMOG already in the early stages would have reduced also the reputation of  the two Force 
Commanders from Ghana, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings, and Nigeria, General Babangida. See Adibe, op. cit. (note 11), 
pp. 76–77.
 Adibe, op. cit. (note 11). Both ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were funded by Nigeria alone, 
amounting to a total of  about $ 8 billion. See Adedeji, op. cit. (note ), p. .
17 Adebajo, op. cit. (note 8), p. 12.
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mented ECOWAS and ECOMOG operations. ECOMOG failed due to factors 
that constrained the fulfillment of  the necessary military, financial, and political 
requirements for success.18
In 199, the added value of  impartial interventions became evident when 
one of  the first hybrid operations, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UN-
OMIL, 199–1996), which was protected by ECOMOG, was launched. This 
was partly due to the fact that the conflict parties did not accept the disarma-
ment of  ECOMOG. The parties could only agree to disarm under supervision 
of  UNOMIL’s military observers, who would then be deployed to observe the 
process under ECOMOG protection.19 Following UNOMIL, international and 
bilateral support and financing of  ECOMOG began to play a more important 
role in its operations; an example is the financial support provided by the U.S. 
Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), which improved ECOMOG logistics.0 
However, rebels also used some internationally-financed equipment that was 
henceforth provided—for instance, some rebel groups took over ECOMOG 
vehicles and used them for the transportation of  their own material. The basic 
pattern of  cooperation with local warring factions was thus not stopped. After 
the election of  Charles Taylor as Liberian President in 1997, little was done in 
ECOWAS to promote further peacekeeping instruments. Charles Taylor himself  
announced that Liberia would no longer need any peacekeepers. Shortly after, 
ECOMOG began disbanding in November 1997 when the first troops left. The 
last ECOMOG monitors eventually exited the area in 1998. 
The sudden end of  ECOMOG was also due to the fact that Nigeria was more 
concerned with its domestic setup than with regional conflicts, which had calmed 
down, at least on the surface. The Abacha regime ended in 1998, after which Ni-
geria embarked onto a political process towards democratic structures. After the 
consolidation of  democratic structures in 1999, the country continued to fulfill 
a leadership role in West Africa. However, this was not necessarily followed by a 
coherent concept of  how to achieve conflict resolution and regional agendas—
which were often watered down by conflicting interests and domestic politics. 
Today, Nigeria continues to play a major role and is a crucial partner in promot-
ing security in the region. However, it should accept that leadership rhetoric is 
not always the best way to ensure support by followers. Others argue that the in-
18 Ibid., p. 296.
19 James O.C. Jonah, The United Nations, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), op. cit. (note ), p. 27.
0 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of  Anarchy. The Destruction of  Liberia and the Religious Dimension of  an African Civil War, 
New York, NY, 00.. 
 Bergstresser, Tull, op. cit. (note 7), pp. 11–1.
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ternational community should develop a complex dialogue and partnership with 
Nigeria. And, indeed, these core themes should include regional integration. 
Nigeria will remain the main regional player in West Africa in terms of  economic, 
military, and political power. Still, it seems to lack a coherent political agenda for 
the region. Its domestic prerequisites for a leadership role are—despite major 
improvements—still shaky, and the acceptance of  a regional role in the region is 
far from a given fact. As Adedeji, the former Secretary of  UNECA puts it: “No 
country that is confronted with a long period of  political instability, economic 
stagnation, and regression, and reputed to have one of  the most corrupt societies 
in the world, has a basis to lead others. […] Sadly, there is no other country that 
is as well placed as Nigeria to play this leadership role.” Nigeria has a democrati-
cally-elected government only since 1999, and was a crisis state under military 
regimes before that time. However, the implementation of  democratic rules is 
still questionable. Observers argue that elections are still rigged and results partly 
predetermined and negotiated among the parties, with the distribution of  eco-
nomic benefits.
International Interventions in Liberia after 2003
In 00, international pressure opened the window of  opportunity to push for 
a further peace agreement in Liberia. One of  the reasons for the success of  the 
peace agreement was the absence of  Charles Taylor during the negotiations fol-
lowing his indictment by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Furthermore, both 
Nigeria and ECOWAS were strong supporters of  the international solution to 
the Liberian crisis. In contrast to the regional interventions, the subsequent UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) did not suffer from insufficient funds, and the politi-
cal dimension—both in terms of  support from local populations and diplomatic 
leverage in the involved countries—was more developed and well-supported 
under the UN umbrella. The main need for military troops was initially fulfilled 
by troops from ECOWAS countries, who had served in the ECOWAS Mission 
in Liberia (ECOMIL) before the arrival of  UNMIL and were re-hatted as blue 
helmets as soon as UNMIL was in place. The mere presence of  U.S. marines off-
shore and on special patrols during the day in 00, combined with the successful 
Nigeria-led ECOMIL force, which was under ECOWAS command, helped to en-
sure that hostilities were stopped and the Peace Agreement was negotiated—an 
agreement which included a clause promising a UN force that would take over 
for ECOWAS. 
 Ulf  Engel, Westafrikanischer Hegemon oder Scheinriese? Nigeria in der internationalen Politik, Hamburg 2007.
 Bergstresser, Tull, op. cit. (note 7), pp. 2–26.
 Adedeji, op. cit. (note 8), p. 6.
 Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice, Geneva 2007.
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Today, Liberia provides a good example of  the parallel importance and influence 
of  international and regional players. Since 200, the country has remained stable 
due to a hefty UN peace operation (UNMIL), strong international support and 
supervision in finance-related areas (most notably by the World Bank, especially 
the Governance and Economic Assessment Program, GEMAP), and a capable 
government since 2006. Despite this international influence, ECOWAS and Ni-
geria remain important players. After 00, Nigerians and Ghanaians held senior 
posts in UNMIL; Nigeria remained one of  the main troop contributors. Nige-
rian enterprises and banks re-opened in Liberia, and a large share of  the petrol 
imports comes from Nigeria. The influence of  Nigerian decisions on domestic 
politics in Liberia has also remained strong. One illustration of  this fact has been 
the initial decision to grant asylum to former Liberian president Charles Taylor 
from 200–2006 before extraditing him to Liberia in 2006. 
ECOWAS since 1999
In 1999/2000 ECOWAS was reformed by its member states, with Nigeria sup-
porting regional integration and conflict prevention efforts. These reforms were 
very important, as they added several institutions necessary for consultation 
and negotiations among member states and as they improved the capacity of  
the ECOWAS Secretariat—the Mediation and Security Council (political), the 
Defense and Security Commission (military), the Council of  Elders (eminent 
persons, civil society)—which led to drastic improvements in political decision-
making. In terms of  capacity, the Mission Planning and Management Cell was 
established within the Office of  the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace 
and Security (PAPS), one of  seven commissioners within ECOWAS.27 Further-
more, in 2007, there were efforts to set up a Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF) designed to strengthen decision-making and intervention capacity.28 In 
addition, the Executive Secretary was given the right to propose initiatives to the 
member states, and the post of  a Deputy Secretary was created for operational 
matters and the coordination of  special representatives deployed to the field. An 
ECOWAS observation centre, given the task of  formulating policies and imple-
menting all military peacekeeping and humanitarian observations, was created. 
Still, EOCWAS funding remains difficult. Member states in the past have often 
failed to provide both financial and human resources for the organization itself  
 Political Affairs Department - Organigramme, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/index.php?id=p_p1_
commission&lang=en> (28/0/2008).
27 The ECOWAS Commission, ECOWAS Commission on a glance, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/index.
php?id=p_p1_commission&lang=en> (28/0/2008).
28 Office of  the Special Adviser on Africa, The Emerging Role of  the AU and ECOWAS in Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding, New York, NY, 2007, p. 22.
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and for the missions of  ECOMOG.29 Almost all member states still owe large 
parts of  their payments to ECOWAS.0 In general, however, the capacities of  Af-
rican states for deploying military forces have considerably increased since 00. 
ECOBRIG, an ECOWAS Standing Brigade, was deployed to Côte d’Ivoire for 
the first time in 200.
Today, Nigeria is incapable of  taking unilateral decisions: the francophone bloc 
in ECOWAS has eight seats out of  1 members, and can therefore block deci-
sions on interventions that require a two-third majority. The important feature of  
the current ECOWAS set-up is that no member state has obtained a veto power, 
which ensures that regional backing of  the organization’s decisions is always a 
necessity. The outlook for the role of  ECOWAS seems good if  “governments 
[…] subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional eco-
nomic goals”. Furthermore, EOCWAS could serve as an umbrella to streamline 
the various sub-regional institutions and organizations coexisting in West Africa, 
which might enable it to create focal areas for the region’s development and sta-
bility—preferably, through coordination under the African security architecture 
as proposed by the African Union. 
This can only be a starting point for increased capacity of  regional organizations 
in general and ECOWAS in particular. Further work needs to be done, both by 
the organizations’ member states in terms of  their monetary contributions and 
political support, and by the international community in terms of  continued and 
substantial support to regional and sub-regional organizations on the African 
continent. 
The Show Must Go On: Supporting Regional Organizations
There are encouraging developments on the African continent. A new security 
architecture under the umbrella of  the African Union was put forward in 00, 
29 Reliable data on the composition and sources of  the budget of  ECOWAS are difficult to retrieve.
0 Based on own rough calculations using data from the ECOWAS website, the member states owe about 21 million 
units of  account [UA] (UA are equivalent to the IMF’s special drawing rights [SDR], 1 SDR = $ 1,62 on 29 April 
2008, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx> (29/0/2008), and 1,912,98 for the ECOWAS 
Bank for Investment and Development (created in 2001), about $  million in total). 
 There is little information on ECOBRIG. See Joachim Koops, Johannes Varwick, Ten Years of  SHIRBRIG. Lessons 
Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany (GPPi Research Paper Series, No. 11), 
2008, p. 18. For a general overview of  African military capacities see Wolf  Kinzel, Afrikanische Sicherheitsarchitek-
tur – ein Überblick, in: GIGA Focus, No. 1, 2007. Important is being done at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, which is also supported by German funds and capacity building (GTZ and ZIF). 
 Jeggan C. Senghor, Institutional Architecture for Managing Integration in the ECOWAS Region: An Empirical Investi-
gation, in: Jeggan C. Senghor, Nana K. Poku (eds.), Towards Africa’s Renewal, London 2007, p. 17.
 CEAO, MRU, BCEAO, UEMOA, ANAD, CEAO, AAFC, just to name a few. 
 Chrysantus Ayangafac, An Analysis of  the African Peace and Security Architecture, in this volume. 
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which also pushed for a strengthened ECOWAS Commission. ECOWAS is likely 
to play an important role in political and economic matters. Regional integration 
seems to be especially important, as most borders are too porous to control. In 
order to counter this development and the movement of  rebel forces, nations 
need to cooperate. 
Despite improvements in the overall governance structure and mechanisms 
within the ECOWAS bodies, very few ECOWAS operations run without Nige-
rian funds and support. Since the domestic changes in 1999, the country is—next 
to South Africa—the leading nation in Africa in terms of  diplomatic mediation 
and regional integration. Furthermore, it is Africa’s largest troop and police 
contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and has almost as many soldiers as 
all other ECOWAS member states combined. However, its soft power remains 
limited throughout the region.7 Nevertheless, its transformation from a military 
dictatorship to a democracy as well as several successful mediation efforts earned 
it the reputation of  a soft power in the waiting and may promote democratization 
in the region. This might, then, ultimately justify a regional role for promoting 
peace and security. Together with Ghana, Nigeria could more actively promote 
the facets of  its soft power in relation to diplomacy, mediation and interventions 
through the ECOWAS framework. 
The critical issue remaining is funding. ECOWAS is largely dependent on Nige-
rian and international donations.8 The argument at the outset was that regional 
organizations would be more successful in promoting and supporting security 
if  they are perceived as organizations with own political, military, and financial 
capabilities, and are not directly influenced by their dominant members. 
Regional and international organizations—including the EU and UN—will 
always be influenced by powerful member states. However, in relation to peace-
keeping and peace-building, regional (and international) organizations can pro-
vide more legitimate and impartial support than hegemonic powers.9 This is 
not to say that the backing and support of  lead nations is not needed for these 
interventions. But the responsibility for the implementation of  peace-building 
missions should be delegated to regional organizations and their military, finan-
cial, and political capacities. This article has tried to shed light on the fact that we 
 Samuel K. B. Asante, The Travails of  Integration, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), op. cit. (note ), p. .
 In 200: 78,00 soldiers. Compare Bergstresser, Tull, op. cit. (note 7), p.1.
7 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
8 Several international and bilateral aid agencies are supporting capacity in ECOWAS, such as EU, GTZ and USAID. 
9 For an organization-theoretic backing of  the argument see Michael N. Barnett, Martha Finnemore, Rules for the 
World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NY, 200.
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need to support regional organizations, especially as they seek to strengthen their 
capacity in terms of  organizational and normative frameworks for regional action. 
In practical terms: member states should give money, soldiers, and political sup-
port to regional organizations, which in turn will then be able to engage in media-
tion, implement peace agreements and provide peacekeeping forces throughout 
the region—without the risk of  being perceived as partial and hegemonic. 
This is not to say that nothing has been done to bolster regional organizations: 
the EU, USAID, GTZ, and others are supporting ECOWAS. But there is more 
to be done: regional leaders should be encouraged to direct some of  their efforts, 
especially those related to conflict management and security, towards regional or-
ganizations to ensure that other countries can ‘follow’ without being and feeling 
dominated. In turn, regional leaders will only take regional organizations seriously 
if  the latter have the ability to manage funds and political processes adequately. 
Nigeria will continue to provide the bulk of  finances, diplomatic resources, and 
troops to support ECOWAS. Nevertheless, strengthening ECOWAS will be 
helpful in promoting the further political integration of  West Africa, which will 
be crucial for the region’s future stability. The resolution of  the Liberian conflict 
already added to the stability and capacity of  ECOWAS by bridging the gap be-
tween anglophone and francophone (and lusophone) countries. It seems essential 
for international donors to continue to provide both technical and financial assis-
tance in order to maintain existing capacity, and, even more importantly, to build, 
develop and strengthen the ability of  ECOWAS in addressing regional challenges 
in West Africa—especially as the United Nations missions in the region downsize 
over the next few years. International efforts must focus on regional organiza-
tions, especially in regions where the immediate attention of  donors and the 
international community is shrinking rapidly. 
To prepare for future interventions, hybrid missions between international and 
regional organizations should be enhanced, especially until the capacities of  
regional organizations become fully developed.0 Despite the recent steps taken 
by ECOWAS, Nigeria, and the international community, a great deal remains to 
be done—in terms of  capacity-building within ECOWAS, cooperation amongst 
international and regional organizations, democratic consolidation in the region, 
and the cooperation and coordination between Nigeria and the international 
community.
0 A. Sahrjo Bah, Bruce Jones, Peace Operation Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrange-
ments, in: Annual Review of  Global Peace Operations 2008, p. 10.
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Policy Recommendations
A non-exhaustive list of  issues that should be addressed in the near future will 
have to include efforts by the international community to further support region-
al organizations in terms of  their organizational capacity and financial manage-
ment. This will necessitate a change in behavior on the side of  regional leaders. 
The latter should be encouraged to build up soft power through regional organi-
zations in addition to their economic and military dominance. More specifically, 
regional leaders should be encouraged to increasingly hand security and conflict 
prevention tasks over to regional organizations. While this still sounds like wish-
ful thinking, one incentive could be the increased deployment of  hybrid forces of  
regional organizations and UN and EU troops. The experiences gained in such 
an endeavor and the financial burden-sharing might then be used as a clear indi-
cation that in regard to ECOWAS as well as the AU, regional leaders will be able 
to gain more by engaging in regional organizations’ peacekeeping efforts than 
initially expected. A good starting point for such a paradigm shift could be joint 
training and logistics standards in ECOWAS (ECOBRIG).
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Running with the Hare, Hunting with the Hounds
South Africa’s Dual Role as Regional Power and Global Player
Miriam Prys
‘[South Africa’s] refusal to renegotiate the skewed South African Customs Union Agreement, its ill-fated 
 intervention in Lesotho, its 990s trade battles and recent ‘quiet diplomacy’ with Zimbabwe, all raise questions 
about Pretoria’s mishandling of  regional affairs while taking on grandiose roles on the continental stage’.
Introduction
Warren Christopher, during a visit in South Africa in 1996, stated that ‘when I 
look around the world, I see few countries with greater potential to shape the 
21st century than the new South Africa.’ The international community, par-
ticularly Western donors, hoped that South Africa’s economy could pull other 
countries in Southern Africa and throughout the continent along as a ‘locomo-
tive of  growth.’ Further hope was raised in that the country could bring stabil-
ity, strengthen regional organizations, and take a leading role in solving African 
conflicts. On a global level these expectations have led to tangible results. For in-
stance, South Africa, alongside Brazil, China, India and Mexico, has been invited 
to partnership talks with the G8. The EU has successfully pushed for a free trade 
agreement with South Africa and upgraded its bilateral relationship to a Strategic 
Partnership in 2006. In the US National Security Strategy outlined on September 
17th, 2002, South Africa has been singled out as one of  the four states in Africa 
that ‘have a major impact on their neighborhood.’ Both the donor and business 
communities have, too, developed a strong interest in using South Africa as a 
springboard for development and projects in Africa.
These global expectations have been reciprocated by the new South African 
government. The projection of  South Africa’s achievements and its peaceful 
transition (to a power?) on regional and global levels has been seen as a ‘natural 
progression,’ and the new international climate of  the post Cold-War era has 
‘inevitably reinforced the Mandela government’s aspiration to play a liberating role 
in international relations.’ South Africa established full diplomatic relations with 
most states by 199 and was (re-)admitted to over  international organizations 
1 The Limits of  Power, in: Africa Confidential, No. 1/200, pp. 2–.
2 Warren Christopher, Address by Secretary of  State Warren Christopher at the South African Institute of  International 
Affairs, Johannesburg, 10/12/1996.
 Fredrik Söderbaum, The Reconfiguration of  Southern Africa: Stabilizers, Globalizers, Exploiters, Peace-Makers, Revi-
sionists, Transformists and Missionaries, unpublished paper, 000. 
 Jack Spence, South Africa: An African Exception or Just Another State, in: Conflict, Security and Development, 
No. 2/2007, pp. 1–7. 
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by 1996. Beyond mere participation, it chaired and hosted international bodies 
and conferences such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Organization of  African Unity (OAU). South Africa presented itself  as 
a ‘good international citizen’ by promoting ‘good causes’ such as the prohibition 
of  land mines and by assuming mediation positions in inter-state conflicts, for 
instance between Libya and the West over the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.
In this paper, I will argue that we cannot understand the way South Africa is exer-
cising its regional leadership in Southern Africa without considering the nation’s 
global ambitions. This is mainly because at times, its global and regional ambi-
tions require different, if  not contradictory, responses, and we can thus speak of  
a ‘dual role’ with which the South African government is attempting to comply.7 
One common argument insists that this dual role and its consequences impact 
the key dimensions of  effective (regional) leadership, both in negative and posi-
tive ways. The inclusion of  this dual role in our understanding of  regional lead-
ership can therefore help us understand the apparent contradictions and incon-
sistencies in South Africa’s foreign policy, particularly towards the region. This 
will be shown through the help of  two key examples—South Africa’s Zimbabwe 
policy and South Africa’s role in the strategic reform of  the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). These two cases represent two matters that are tradi-
tionally considered to be crucial aspects of  regional hegemonic leadership: the 
provision of  regional stability and the facilitation of  economic development.
Dual Role and Regional Leadership
The dual role of  regional powers creates, potentially, contradictory behavioral 
incentives for the regional power. A clear regional leadership role would, for 
instance, require the elimination of  significant external influence in the region, 
particularly if  this influence is meant to balance or contain the regional leader. 
Engagement with the international system should happen on behalf  of  the entire 
region, taking into account collective regional goals rather than simply the re-
gional leader’s own national interests. Activities of  this type are described as gate-
keeping. On the other hand, creating and maintaining a global role requires using 
 Robert Davies, South African Foreign Policy Options in a Changing Global Context (Centre for Southern African 
Studies, University of  the Western Cape, Southern African Perspectives, No. 0), Bellville 199.
6 Peter Kagwanja, Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of  Africa’s Multilateral Capacity for Peacemak-
ing, in: Journal of  Contemporary African Studies, No. 2/2006, pp. 19–18.
7 Domestic preferences and, hence, both regional and global ‘ambitions’ are largely taken as a given in this study, as a 
discussion of  the generation of  these preferences and values would go far beyond the scope of  this article. Instead, I 
have used governmental documentation and other official primary resources to assess both ambitions and interests of  
South Africa. As South Africa is a democracy, it is, as a simplification, taken for granted that these positions adequately 
amalgamate and represent domestic interests.
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the outstanding regional role as a stepping-stone to achieve global aims. This can 
be in the interest of  the region; usually, however, we should expect that the global 
interests of  a more developed state like South Africa differ from the interests 
of  its lesser or least developed neighbors. In sum, while gate-keeping involves 
the exclusion of  global actors from the region, stepping stone behavior requires 
close interaction with the same actors on issues of  global governance; and while 
the first type of  behavior generally requires the emphasis of  regional identity and 
solidarity, the latter demands a global outlook and, arguably, compliance with 
international expectations.
Leadership here is understood to have two main sources.8 On the one hand, it 
can be attained through the provision of  positive (and negative) material incen-
tives, such as public goods or market access. On the other hand, we can find a 
more subtle component of  leadership ‘at the level of  substantive beliefs’.9 Actors 
that are perceived to be legitimate and whose norms are accepted or internalized 
will find it easier to assume leadership. In both regards, the dual role of  regional 
leaders can have an impact. With regard to material incentives, the global involve-
ment of  South Africa means that it is able to provide smaller neighboring states 
with the opportunity to voice their interests, as South Africa acts as a mouthpiece 
for African concerns. Yet, an involvement at the global level could also divert 
financial or administrative resources away from regional concerns, which is often 
a key complaint of  South Africa’s neighboring states. With regard to beliefs and 
perceptions, involvement at the global level can negatively impact acceptance and 
legitimacy. In the case of  South Africa, we have found that it is often accused of  
acting as a puppet of  the West, and its explicit assumption of  an ‘intermediary 
role’ has been challenged in the neighborhood. The clearly-formulated expecta-
tions of  external actors, however, seem to give credibility to South Africa’s ability 
to solve some of  Africa’s problems more effectively than contenders such as 
Zimbabwe or Nigeria.
The Southern African Customs Union
The Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACUA) establishes a com-
mon external tariff  between the states of  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
8 This is certainly a very brief  discussion of  ‘leadership’ and summarizes briefly the key elements of  leadership identi-
fied elsewhere. See for example John G. Ikenberry, Charles A. Kupchan, The Legitimation of  Hegemonic Power, in: 
David Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony, London 1990, pp. 9–60; Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, 
Kim Nossal, Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf  Conflict, in: Political Science Quarterly, 
No. /1991, pp. 91–10; Arild Underdal, Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of  Management, in: William 
I. Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral Negotiations, San Francisco, CA, 199, pp. 178–197; Dirk Nabers, China, 
Japan and the Quest for Leadership in East Asia, Hamburg 2008.
9 G. John Ikenberry, Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, in: International Organization, 
No. /1990, pp. 28–1.
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(BLNS) and South Africa.0 Since the SACU’s establishment in 1910, its member 
pool has received substantial income from excise and import duties, which mem-
bers then share according to a complex, frequently-revised formula. After the end 
of  apartheid in South Africa, the SACUA had to be renegotiated again as both 
sides—South Africa on the one hand, and BLNS on the other—had become 
increasingly dissatisfied with it. The key points of  contestation were the deci-
sion-making processes; for instance, with regard to the level of  external tariffs, 
which were almost exclusively controlled by South Africa and the revenue sharing 
formula which was considered to be unfair by both. While South Africa contrib-
uted over 90 percent of  revenue, it received only a fraction of  the redistributed 
finances. The BLNS felt, however, that even this rather skewed distribution did 
not adequately compensate them for the trade diversion caused by South Africa’s 
much more considerable economic strength. Renegotiations started in 199, yet 
the final agreement was only signed in October 2002 and effectively implemented 
in 00.
Often, the difficulties that were faced during this torn-out reform process are 
linked with South Africa’s inability or unwillingness to commit to its regional 
leadership role in providing both positive and material incentives for its smaller 
neighboring states.  The reform and cooperation in SACU thus can illustrate the 
tensions of  regional leadership at the nexus of  regional and global politics. South 
Africa, on the one hand, is the clear economic hub in the SACU region, its eco-
nomic steam room, and also provider of  employment and stability. On the global 
level, it is an emerging, yet nevertheless small actor that, through its reputation, 
the reverberations of  its miracle transition, but also its regional power position, 
has over-proportional credence. South Africa clearly brings in its clout and hu-
man resources into negotiations with external actors. While, on the one hand, this 
might undermine the participatory rights of  the BLNS, it has been assured by the 
Department of  Trade and Industry (DTI) that strict coordination processes are 
followed and the South African negotiators have clear mandates that are geared 
towards the interests of  all SACU members: ‘With China, all the negotiations 
that are taking place are SACU negotiations. SA leads; and that was by agreement, 
because SA has the capacity to do this, which the other countries do not have.’ 
South Africa often takes on a protective stance in favour of  the BLNS against 
negative influences from outside the region and thus engages in a ‘gate-keep-
0 More on SACU: Robert Kirk, Matthew Stern, The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement, Africa Region 
Working Paper No. 7. Washington, DC, 200; Richard Gibb, The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: 
Dependence with Democracy, in: Journal of  Southern African Studies, No. /2006, pp. 8–60.
 New Agreement on SA Customs Union, in: Financial Times, 0/12/199. 
 Patrick J. McGowan, Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa, in: Journal of  Contempo-
rary African Studies, No. 2/1998, pp. 16–19.
 Interview with government official, Pretoria, 08/08/2006. 
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ing’ strategy. Several examples can be named, for instance when, allegedly, South 
Africa attempted to prevent China from impacting negatively on Lesotho’s textile 
industry, but more clearly and officially, when it stopped negotiations of  a SACU-
USA free trade agreement over a dispute about the treatment and special privileg-
es of  Southern Africa’s least developed countries (LDCs), mostly in agriculture. 
This happens despite that fact that it might jeopardize some of  South Africa’s 
opportunities of  concluding agreements with external partners.
South Africa’s dual role is, however, also problematic because of  the vast differ-
ences in economic development and trading needs between South Africa and 
its SACU neighbors, particularly the LDCs among them. Its commitment to 
development in Africa often contradicts the more specific commercial benefits 
available to South Africa through multilateral trade negotiations, and ‘South 
Africa faces a dilemma that reaches the core of  its trade policy.’ Taylor formu-
lates the following criticism: ‘Although South Africa has assiduously crafted an 
international image as “bridge-builder” between North and South at the WTO, in 
practice this has meant weakening African solidarity […]. Pretoria’s tactic of  uni-
laterally cutting deals with the North while grandly preaching African solidarity is 
also proving problematic for Mbeki’s credibility as a spokesperson for the whole 
of  Africa rather than for narrow South African interests only.’ In this respect, 
particularly the interactions of  South Africa at the WTO and its free trade nego-
tiations with the EU, the EU-SA Trade and Development Cooperation Agree-
ment (TDCA), have been attacked. It remained unclear for its neighboring states 
where South Africa’s ‘loyalties’ were and thus provoked a strong reaction. While 
the TDCA might have elevated South Africa’s position internationally by creat-
ing a basis of  equality between the two partners, to the BLNS it has signaled that 
South Africa considers itself  to be a country that is closer to ‘developed’ than to 
‘developing’ status’ and that its trade interests lie outside the region. At the WTO, 
South Africa cooperated with a group of  countries including Brazil, Argentina 
and Thailand, rather than siding with the then Organization of  African Unity 
(OAU). In Seattle, the South African delegation did not take part in the OAU 
caucus but rather participated in closed-door ‘Green Room’ discussions that 
provoked deep anger among developing countries.17 South Africa was openly op-
posed when trying to negotiate common SADC and SACU position on agricul-
 Interview with Dr. Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 07/07/2006.
 Lyal White, South Africa in the Post-Apartheid Era: Converging Foreign Policy and Trade Policy Priorities to Meet the 
Challenge of  Economic Growth and Equity, in: Fabio Villares (ed.), India, Brazil and South Africa: Perspectives and 
Alliances, São Paolo 2006, pp. 1–196. 
 Margaret C. Lee, The European Union-South Africa Trade Agreement: In Whose Interest?, in: Journal of  
Contemporary African Studies, No. 1/2002, pp. 81–106. 
17 Ian Taylor, When Rhetoric isn’t enough: Contradictions in South African Foreign Policy and NEPAD, in: Walter 
Carlsnaes (ed.), In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid, Midrand 2006, pp. 16–17.
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ture for the new Doha round in 00.18 South Africa’s ability to be included at the 
decisive informal groups at the international level arguably enhanced its interna-
tional weight, but also generated resentment and opposition at the regional level. 
Further, administrative capacities in South Africa were, for instance, stretched 
due to the simultaneity of  various important trade negotiations at the WTO level, 
with the EU, SADC and SACU. This has been named as the key reason for the 
delay of  the new SACU Agreement by officials of  the Department of  Trade and 
Industry.19
South Africa’s Zimbabwe Policy
The Zimbabwean crisis has been the poster case for many scholars to show 
how little influence South Africa has in Southern Africa and how easily it was 
‘snubbed off ’ by a resilient President Robert Mugabe. While many factors need 
to be considered, from the notion of  African solidarity, the status of  President 
Mugabe as liberation hero to domestic dynamics in South Africa, again, South 
Africa’s dual role on the regional and the global level arguably had an important 
effect on its regional leadership capacities and credentials. With regard to accep-
tance and legitimacy as elements of  successful leadership, the extent of  Western 
expectations on South Africa have played a particularly important role. Zimba-
bwe started to become a concern to the West with its decision to intervene in the 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo (DRC) with 10 000 troops in 
1998/99. Domestic developments in Zimbabwe that were increasingly framed as 
a violation of  New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
aggravated the alienation between Western governments and Zimbabwe even 
further. This is decisive as NEPAD was considered to be a major achievement 
in bringing about positive change in the relationship between Africa and the 
developed world.0 At the same time, the end of  Cold War proxy confrontations 
in the region, for instance in Angola, have left a power vacuum in the region, 
and South Africa as a regional power is widely regarded to be the most desirable 
actor for the solution of  arising problems, as expressed in US President George 
W. Bush’s designation of  President Mbeki as his ‘point man’ on Zimbabwe. The 
EU Commission has emphasized that ‘South Africa […] is a natural partner to 
Europe on the African continent and on a global level’ and plays a crucial role in 
18 South African officials complained about ‘hostile sentiments’ by both Namibia and Zimbabwe. Office of  the President, 
Background Information with Respect to South Africa’s Participation in the Fifth Southern African International 
Dialogue (SAID) on “Smart Partnership”. Annex B: Status with Respect to the WTO Negotiations (unpublished 
document), Pretoria 2001. 
19 Interview with government officials, Pretoria, 08/08/2006 and 1/08/2006.
0 Steffen Stübig, Wirkungsloser Druck: ‚Pariastaat’ Simbabwe zwischen westlichen Sanktionen und regionaler Solidarität, 
Hamburg 2007. 
 US Department of  State, Press Availability with President Bush and President Mbeki, Pretoria, 07/09/200. 
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making continuous efforts to bring the Zimbabwean crisis closer to a solution. 
The Zimbabwe resolution of  the European Parliament of  2002 is more explicit 
in expressing its expectations on, describing ‘President Mbeki […] in particular, 
as Zimbabwe’s most powerful neighbor and economic partner, as chairman of  
the AU, and as a member of  the Commonwealth Troika’ to have ‘the opportunity 
and responsibility to show leadership in helping bring about urgent change for 
the better in Zimbabwe.’ In practice, this means for example that South African 
government officials are consulted on Zimbabwe by most if  not all international 
actors.
Thus, while expectations of  South Africa to ‘take care of  its own backyard’ are 
palpable, we need to discuss whether, and if  so how, these expectations and 
pressures become relevant for South Africa’s regional leadership. These global 
support and expectations enhance South Africa’s capacities, by its ability, for 
example, to hold authoritative discussions with the World Bank and the IMF on 
the potential economic fall-out of  the Zimbabwean crisis and to build a bridge 
between Zimbabwe and these two organizations. This also extends to South 
Africa’s special partnership with the G8. Interviews with government officials in 
 Ibid.
 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Zimbabwe (P_TA/(2002)012), Point H, No. 9. 
 Interviews with two government officials, Pretoria, 1/07/2006 and 0/08/2006. 
 Zimbabwe Loan Freeze Sparks Regional Alert, in: All Africa, 08/10/2000. 
Magdalena Łecka from Poland, Miriam Prys from Germany, Chsysantus Ayangafac from 
Cameroon
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South Africa have shown that, while neighboring states will not like that South 
Africa does, for instance, have this access, they will have to live with it and make 
the best of  it, particularly, as government officials insisted, as South Africa argues 
on behalf  of  the whole region or continent in these forums. In the same vein, 
Zimbabwe does not appreciate the treatment of  South Africa as an envoy for 
its own domestic problems by external actors. Yet, in its isolation, it seems to 
make the best out of  the situation by using South Africa’s voice to bring its own 
concerns to the fore at the international level.27 Here, the ambivalence of  these 
effects becomes particularly clear as, at the same time, South Africa feels the need 
to distance itself  from US and European pressures and to take part in (African) 
multilateral negotiations.28 Also, the issue of  allegations of  racism of  the West is 
an important factor that impacts negatively on the possibility of  South African 
agency, as it puts it in the uncomfortable position to be easily labeled as a ‘black’ 
puppet of  the predominantly ‘white’ West.29
Looking at the way South Africa deals with its potential dual role on both the 
regional and the global level, we can see that it has engaged with the global level 
on behalf  or with respect to Zimbabwe at three important international entry 
points, the Commonwealth, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, as well as the EU and the United States. It has limited the capacity of  these 
actors to engage with Zimbabwe directly. South Africa made clear that external 
actors should not interfere and, by its defensive posture, have effectively shielded 
Zimbabwe and the region from the interference of  external actors. Thus, South 
Africa clearly shows characteristics of  gate-keeping rather than stepping-stone 
behavior particularly as it has jeopardized its international reputation as a torch-
bearer in human rights issues and a reliable state in Africa. This has potentially 
enhanced its legitimacy and leadership capacities on the regional level.
Conclusion
For both cases, SACU and Zimbabwe, South Africa is unmistakably faced with 
competing priorities and a conflict between its global and regional ambitions. 
This has had an impact, particularly, on how its leadership role is perceived by its 
neighboring states. The arising tensions have at times forced South Africa to take 
a stand either pursuing its global interests or abiding regional concern. Overall, it 
 Interview with government official, Pretoria, 08/02/2006 and with Dr. Chris Landsberg, Johannesburg, 07/18/2006. 
27 Interview with Prof. Adam Habib, Pretoria, 07/29/2006. 
28 Janis von der Westhuizen, South Africa’s Emergence as a Middle Power, in: Third World Quarterly, No. /1998, 
pp. –6. 
29 Interviews with Dr. Chris Landsberg, Johannesburg, 18/07/2006 and Prof. Adam Habib, Pretoria, 29/07/2006. This 
has been in particular an issue in the Commonwealth discussions of  the Zimbabwean issue and President Mbeki has 
been very outspoken about this. See Thabo Mbeki, Letter from the President, in: ANC Today, 12/12/200. 
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seems that in both cases, it has tried to emphasis its regional credentials. In the 
case of  SACU, South Africa gave up its privileges to negotiate independently on 
the global level with regard to its own economic self-interest only. The benefits it 
gained from this relinquishment are predominantly regional. It has strengthened 
its position in the region by making its overwhelming power more legitimate and 
more accessible to the BLNS by providing them with an arrangement securing a 
steady and much-needed flow of  revenue.0 Also in the case of  Zimbabwe, South 
Africa has prioritized its regional ambitions and, thus, extended the acceptance of  
its regional leadership. We have to keep in mind that the interest in the end of  the 
Mugabe regime is not necessarily shared in Southern Africa, where the majority 
of  regimes have rather doubtful democratic and human rights credentials. On an 
international level, its reputation as a good international citizen, its NEPAD proj-
ect and potentially a permanent seat in the UN Security Council have been put 
at risk through its Zimbabwe policy. Yet, its regional role prescriptions required 
it to act in the best interest of  the region, which is, at least from a governmental 
perspective, best assured by quiet diplomacy and a restriction of  the influence 
of  external actors. This results in inconsistency, for example, when it comes to 
the strong support of  NEPAD and its African Peer Review Mechanism while 
simultaneously Zimbabwe seems to break most of  the rules embedded in both 
institutions.
South Africa’s dual role thus shapes its approach to the region. This ambivalence 
is present in most of  its interactions and it is caught in a desire to be both part 
of  the global governance elite and to rely on its regional leadership credentials in 
order to support this ambition. While South Africa is therefore often criticized 
for not fulfilling its regional responsibilities, this paper has tried to show that we 
need to think more about the potential dual role of  regional leaders in order to 
properly understand the difficulties these states face in balancing their interests 
on both the regional and the global level.
0 Rod Alence, SACU and the Political Economy of  Regionalism: Towards a Deeper and Broader Integration?, Trade 
Policy Briefing, Vol. 12, 2006.
 Jack E. Spence, Point Man on Zimbabwe: South Africa’s Role in the Crisis, in: The Round Table, No. 8/2006, 
pp. 191–199. 
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Primus inter Pares: Britain’s Contribution to the Development 
of a European Union ‘Grand Strategy’
James Rogers
It goes without saying that the United Kingdom was a latecomer to the political 
project of  European integration. While Sir Winston Churchill may have been 
the first major European statesman to advance continental unification, he was 
clear that Britain should not be part of  it: ‘We have our own dreams. We are with 
Europe but not of  it. We are linked but not compromised.’ Even at the end 
of  World War II, many Britons felt that they had a special global role—a view 
buttressed by William Fox, who coined the term ‘superpower’ in 19, including 
Britain alongside the United States and Soviet Russia. But in hindsight, as ‘de-
colonization’ began with India’s independence in 197, Britain’s reach began to 
falter. Economic difficulties and the Suez War in 196 compounded this trajec-
tory; superpower pretensions were shattered.
Pruned of  empire, and perhaps envious of  German, Italian and French economic 
resurgence, it was not long before the British government sought to join the Eu-
ropean Community. While this was achieved in 197, Britain was soon branded 
as a ‘reluctant European,’ not least because of  the importance it placed on rela-
tions with other parts of  the world—particularly the United States. As Brendan 
Simms has recently shown, this global orientation hardened after the British 
victories during the Seven Years’ War (176–176), when the country’s traditional 
Eurocentric grand strategy began to turn global. ‘Europe’ has competed for Brit-
ish attention ever since. And, according to Simms, this has been very much to 
the nation’s detriment:
a forward policy in Europe best secured Britain’s maritime predominance...the sea was not 
a bulwark at all. Rather it was a highway connecting Britain not only to the wider world, 
but more importantly to her immediate neighbours: a bridge, not a moat. “Rule Britannia” 
had it wrong: the “main” which mattered most to Britons was not the shimmering “Span-
1 For more on Sir Winston Churchill’s thoughts on European integration, see: Wendell Mauter, Churchill and the 
Unification of  Europe, in: The Historian, No. 1/1998, pp. 67–8.
2 William T. R. Fox, Superpowers: the United States, the British Empire and the Soviet union—their responsibility for 
peace, New York, NY, 19, p. 21.
 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British policy and World Power in the 20th century, Harlow 2000, pp. 191–19.
 Andrew Gamble, Between Europe and America: The Future of  British Politics, Basingstoke 200, pp. 108–11.
 For a review of  Simms’ argument, see: James Rogers, Britain: The European power, in: Global Power Europe, 
0/11/2007.
6 A good discussion on British-European identity can be found in: Timothy Garton Ash, Is Britain European?, in: 
International Affairs, No. 1/2001, pp. 1–1.
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ish main” of  unlimited colonial opportunity, but the European “mainland” to which they 
belonged politically, if  not geographically. In short, Britain’s first and most important lines 
of  defence lay not in her “wooden walls”, but in Europe itself.
In what follows, we hope to show that British grand strategy is again undergoing 
a phase of  ‘Europeanization’, while the global dimension of  British foreign and 
security policy is simultaneously being projected onto the European level. And 
we hope to show how this double movement between Britain and the European 
Union has led to the reorganization of  both as international actors—and particu-
larly to the empowerment of  the latter.
A Few Words on ‘Grand Strategy’
A ‘grand strategy’ can be likened to a framework through which a community 
seeks not only protection from specified threats and challenges—its ‘security cul-
ture’—but also the instruments required to address those concerns—its ‘strategic 
culture.’8 Grand strategy can be understood as a synthesis of  the two. According 
to Barry Posen:
A grand strategy can be best conceived as a theory about how to achieve security. Security as 
a concept encompasses the safety, sovereignty, territorial integrity and power position of  states. 
A grand strategy identifies and prioritises threats to a state’s security, and similarly identifies 
appropriate political and military remedies. These remedies consist of  chains of  interconnect-
ed political and military means and ends—including military forces, intelligence capabilities, 
alliances, defence industry, foreign aid programmes, etc.9
A grand strategy is thus a political framework that serves as the central point of  
identification within a given community. That is to say, as progressively more 
groups and people identify with the grand strategy, it shapes the community by 
defining its borders; providing it with a collective story about its past; organizing 
a framework for envisioning its potential future; and structuring how the commu-
nity should interact and position itself  vis-à-vis the outside world. In short, grand 
strategy is stitched into the fabric of  the social, shaping its very identity.0
7 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, London 2008, p. .
8 For a good introduction to the debates on both concepts, see: Jeffrey S. Lantis, Darryl Howlett, Strategic Culture, 
in: John Baylis et al. (eds.), Strategy in the Modern World, Oxford 2007, pp. 82–99. In a European context, the best 
discussion is provided by: Geoffrey Edwards, Paul Cornish, Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of  a 
European strategic culture, in: International Affairs, No. /2001, pp. 87–60.
9 Barry Posen, The European Security Strategy: Practical Implications, in: Oxford Journal of  Good Governance, 
No. 1/200, pp. –.
0 Iver B. Neumann, Henrikki Heikka, Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of  Nordic Defence, 
in: Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of  the Nordic Studies Association, No. 1/2007, p. .
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Yet how does grand strategy change? The answer can surely be provided by two 
concepts: the first being ‘dislocation’ and the second being the political practice 
of  ‘securitization’. Dislocation accounts for the moment during which an exist-
ing framework is shattered by some negative and decidedly traumatic experience. 
Usually, these experiences are very minor, but they can also be more radical, 
whence they penetrate right down to the depths of  the social. But dislocation is 
not only a traumatic experience. As Ernesto Laclau says: ‘If  on the one hand … 
[dislocations] threaten identities, on the other they are the foundation on which 
new identities are constituted.’ In other words, after dislocation, we should 
expect ‘hegemonic agents’ to emerge in order to stitch the dislocated parts of  
the strategic culture into a new framework—or to try and radically restructure 
the entire ensemble. We cannot, however, necessarily discern in advance which 
hegemonic agents will succeed in providing the ‘answers’ to the ‘threats’; rather, 
what we are likely to witness is a political struggle by different groups, each aim-
ing to universalize its own particular vision of  grand strategy as the community’s 
own.
Securitization could be seen as a form of  articulation applicable to the disloca-
tion of  grand strategy. In the event of  the emergence of  a perceived threat to 
a community’s safety and cohesion, hegemonic agents might seek to provide a 
new vision in order to overcome the danger. This does not mean that the threat 
is necessarily fabricated, but rather that securitization ‘takes politics beyond the 
established rules of  the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of  poli-
tics or as above politics.’ This allows particular hegemonic agents, in this case, 
‘securitizing actors’—that is to say, officials, academics and politicians with the 
authority to issue statements on foreign policy and security—to press for extraor-
dinary forms of  action in order to overcome the said threats. But as Ole Wæver 
points out, the securitizing move can only succeed, if  the community accepts the 
securitizing actors’ arguments as credible and legitimate.17 As such, grand strategy 
is usually pieced together after a dislocation at which point ‘securitizing actors’ 
proliferate and struggle to re-articulate a new order.
 For more on the theory of  dislocation, see Yannis Stavrakakis, On the emergence of  Green Ideology, in: David 
Howarth et al. (eds.), Discourse theory and political analysis, Manchester 2000, pp. 100–118.
 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of  Our Time, London 1990, p. 9.
 Neumann, Heikka, op. cit. (note 10), pp. –2.
 For a good introduction on the concept of  securitization, see: Ralf  Emmers, Securitisation, in: Allan Collins (ed.), 
Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford 2007, pp. 109–12.
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO, 1998, p. 2.
 Ole Wæver, Securitisation and Desecuritisation, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York, NY, 199, p. .
17 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, op. cit. (note ), p. .
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New Geopolitics, New Labour, New Britain, New Europe?
Britain, like France, has a traditional grand strategy of  its own, predicated on 
global activism and forward deployment, which puts it in a different league than 
supposedly neutral powers like Austria and Finland or the more cautious member 
states Germany, Italy and Spain.18 This global orientation may be far removed 
from the days of  empire, but the residue still penetrates British imaginations. As 
Stephen Haseler puts it: ‘This lingering imperial impulse…[is] a somewhat incho-
ate, but seriously held view that Britain was some kind of  special country—a 
reduced but still exceptional, even superior power which can help guide less 
fortunate nations.’19 The British obsession with what might be called ‘positional 
security’ has always been a critical dimension of  their foreign policy.0 In William 
Walker’s words: Britons have long needed to know ‘where they stand in the world, 
who they stand with, and how to improve or regain their standing.’ In this sense, 
Britain came to question its position again during the mid and late 1990s, when 
a number of  events dislocated many of  the alliances, frameworks and doctrines 
through which British grand strategy had been pursued during the Cold War era 
and its immediate aftermath.
First, the Wars of  the Yugoslav Succession (1991–1999) revealed Britain’s inabil-
ity and unwillingness to put an end to a small crisis on Europe’s periphery, par-
ticularly because of  the ‘Realist’ foreign policies implemented by the Conserva-
tive government of  John Major and his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. And 
because of  the primacy of  the Atlantic Alliance, British politicians and strategists 
were still reluctant to provide the European-level capabilities, doctrine and institu-
tions needed to solve the crisis. Second, the residue of  Cold War strategy and 
the economic difficulties it produced contributed to British inactivity, and it was 
only after the Europeans—and particularly the British—gave way to the United 
States’ policy of  ‘lift and strike’ that some sort of  a lid was put back on the Bal-
kans cauldron, and many Europeans got very red faces. Third, the handover of  
Hong Kong in 1997, and a feeling of  isolation in Brussels during the latter era 
18 Robert Tombes, Isabelle Tombes, That Sweet Enemy: The British and the French from the Sun King to the Present, 
London 2007, p. 671.
19 Stephen Haseler, Sidekick: British Global Strategy from Churchill to Blair, London 2008, p. .
0 For more on this concept, see: William Walker, Where Does Britain Stand in the World?, in: John Gittings, Ian Davis 
(eds.), Britain in the 21st Century: Rethinking Defence and Foreign Policy, London 1997, pp. 7–8. Also: Christoph O. 
Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, Basingstoke 2006, p. 8.
 Walker,ibid.
 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of  Bosnia, London 2001. See especially pp. 6–9.
 Richard Whitman, Amsterdam’s unfinished business? The Blair government’s initiative and the future of  the Western 
European Union, Paris 1999, p. 9.
 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence in the European Union, Basingstoke 2007, p. .
 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th century, Harlow 2000, pp. 29–297.
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of  John Major’s government, further reduced Britain’s international and Europe-
an roles. It is in this atmosphere that a number of  British hegemonic agents seem 
to have realized that Britain could regain influence if  they began to press for the 
European Union to be furnished with the means to become a more credible and 
capable global power.
The trouncing of  the Tories in the British general election of  May 1997 opened 
the door to a restructuring of  British grand strategy. New Labour suffered 
neither the euroscepticism nor Realpolitik of  the previous government.27 The 
Americans were the first to realize this; New Labour’s approach, as one Ameri-
can official claimed, was like ‘a breath of  fresh air.’28 This was already apparent 
in April 1997, when Tony Blair gave his only lecture on foreign policy during 
the electoral campaign. As John Kampfner reports, this speech was robust and 
confident: Blair criticized the Conservatives’ ‘negative’ foreign policy, their weak-
ness, their indecision, and their burning of  bridges with Washington and Brussels. 
Blair proclaimed: ‘The Britain in my vision is not a Britain turning its back on the 
world—narrow, shy, uncertain. It is a Britain confident of  its place in the world, 
 This came to the fore during an interview with the former Director-General of  External and Politico-Military Affairs 
at the General Secretariat of  the Council of  the European Union, Sir Brian Crowe, on 10th March 2008.
27 This type of  foreign policy has been aptly described as ‘amoral quietism.’ See Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism: The 
Left-wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy, London 200.
28 Cited in Simms, Unfinest Hour (note 22), p. .
James Rogers from the United Kingdom, Charlotta Spolander from Finland, Kathrin Brockmann 
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sure of  itself  … and [ready to] provide leadership in the world.’ His speech’s apex 
was: ‘Century upon century it has been the destiny of  Britain to lead other na-
tions. That should not be a destiny that is part of  our history. It should be a part 
of  our future.’29 At the time, many suggested that this was just pre-election hot 
air, but in hindsight, it represents the re-emergence of  Britain’s traditional global-
ism, albeit one set to be wrapped in new European clothes.
The New Labour government was keen to show that it was committed to the Eu-
ropean enterprise in a way that previous Tory governments were not. According 
to Sir Stephen Wall, the British Ambassador to the Union from 199 to 2000, and 
then Tony Blair’s foremost European Union advisor between 000 and 00, a 
new catch-all phrase was even created—by Colin Budd, an official at the Foreign 
Office—to christen the new approach: ‘Step Change.’0 Quickly pushed in the 
ministries of  Whitehall, ‘Step Change’ reached its crescendo during the Anglo-
French St. Malo summit in 1998, when the Prime Minister unlocked the door to 
a greater level of  European strategic autonomy. In part, British leaders were keen 
to push European security and defense because they needed an area in which they 
could demonstrate Britain’s willingness to be at the heart of  Europe, especially in 
light of  their decision in October 1997 not to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union. But they were also motivated by real concerns about the marginalization 
of  European influence within the Atlantic Alliance, due to declining European 
military capabilities and political will. The new British government decided that 
something had to be done to bring other member states out of  Cold War strate-
gic mindsets and into line with the new British approach to foreign, security and 
defense policy—represented by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR).
As Richard Whitman has shown, Robert Cooper, who was at the time the Deputy 
Secretary for Defence and Overseas Affairs in the Cabinet Office, was also influ-
ential in this project, especially when he was asked to draft a confidential memo-
randum in May 1998 for the Prime Minister and relevant parties in the Foreign 
Office. Charles Grant, who in 1998 assumed the directorship of  the newly es-
tablished Centre for European Reform, also saw Cooper’s memorandum. This 
influenced his own pamphlet “Can Britain Lead in Europe?”, which included an 
influential chapter calling for Britain to support a European-level security and 
29 John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, London 200, p. .
0 Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair, London 2008, p. 176.
 Ibid., p. 169.
 Secretary of  State for Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/
6FD7AC-0-119-9A2-208288E0E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf> (01/07/2008).
 Whitman, op. cit. (note ), p. .
 This was established during an interview with Charles Grant, 0/0/2008.
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defense policy. Grant suggested that the old Western European Union, a largely 
defunct institution, should be dismembered; he argued that its political dimension 
should become a fourth pillar in the European Union, while its military dimen-
sion should be given to NATO. He claimed that this would confirm a new Brit-
ish commitment to the rest of  Europe, while simultaneously strengthening the 
Atlantic Alliance. In this way, Grant’s pamphlet can be understood as an attempt 
to transmit political demands by sectors within the British government into the 
wider political community, especially towards those interested in the potential for 
European security and defense policy.
This new British approach was discussed at the informal summit of  European 
leaders at Pörtschach on October 2th–2th, 1998, but it was not until the 
St. Malo summit between the British and French on December th, 1998 that 
it bore fruit. While France—which had pushed for European defense integra-
tion for many years—was initially cautious of  the new British approach, the two 
powers agreed that the European Union should be able ‘to be in a position to 
play its full role on the international stage,’ including ‘autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so,’ while sustaining ‘the vitality of  a modernized Atlantic Alliance which 
is the foundation of  the collective defense of  its members.’ Britain and France 
also agreed that, ‘Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly 
to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European 
defense industry and technology.’ However, as Jolyon Howorth has noted, it 
remains unclear whether the two powers still had different understandings as to 
where the project they unleashed at St. Malo might lead—whether it was (and is) 
about a fully autonomous European power, or merely a means to improve Eu-
ropean military capabilities within the Atlantic Alliance.7 Yet, to date, it has not 
prevented several further steps from being taken, not the least of  which is the 
ongoing creation of  the European Rapid Reaction Force, numerous battlegroups, 
the institutions in Brussels, and the European Defence Agency. It has also not 
precluded seventeen different civil and military missions, as undertaken under the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). And with France’s full readmis-
sion to NATO likely, this question of  the intentions of  the St. Malo project may 
already be answered.
 Charles Grant, Can Britain Lead in Europe?, London 1998, pp. –0.
 Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo 0/12/1998, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=
OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=100702991629&aid=101618907> (06/0/2008).
7 Jolyon Howorth, Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy, in: West 
European Politics, No. 2/200, pp. 211–2.
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Clearly, the sheer power and capabilities available to the British state buttressed 
the British government’s position within Europe. While the French military also 
packs a formidable punch, the British military’s level of  global reach, technologi-
cal firepower and organizational capacity is simply on a different plane than the 
militaries of  other European Union member states. Problems do exist: Britain has 
been stretched considerably thin since undertaking expeditionary operations in 
Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001–) and Iraq (200–), and it 
would be succinctly difficult for Britain to fight a large war alone. But the British 
Armed Forces still remain unique amongst Europeans in their ability to project 
power over long distances, using some of  the world’s foremost technology.8 
They are financed not only by the largest military research budget in Europe,9 
but also by the second highest military funding in the world,0 which supports a 
sizable defense complex. With this, Britain’s four nuclear ballistic missile subma-
rines provide it and its European allies with a nuclear umbrella, while the Royal 
Navy’s aircraft carriers—which are to be significantly upgraded in 201 and 2016, 
respectively—and new amphibious assault vessels (commissioned in 00) are 
the backbone around which the world’s second strongest fleet is organized. The 
Royal Air Force is Europe’s second biggest and among the world’s most advanced, 
while the British army, although small, is fully professionalized and able to fight at 
similar levels of  intensity as the United States. Alongside France, Britain is also 
unique in possessing several overseas military installations, space-based arrays and 
satellite infrastructure. These capacities have furnished Britain with the means to 
undertake worldwide military operations every year for the past decade.
This combination of  a new strategic doctrine and material power has placed Brit-
ain in a unique position as the European Union’s pre-eminent military power. As 
Daniel Korski of  the British-based European Council on Foreign Relations has 
argued, these strategic attributes serve as a model for other Europeans to copy 
and follow. In his words: ‘the pendulum has swung towards London and the re-
8 Robert Tombes, Isabelle Tombes, op. cit. (note 18), pp. 67–679.
9 European Defence Agency, National Defence Expenditure in 2006, Brussels 2007, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/
genericitem.aspx?area=Facts&id=09> (10/0/2008).
0 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The 1 major spender countries in 2006, Stockholm 2007, <http://
www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf> (10/0/2008).
 Matthew Jamison, James Rogers, Britain and the world, in: John Bew (ed.), The British Moment, London 2006, p. ; 
James Hope, James Rogers, The Royal Navy: Britain’s Trident for a Global Agenda, th September 2006 <http://www.
henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=9&id=279> (07/0/2008).
 Venusburg Group, A European Defence Strategy, Gütersloh 200, <http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/
download/200/200_Venusberg_Report.pdf> (10/0/2008), p. 68.
 Outside of  the European Union, these can be found in Ascension Island, the Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Canada, 
Cyprus, Diego Garcia, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Kenya, Nepal, Norway, Qatar, Singapore and the United States.
 These conflicts include: bombing Iraq (1998), the Kosovo intervention (1999), the intervention in Sierra Leone (2000), 
the war against the Taleban (2001–), the war in Iraq (200–-) and assistance in European military operations under the 
ESDP.
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configuration of  Europe’s security landscape is a reality.’ For example, it seems 
more than mere coincidence that the German Defence Review of  2006 and the 
French Defence Review of  2008 reflected the evolving British trend solidified in 
the 1998 SDR. What is important here is not that the British government has di-
rected this project, but rather that the dynamism of  British strategic discourse has 
filtered across to other member states, as well as up to the European level, and 
perhaps even back down again. Britain’s European influence has risen through 
the dispersion of  its grand strategy.
The European Union’s Grand Strategy
Those, such as Robert Cooper, who were involved from the start in rethinking 
British foreign policy, have also directed their attention to the European level (in-
sofar as the two can be disentangled). In 1996, a Labour-leaning think tank called 
Demos published Cooper’s first pamphlet, which marked the start of  a stream 
of  subsequent articles, pamphlets and books on foreign policy, international 
politics and security studies.7 All of  these works have looked into the relation-
ship between security threats after the Cold War and the way in which the Eu-
ropean Union might respond to them. Running through all of  them is Cooper’s 
claim that the end of  the Soviet Union meant the death of  Realpolitik within the 
European system. According to Cooper, this collapsing order has been replaced 
with neither a ‘new world order’ nor a ‘new world disorder’; instead, as he put it: 
‘there is a zone of  safety in Europe, and outside it a zone of  danger and a zone 
of  chaos.’8 In fact, most of  the world is like a dangerous ‘jungle’.9 For Cooper, 
the Westphalian modern state, which made Realpolitik possible, has either col-
lapsed into pockets of  ‘pre-modern’ disorder—particularly in places such as the 
former Yugoslavia—or has condensed into a greater order, which he describes as 
the ‘post-modern element’. Cooper claims that the European Union is the best 
 Daniel Korski, London Calling: How Britain Now Runs European Security, 0/0/2008, < http://www.ecfr.eu/
content/entry/commentary_london_calling_how_britain_determines_euroepan_security/> (01/07/2008).
 Robert Cooper, The post-modern state and the world order, London 1996.
7 For example, ‘The post-modern state’ was updated in 2000, and formed the core of  chapter in Mark Leonard’s 
Reordering the World: The long-term implications of  September 11th. It was also integrated into two articles entitled 
‘The new liberal imperialism’ and ‘Civilise or die’, as well as Cooper’s book, ‘The Breaking of  Nations’. The second 
part of  this was intended originally as an essay for the British Prime Minister to read over Christmas 2002. See: Robert 
Cooper, The post-modern state and the world order, London 2000; Robert Cooper, The post-modern state, in: Mark 
Leonard (ed.), Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term implications of  September 11th, London 2002, pp. 11–20; 
Robert Cooper, The new liberal imperialism, in: The Observer, 7th April 2002; Robert Cooper, Civilise or die, in: The 
Guardian, 2rd October 200; Robert Cooper, The Breaking of  Nations, London 200; Robert Cooper, The Breaking 
of  Nations, London 200.
8 Robert Cooper, The post-modern state and the world order, London 1996, p. .
9 Ibid., p. 8.
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representative of  post-modernity.0 As such, it is not too far off  the mark to sug-
gest that Cooper has attempted to securitize the entire non-European world.
Cooper fears that post-modern states, predicated on openness and transparency, 
are increasingly unwilling to exercise raw power, which in his eyes has led them to 
‘neglect our defences, both physical and psychological.’ In such circumstances, 
he warns that ‘when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of  states, we need 
to revert to the rougher methods of  an earlier era—force, pre-emptive attack, 
deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century 
world of  every state for itself.’ And in order to do this, he calls on Europeans to 
bolster their defences, develop an effective grand strategy and engage more pro-
actively across the globe. Indeed, similarly to (and before) Robert Kagan, Coo-
per warns Europeans that becoming too reliant on civilian power, multilateralism 
and international institutions will not only harm their own foreign policy but also 
their relationship with the United States:
The … issue is whether in the long run—and I would say personally, this is perhaps the 
point that worries me most—there isn’t a risk of  a cultural separation taking place between 
Europe and the US—a culture of  power on one side of  the Atlantic and a culture of  law 
on the other side. Or, if  you like, Hobbes on one side and Grotius on the other. Actually, 
we need both law and power; we need both Hobbes and Grotius.54
Cooper’s primary concern is to combine the use of  force with the importance 
of  legitimacy. His answer is to extend international law, supplemented with 
military power, to tame ‘jungle’—that is, ‘modern’ danger and ‘pre-modern’ 
chaos—through transformational imperialism. For him, European power must 
be calibrated to meet these new circumstances.
0 Robert Cooper, The post-modern state, in: Mark Leonard (ed.), Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term implications 
of  September 11th, London 2002, p. 16.
 Ibid.
 Cooper, op. cit. (note 8), p. 7.
 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of  Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century, London 200, p. 16.
 This context of  this argument is often attributed to the American scholar, Robert Kagan. See: Robert Kagan, Power 
and Weakness, in: Policy Review, June/July 2002, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6026.html> 
(0/0/2008). But it was actually Cooper who first advanced the problematic situation of  Hobbesian Americans and 
Grotian Europeans, at the annual meeting at the Trilateral Commission, in 2000: <http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/
trialog/trlgtxts/t/coo.htm> (0/0/2008). For a longer article on the same issue, see: Robert Cooper, Hard Power, 
Soft Power and the Goals of  Diplomacy, in: David Held, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 
21st Century, Cambridge, 200, pp. 167–180. 
 Frank Foley, Between Force and Legitimacy: The Worldview of  Robert Cooper, Florence 2007.
 For example, he cites Machiavelli’s maxim of  the need for ‘good laws and good armies’. See: Robert Cooper, Civilise 
or die, in: The Guardian, 2/10/200. For a longer article, see: Robert Cooper, Imperial Liberalism, in: The National 
Interest, No. 79/200, pp. 2–.
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Significantly, Cooper was given the opportunity to advance this British-influenced 
approach at the European level in autumn 00. He was appointed Director-
General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of  
the Council of  the European Union. Not only has he since played an important 
role as one of  Javier Solana’s top advisors, but his pen was also behind much of  
the European Security Strategy of  200.7 Many of  his ideas can be found in this 
document, from calls for the Union to become more active and establish a world 
order predicated on ‘effective multilateralism’, to the ‘need to develop a strategic 
culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.’8
The European Union’s Emergence as a ‘Global Power’
So where does this lead us? Clearly, the partial dislocation of  British grand strat-
egy in the 1990s allowed for the construction of  a new and increasingly Europe-
an equivalent. This saw the displacement of  many facets of  British globalism and 
their transference to the European level. Hegemonic agents influenced by British 
grand strategy—people like Cooper and Grant, but also others like Daniel Keo-
hane, Steven Everts, Nick Witney and Mark Leonard, as well as think tanks like 
the Centre for European Reform, the Foreign Policy Centre and Demos—have 
pioneered the way in this new project, first within Britain during the latter 1990s, 
and now increasingly at the European level. They have produced, in turn, an 
environment in which new think tanks such as the European Council on Foreign 
Relations can develop, adding further weight to the project.9 In part, this is surely 
because of  the attraction of  Britain’s globally-oriented and activist tradition in 
international politics. While a similar approach has long been taken by France, it 
was only after the aforementioned changes in Britain that both powers joined 
forces to press the project forward at the European level, leading to what Michael 
Smith calls a ‘wider’, ‘deeper’ and ‘harder’ Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and ESDP.0
As such, Britain has emerged as a regional leader within the European Union. 
The transferal of  its dynamic global approach has influenced European security 
culture, which is increasingly less ‘chronopolitical’—that is, less concerned with 
the return of  Europe’s warlike past—and progressively more ‘geopolitical’, in 
7 Jolyon Howorth, From Security to Defence: the Evolution of  the CFSP, in: Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, 
International Relations and the European Union, Oxford 200, p. 19.
8 European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels 200, <http://ue.eu.
int/uedocs/cmsUpload/7867.pdf> (06/0/2008).
9 Notice, for example, the creation of  the European Council on Foreign Relations in several European Union capitals, 
which is headed by Mark Leonard. Further, Charles Grant has also been noted for the Centre for European Reform 
‘punching above its weight.’
0 Michael Smith, The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions, in: European 
Foreign Affairs Review, No. /2007, p. .
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other words, positioning the Union separately from the outside world. As Geof-
frey Edwards and Paul Cornish have shown, this is leading towards a European 
strategic culture, which is more robust and credible. And when taken together, 
the two cultures, security and strategic, have contributed to a new European 
Union grand strategy which, in turn, has constituted a more amalgamated security 
community. This could have significant consequences for the British, European 
and global orders, particularly if  the political cohesion and willpower can be 
found at the European level to project the Union’s growing capacities and de-
mands onto the world stage.
Given its position as a hub of  strategic expertise and as Europe’s pre-eminent 
military power, Britain’s role in the future development of  a European Union 
grand strategy appears likely to remain critical. As the CFSP High Representative, 
Javier Solana, argued at the University of  Oxford in March 2008: ‘Europe needs 
Britain. A credible European foreign policy without the United Kingdom is sim-
ply not possible. Europe needs your … ideas, resources and relationships. Your 
organisational capacity, your global mindset and your armed forces.’ Yet in an 
increasingly volatile and unpredictable world, Britain’s leaders seem increasingly 
convinced that Britain needs the European Union. Should this project continue 
to develop at the same speed over the next decade as it has over the previous 
ones, the paradox might be that Britain’s grand strategy becomes indistinguish-
able from the ‘European’ grand strategy, perhaps reducing Britain’s standing. But 
if  we are facing the threats identified by British strategists, the cost might be 
worth the price. Should Gordon Brown’s government choose to do so, it could 
put Britain further at the heart of  Europe, particularly if  London can find ways 
of  reconciling any outstanding differences with Paris.
 Paul Cornish, Geoffrey Edwards, The strategic culture of  the European Union: a progress report, in: International 
Affairs, No. /200, pp. 801–820.
 Karl Deutsch (ed.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of  
Historical Experience, Princeton 197. For more on ‘security communities’, see: Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), 
Security Communities, Cambridge 1998.
 Javier Solana, Europe in the World: The Next Steps, Oxford 2008, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/99116.pdf> (10/0/2008).
 The British government’s policy dossier Global Europe, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/global- 
europe> (08/07/2008). 
France’s Renewed  
Atlanticism
11
 
New Faces Conference 2008
France’s Renewed Atlanticism
Luís Simón Navarro
Introduction
This article seeks to conceptualize France’s geopolitical repositioning within the 
transatlantic space. France’s renewed atlanticism is here explained as an attempt 
to preserve grandeur in a context characterized by an ongoing erosion of  the 
country’s relative influence in Europe and leadership position in the European 
Union, best illustrated by the rise of  Germany’s relative power in the continent 
and, to a lesser extent, Britain’s growing interest in the European Union.
The ideal of  grandeur, widely associated with that of  autonomy, lies at the very 
centre of  France’s foreign and security policy. Whereas the notion of  autonomy 
has clearly occupied a central role in French foreign and security policy literature, 
it has sometimes been presented in contradiction with that of  influence, both 
in the realm of  French foreign and security policy studies and Foreign Policy 
Analysis at large. It is, nonetheless, seemingly hard to separate the very notions 
of  freedom (autonomy) and power (influence) from each other, and perhaps 
more obviously so in the realm of  international politics; as Michael Heseltine 
argued, “a man alone in the desert is sovereign. He is also powerless.” To be 
sure, France’s quest for grandeur has rested upon her attempt to balance au-
tonomy and influence, an enterprise which requests the adequate combination of  
the country’s various foreign and security policy assets—mainly diplomatic and 
military. The concepts of  autonomy and influence will therefore be here treated 
interdependently, at the service of  grandeur.
1 I would like to thank Jerome Bacquias, Rosa Balfour, Edward Mills, Alister Miskimmon, Antonio Missiroli, Henning 
Riecke, James Rogers, an anonymous reviewer, and all the participants in the 11th DGAP New Faces Conference for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the European Foreign and Security Policy Studies 
Program—Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Compagnia di San Paolo and Volkswagen Stiftung—and the Department of  
Politics and International Relations of  Royal Holloway (University of  London) for financial support.
2 For a stimulating overview of  Britain’s growing European focus see James Rogers’ contribution on this issue.
 Grandeur (greatness) is often described as rank, status. On grandeur and French foreign policy see Maurice Vaïsse, La 
grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (198–1969), Paris 1998; Fréderic Charillon, Peut-il encore y avoir 
une politique étrangère française?, in: Politique étrangère, No. /2002, pp. 91–929 ; Stanley Hoffmann, La France 
dans le Monde 1979–2000, in: Politique étrangère, No. 2/2000, pp. 07–17.
 Etienne de Durand, Quel format d’armée pour la France, in: Politique Etrangére, No. /2007, pp. 729–72; Rainer 
Baumann, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Wagner, Neorealist foreign policy theory, in : Volker Rittberger (ed.), German 
foreign policy since unification, Manchester 2001, pp. 7–69. 
 Quoted in Javier Solana, Europe in the world: the next steps, Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University, 28/02/2008, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/99116.pdf>. For a conceptual 
discussion on the different faces of  power see Steven Lukes, Power: a radical view, Basingstoke 200. For a dissent-
ing view on Lukes’ analysis see John Gray, On the contestability of  social and political concepts, in: Political Theory, 
No. /1977, pp. 1–8. 
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France’s Quest for Grandeur since Suez
America’s request to the French, British and Israelis to cease their military activi-
ties in the Suez Canal in 196 marked a symbolic turning point in France’s post 
World War II foreign and security policy: never again would France allow a third 
party to hold a veto over her legitimate security interests. Since the birth of  the 
th Republic in 198 and for the remainder of  the Cold War period, France’s 
search for grandeur rested upon strategic autonomy—largely associated with the 
development of  an independent nuclear deterrent capability—and a search for 
leadership (influence) over Western Europe, ideally through the nascent Europe-
an Community (EC). Indeed, the very orientation of  France’s foreign and secu-
rity policy during the Cold War is very telling of  the extent to which the ‘foreign’ 
(diplomacy) and ‘security’ (capabilities) bits of  foreign and security policy are 
coordinated at the service of  a coherent strategy: France’s instinct for strategic 
assets—chiefly the independent nuclear force de frappe, but also a vested interest 
in the field of  satellite communications or in maintaining a national industry for 
defense procurement—was explicitly linked to the idea of  autonomy and leader-
ship over Western Europe.
Soon after General de Gaulle’s announcement of  his country’s inauguration into 
the nuclear club in 1960, and as World War II wounds began to heal thanks to a 
combination of  American cash, the economic incentives arising from European 
integration and the domestic opportunities offered by the tasks of  reconstruc-
tion,7 France would grasp the potential benefits of  ‘going alone.’ In 196 and, 
again, in 1967, President de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s bid to join the EC; in 196, 
he withdrew France’s representative from the Community as a protest against 
the EC’s supranational biases; and in 1966 he announced his decision to leave 
the Alliance’s integrated military structure and asked NATO to remove its head-
quarters (formerly in Paris), all forces and other facilities from France by the 1st 
of  April of  1967. Paris would assert its autonomy from NATO and the US while 
watching out against any elements—be these other States or the rise of  suprana-
tionalism—that might pose a threat to its leadership (influence) over the EC. The 
American-imposed multilateral order in the continent provided an effective check 
on Western Germany, which gave France a degree of  latitude in European af-
 For an insightful discussion on the differences between a strategically oriented model of  army and a more tactically 
oriented one see Durand, op. cit. (note ), pp. 729–72 ; Christopher S. Chivvis, Durand, Political and strategic conse-
quences of  the French White Paper, (US-Europe Analysis Series, Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, Spring 2008. 
On France’s strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe see Adrian Treacher, Europe as a power multiplier for French security 
policy: strategic consistency, tactical adaptation, in: European Security, No. 1/2001, pp. 22–.
7 For an analysis of  France’s economic evolution after World War II see Bruno Palier, Gouverner la securité sociale, 
Paris 200. 
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fairs that the unification of  her larger German neighbour in the late 19th century 
seemed to have made unthinkable.
During most of  the Cold War, France’s accent on the multilateralism and third 
forcism represented by the EC was largely motivated by her perceived leadership 
over a Community, which rested upon the implicit bargain of  German economic 
strength and France’s politico-strategic direction. These (advantageous) condi-
tions largely resulted from Germany’s imposed weakness and over-dependence 
on her Western allies for security—mainly the US—, but also from France’s 
crafty attempts to balance her perceived monopoly over ‘Europe,’ her emphasis 
on strategic autonomy from NATO and the US, and some occasional flirting with 
the Soviets, with her belonging to NATO and the Western camp.8 To sum up, 
France’s Cold War diplomatic and capability assets were coordinated in a rather 
coherent manner: while the capability effort was directed to achieve and consoli-
date a strategic outlook, diplomacy was oriented to selling and buying the idea of  
French leadership over Western Europe; the cause-effect relationship between the 
‘foreign’ and ‘security’ bits of  foreign and security policy went both ways.9
Since the end of  the Cold War, an important succession of  tectonic shocks—i. e. 
disappearance of  Soviet military threat to Western Europe, German and Eu-
ropean reunification, the several crises in the Western Balkans, the irruption of  
international terrorism or the lessons of  Afghanistan and Iraq—has altered the 
very logic underpinning international and regional distributions of  power, but 
also the way in which threats are perceived and conceptualized. Insofar as the 
power balance and the strategic environment (threat balance) are the key variables 
underpinning states’ foreign and security policy, key changes in the balance of  
power and the strategic environment are pushing different countries to reshape 
their respective strategies to maximize their influence in international politics. It 
is in this context of  tectonic movement, that France has, since the 1990’s, pro-
ceeded to a gradual rethinking of  the way in which she puts in play her different 
diplomatic-political and capability assets in order to deliver grandeur.
At a more political level, France responded to the end of  the Cold War with a re-
assuring sign of  commitment to deepen her strategic relationship with Germany 
in the framework of  the EU, of  which the 199 Maastricht Treaty is a very good 
testimony.0 On the other hand, a parallel intensified diversification of  France’s 
8 On the opportunities that structural conditions in Western Europe offered to French foreign policy see David P. Cal-
leo, Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. EU, in: World Policy Journal, Fall 200, pp. 17–2. 
9 Author’s interview at the French Ministry of  Defence (Paris, April 2006).
0 For a geopolitical analysis of  the Treaty of  Maastricht see Michael J. Baun, The Maastricht Treaty as high politics: 
Germany, France and European Integration, in: Political Science Quarterly, No. /199–96, pp. 60–62; Joseph 
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diplomatic activity can be appreciated since the early 1990’s, namely the repeated 
efforts to improve relations with Britain and the US/NATO (see below); at-
tempts to palliate an EU Eastern enlargement, which happened too soon and 
too fast for both France and Europe, by progressively raising her presence in 
Eastern Europe; an insistence in underscoring a national commitment to Africa 
or the Middle East; and, most recently, the will to exploit her nuclear leverage to 
strengthen her influence through bilateral ties in strategic neighborhoods—i. e. 
across Northern Africa or in the Gulf  Region—or President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
visible pushes for a Union for the Mediterranean.
Most notably perhaps, the last fifteen years have witnessed a ‘love me-love me 
not affair’ between France and the US/NATO. During the early to mid-1990s, 
France courted NATO and the US in the framework of  a reconciling trend 
that reached its peak in 199–97—during the so-called AFSOUTH crisis, when 
French demands to gain command over NATO’s southern Mediterranean fleet 
led to a standoff  in the negotiations over France’s re-entry into the Alliance’s 
integrated military structure. That positive climate, nonetheless, served to pave 
the way for a Franco-British momentum that stretched from effective coopera-
tion ‘on the mountains of  Bosnia’ in 199 to the 1998 Franco-British Saint 
Malo Summit, eventually resulting in the development of  the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP). Sooner rather than later Paris would, again, distance 
herself  from Washington given the latter’s response to the 9/11 attacks, a re-
sponse which emphasized long term military solutions to terrorism and a mani-
fest disdain for multilateralism. Franco-American tensions reached a historic high 
during the run-up to the 00 Anglo-American military intervention in Iraq. 
Not long after the transatlantic storm over the 00 Iraqi crisis, France would, 
however, progressively and cautiously seek to close the gap with Washington, a 
M. Grieco, State interests and institutional rule trajectories: a neorealist interpretation of  the Maastricht Treaty and 
European economic and monetary union, in: Security Studies, Spring 1996, pp. 261–06. For a rich and compelling 
overview of  France’s stakes in European Monetary Union see David Howarth, The French Road to European Mon-
etary Union, Basingstoke 00. 
 On France and NATO see Fréderic Bozo, Alliance Atlantique: la Fin de l’Exception Française ? (Document de Travail, 
Fondation pour l’innovation politique), Paris, February 2008, <http://www.fondapol.org/v2/publication-details.
php?id=261&lg=fr>; Jolyon Howorth, Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, in : Survival, No. 2/2000, 
pp. –. On France’s perception of  the EU enlargement to the East see Florence Deloche, La France et les 
élargissements à l’Est de l’Union Européenne, in: Les Études du CERI, No. 6/1998, pp. 1–1. For an analysis of  
France’s leading role in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of  Congo see Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay 
and Catriona Mace, Operation Artemis: the shape of  things to come?, in: International Peacekeeping, No. /200, 
pp. 08–2. On the French proposal for a Union of  the Mediterranean see Rosa Balfour, Dorothée Schmid, Union 
for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU? (Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Policy Brief), Brussels, 
1/02/2008; Michael Emerson, Making sense of  Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean, (CEPS, Policy Brief), Brus-
sels, 0/07/2008.
 Stephanie Hoffman, Ronja Kempin, France and the Transatlantic relationship: love me, love me not…, (Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Working Paper), Berlin, 0/02/2007.
 The expression is from David Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union, Basingstoke 2001.
 Jolyon Howorth, France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic crisis, in: Survival, No. /200, pp. 17–192.
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rapprochement which has been most eloquently illustrated by President Sarkozy’s 
recent camaraderie with President George W. Bush.
France’s choice to widen her diplomatic options and to get closer to her NATO 
allies cannot be isolated from a parallel diversification of  capabilities away from 
an exclusive focus on strategic assets in order to pay more attention to attributes 
such as deployability, readiness or interoperability. In this sense, France’s moves 
towards capability diversification in the military realm are part of  a much wider 
movement of  military transformation that reflects important changes in the 
definition and understanding of  the concept of  threat.17 Changes in our under-
standing and definition of  threats result in changes in the way we conceive our 
responses to them: the shift from traditional (i. e. interstate) military threats to 
less traditional threats (i. e. regional crises, terrorism, rogue states) has given way 
to a progressive shift from deterrence to force projection; from conscription and 
mass armies to professionalization. Not only did changes in the strategic environ-
ment (i. e. end of  Cold War bipolarity) largely result in capability or doctrinal ad-
justments across the board (i. e. professionalization of  armed forces, emphasis on 
deployability, readiness or interoperability, etc). Furthermore, those adjustments 
in capabilities or doctrine generated their own path dependencies on the part of  
the agent that fed back into the structure and contributed to the consolidation of  
a new strategic environment. The logic ran both ways.18
Since the professionalization of  the French army in 1996, two successive lois de 
programmation militaire (1997–2002 and 200–2008) have been approved to 
translate the demands of  the emerging strategic environment into specific capa-
bility requirements. After operation Desert Storm, France tried to restore the loss 
of  weight that followed from the Soviet decline by upgrading force projection 
to the status of  core strategic function, by identifying strategic communications, 
armed forces professionalization and command as the new vehicles towards in-
ternational influence. The demand for readiness and tactical capabilities, however, 
would not be made at the expense of  France’s strengths at the strategic level: in 
 Sarkozy’s holiday in US raises eyebrows, Financial Times, 11/08/2007. For a description of  an improvement which 
was already under way before the arrival of  Sarkozy to power see Fréderic Bozo, Guillaume Parmentier, France and 
the United States: waiting for regime change, in: Survival, No. 1/2007, pp. 181–197.
 In this sense, the obstacles to allied interoperability that France evidenced during Operation Desert Storm were largely 
behind France’s will to get closer to NATO during the early to mid-1990’s. I thank Antonio Missiroli for alerting me 
on this point.
17 For an insightful appraisal of  the patterns of  military transformation in France, Britain and Germany see Thomas Dy-
son, Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy: Convergence and Divergence in post-Cold War British, 
French and German military reforms, UACES annual conference, Portsmouth 2007. 
18 On the role of  using discourse to set the terms of  the strategic environment see David Campbell, Writing security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the politics of  identity, Minneapolis, MN, 1998; David Grondin, (Re)writing the 
‘national security state’: How and Why realists (re)built the(ir) Cold War (Center for the United States of  the Raoul 
Dandurand Chair of  Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Occasional Paper ). 
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this sense, the obsession to develop the necessary means to achieve the status of  
‘framework nation’ in the context of  coalitions and alliances, notably the EU, re-
mained visible.19 In an attempt to assess France’s capability needs at a time when 
the Livre blanc sur la défense (Defence Review) was still being drafted, Durand 
recently argued that ‘beyond the false debates that oppose classic vs. nuclear 
forces, the current strategic environment and the challenges of  military planning 
demand to make choices and set orientations. If  these are to have a chance of  
being perennial, and contrarily to certain dominating doxa today, it appears that 
the best move would be to reject black-or-white choices and aim for a composite 
format.’0
Beyond the military realm, France has, since 9/11 and yet most vocally since 
the precarious evolution of  the Afghan and Iraqi theaters, highlighted the need 
to resort to different means (diplomatic, economic and military) to address the 
complex challenges of  conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
stabilization. This includes an emphasis on non-military operational means to 
crisis management (i. e. policing), with France’s gendarmerie offering an opportu-
nity to add a valuable strength in the framework of  the European Gendarmerie 
Force. Whereas some authors have appealed to ‘social learning’ or ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ in order to account for France’s open attitude towards a more ‘comprehen-
sive’ approach to security, structural reasons should not be overlooked, namely 
the changing nature of  the strategic environment itself, as reflected by the US 
weaknesses to bring about stability in Afghanistan and Iraq after military victory. 
These weaknesses on the American part offer the French an opportunity to assert 
the added value of  the EU, an opportunity that shall not go unnoticed.
The Rationale behind France’s NATO Bid
The end of  the Cold War not only resulted in important dynamics of  transfor-
mation in the global strategic environment or the global power balance, it has 
also opened the door to a series of  (ongoing) changes that substantially alter the 
balance of  power that underpins European geopolitics. For one thing, a range 
19 Durand, op. cit. (note ), pp. 729–72. Durand emphasizes the symbolism of  Operation Artemis in this regard.
0 Durand, op. cit. (note ), pp. 77–78 (author’s translation). Indeed, France’s 2008 Livre Blanc attempts to 
strike a balance between the need for tactical capabilities and the ongoing importance of  strategic assets, in-
cluding the role of  the independent nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of  France’s security (p. 69). 
The 2008 Livre Blanc pour la défense et la sécurité nationale can be found at: <http://www.defense.gouv.
fr/livre_blanc/les_conclusions__1/le_livre_blanc_l_integrale/le_livre_blanc_l_integrale__1>. 
 See Pernille Riecker, From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of  French 
foreign and security policy?, in: Security Dialogue, No. /2006, pp. 09–28.
 American participation in the EU’s new policing mission in Kosovo is a good illustration of  this. For a rather skeptical 
view on the EU’s alleged strength in comprehensive tools to crisis management see Christopher S. Chivvis, Birthing 
Althea: The uncertain future of  the European Security and Defence Policy (ifri, Focus Strátegique nº ), Paris, March 
2008.
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of  different factors—among which America’s progressive disengagement from 
Europe stands out—would result in Britain’s growing interest in European inte-
gration. Secondly, Germany’s reunification first, and securitization later—most 
eminently symbolized by the EU and NATO enlargements to the East—, would 
call into question the very sacred balances underpinning the European integra-
tion process, resulting in a (progressive) rebalancing within the Franco-German 
engine in favor of  the latter and a decline in the overall influence of  the Franco-
German engine over the whole European integration process.
On the one hand, Germany’s improving position, and, although to a lesser 
extent, Britain’s growing interest in European integration call into question the 
idiosyncrasy of  France’s Euro-Atlantic positioning, rested on the comfort that 
absence from NATO’s military structure was balanced (justified) by a leadership 
position over the European integration process, German weakness (dependence) 
and Britain’s lack of  interest in Europe. On the other hand, the French are well 
aware of  the fact that British acquiescence to ESDP is necessary for both mili-
tary—the UK has the best power projection capabilities in Europe—and political 
 The issue of  Germany’s rise has generated much literature in the past decade. Many authors have rightly pointed to the 
many financial, political or cultural factors as standing in the way of  a more influential German foreign and security 
policy. On this see Alister Miskimmon, A crisis of  influence? German foreign policy in crisis since 1998, in: Alister 
Miskimmon, William E. Paterson, James Sloam (eds.), The German crisis, Basingstoke forthcoming 2008. However, 
the idea here is to pinpoint wider structural trends. For an excellent account of  Germany’s changing position on the in-
ternational stage see Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: the crisis in German-American relations, Washington, DC, 200.
Luís Simón Navarro from Spain and Oleg Kozlovsky from Russia discuss a future European secu-
rity architecture
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reasons—Britain’s stamp gives the ESDP project the Pan-European legitimacy 
that a French-led initiative would lack. Finally, the French know well that the road 
from Paris to London goes through Washington, hence the extra motivation to 
work the US/NATO element.
France’s chief  mistake during the Cold War was her lack of  empathy. Her con-
stant claims for a strong Europe were always accompanied by an instinct for 
‘intergovernmentalism’ that did not help to dispel what has been a widespread 
perception among her European partners for too long a time: the French want 
a Europe à la française. Today Paris must avoid the same mistake. The current 
rapprochement to the US and NATO must be largely understood by an acknowl-
edgement that recognizing the concerns of  her partners in an enlarged Europe 
is key to credibility and leadership. France’s contemporary foreign and security 
policy dilemma evolves around finding the right balance between the need for 
asset diversification (i. e. improving force projection capabilities or approaching 
Washington and London) and the must of  looking after a well-earned excep-
tionalism that rests upon her special position in the realm of  strategic assets and 
her special partnership with Germany in the framework of  the European Union. 
Insofar as these balances between change and continuity mirror not only systemic 
developments but also domestic tensions within France’s various foreign and se-
curity policy communities, the mixed external and internal signals are most likely 
to produce hybrid solutions.
The way ahead
Henry Kissinger once said that ‘the test of  a Statesman is his ability to recognize 
the real relationship of  forces and to make this knowledge serve its ends.’27 Today, 
President Sarkozy has a chance to mould the environment, to take advantage of  
the various external forces and turn it into an opportunity for France.
As of  today, the signs that some sort of  bargain aimed at closing the gap between 
Paris and Washington in the realm of  security policy is on the way can hardly be 
 The history of  European integration has been marked by the tension between intergovernmentalism (the power lies 
with national governments) and supranationalism (let the Community institutions decide), a tension well captured 
in the literature. As Bohlen argues, ‘De Gaulle always acted unilaterally. In the five years I was ambassador in Paris, 
there was not a single important foreign-policy issue in which he sought to consult with his allies (...) discussion and 
attempts to work out a common point of  view were alien to him’; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to history 1929–1969, 
New York 197, p. 10.
 Philip Gordon, The Hyperpresident, in: The American Interest (The Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, Holi-
days (Nov/Dec 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2007/11france/11france.pdf>.
 Durand, op. cit. (note ), pp. 729–72. For a good account of  the internal disputes among France’s various foreign and 
security policy communities see the interview with Justin Vaisse, Le revirement de Nicolas Sarkozy sur l’Europe (Brook-
ings Institution), Washington, DC, 2008 <http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/019_europe_vaisse.aspx>. 
27 Henry Kissinger, A world restored: Europe after Napoleon, Boston, MA; 197.
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missed.28 It is the very nature of  that bargain, whether ‘grand’ or ‘patchy’, that 
is still up for grabs. One important observation shall be pointed out: France’s 
re-entry into NATO’s military structure and (French) access to command posi-
tions in NATO are not the only items on the table.29 During the last few months, 
policy analysts have found it particularly challenging to keep up with the pace of  
ongoing developments when explaining the nature and likely consequences of  a 
supposed grand bargain encompassing the evolution of  NATO, that of  ESDP or 
the future of  EU-NATO relations.0 Philip Gordon has captured well the grandes 
lignes of  the bargain: ‘NATO US officials (…) realize that a grand bargain with 
France—France’s full reintegration into NATO, US support for European De-
fense, and perhaps a new NATO strategic concept—may not be possible before 
Bush’s term ends, but they want to try.’
Both France and the US have been resisting each other’s plans vis-à-vis ESDP 
and NATO respectively for quite some time. Leaving earlier Cold War riffs 
aside, France has systematically opposed America’s occurrences for an ontologi-
cal (from a military being to a more political one), geographical (from a Euro-At-
lantic organization to a global partnership) or functional (from a collective de-
fense organization to a security provider) redesign of  NATO since the Cold War 
ended, and most vocally so since US failures to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan 
have given her the perfect excuse to do so. The Americans have, on their part, 
opposed the idea of  an autonomous ESDP since long before its birth. However, 
28 Philip Gordon, Europe is still on the Agenda (The Brookings Institution),Washington, DC, Nov/Dec 2007; Ronald 
Asmus, Saying Yes to France, in: The Washington Post, 29/10/2007.
29 EPC-UACES lecture by French Ambassador Gérard Errera at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 21/02/2008.
0 Stephanie Hoffman, L’OTAN: vers un nouveau concept stratégique, in: Politique étrangère, No. 1/2008, pp. 10–118; 
Jolyon Howorth, The Future of  the European Security Strategy: towards a white book on European defence, Presen-
tation to the workshop organised by the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, 0/06/2008; 
Luis Simón Navarro, Sarkozy’s dilemmas, the forthcoming French EU Presidency and ESDP: what’s in it for Europe? 
(Real Instituto Elcano ARI 76), Madrid, July 2008; J. Vaisse, Nicolas Sarkozy’s foreign policy: Gaullist by any other 
name (The Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, April 2008; Thomas Valasek, The roadmap to better EU-NATO 
relations (Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note), Brussels, December 2007; Thomas Valasek, France, NATO 
and European Defence (Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note), Brussels, March 2008.
 Gordon, op. cit. (note 28).
 On France and NATO see Frédéric Bozo, La France et l’OTAN. De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen, Paris 
1991; Giles Andréani, La France et l’OTAN après la guerre froide, in: Politique étrangère, No. 1/1998, pp. 77–92.
 The latest notable examples have been France’s opposition to give the Iraqi crisis a NATO stamp or the rather modest 
outcome of  NATO’s 2006 Riga summit, when the French opposed plans to improve the Alliance’s access to civilian 
assets or the proclamation of  a global NATO. In both occasions, the French teamed up with the Germans. On this 
see Sven Biscop, NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: no transformation without re-equilibration (Royal Institute 
for International Relations, Egmont Paper 11), Brussels 200. For a more recent analysis on the existing approaches 
to NATO’s transformation see Stephanie Hoffmann, OTAN: vers un nouveau concept stratégique?, in : Politique 
étrangère, No. 1/2008, pp. 10–118.
 On Europe’s attempts to create a European security dimension after the Cold War see Jolyon Howorth, John TS 
Keeler, Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy, New York, NY, 200. For a more 
detailed overview of  the US opposition, and the cooling of  that opposition, to the ESDP see Esther Brimmer, Seeing 
Blue: American visions of  the European Union (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 10); 
Paris, September 2007.
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the growing demand for allied operational support seems to have forced Wash-
ington to rethink its stance on this issue.
Beyond the fact that France’s improvement of  relations with the US/NATO in 
light of  Germany’s rise and Britain’s growing interest in the EU, has become an 
end in itself, the French seek to make further concrete gains out of  their renewed 
atlanticism. For one thing, US explicit support for ESDP is of  capital impor-
tance as it would ease the process of  marketing Paris’ plans to re-launch ESDP 
in London (chiefly), Berlin or Warsaw. On the other hand, the French aspire 
to a good deal in terms of  command positions in NATO and, more generally, 
further signs of  American openness to an eventual rearrangement of  NATO’s 
structures and practices, in the sense of  more explicitly recognizing the existence 
of  a European element.7 For the Americans, beyond the fact that they welcome 
Paris’ contribution to the imminent urgencies that the Alliance is facing on the 
ground (notably in Afghanistan), the French can help instigate a more positive 
mood in Europe vis-à-vis the idea of  NATO transformation and, more specifi-
cally, the approval of  a new strategic concept for the Alliance. Although US back-
ing of  ESDP would be an important step for France’s ambitions of  building up 
an autonomous ESDP, one shall be careful not to take such backing as a panacea. 
Ultimately, European autonomy in the realm of  security policy or, for that mat-
ter, any form of  potential rearrangement within NATO would depend upon the 
political and financial will of  most European countries to advance in that direc-
tion. Whereas American support of  ESDP might be a necessary cause for that, it 
is certainly not a sufficient one.
As Sven Biscop has well captured, the extent to which the French (or, for that 
matter, Europeans) are ready to sign in go a more apt NATO bears a direct 
relationship to the extent to which the US is ready to embrace an autonomous 
 Speaking before the members of  the North Atlantic Council, President George W. Bush asserted, the 2nd of  April 
2008 in Bucharest, that ‘building a strong NATO Alliance also requires a strong European defense capacity’ <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/0/2008002-2.html>. In two consecutive speeches in Paris (22-2-2008) 
and London (2-02-2008), US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, recently spoke in similar terms: ‘An ESDP 
with only soft power is not enough. As we look to the French Presidency of  the EU this summer, we hope France will 
lead an effort to strengthen European defense spending, upgrade European military capabilities with badly needed 
investment in helicopters, UAVs, special forces, interoperable communications and counterinsurgency trained soldiers 
and civilians’ <http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=21A61-E9D6-1D-9FD-6FDD189EB0>. In this 
sense see also Ronald D. Asmus, Rethinking the EU: why Washington needs to support European integration, in: 
Survival, No. /200, pp. 9–102.
 Luis Simón Navarro, Sarkozy’s dilemmas, the forthcoming French EU Presidency and ESDP: what’s in it for Europe? 
(Real Instituto Elcano ARI 76), Madrid, July 2008.
7 This is an old debate, one which eventually resulted in the breakdown of  the negotiations over France’s re-entry into 
NATO’s military structures in 199–1997. See Gilles Andréani, La France et l’OTAN après la guerre froid, in: Poli-
tique étrangère, No. 1/1998, 77–92; for a comparison between the 1990’s negotiations and today’s process see Fréderic 
Bozo, Alliance Atlantique: la Fin de l’Exception Française ? (Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique, Document de 
Travail), Paris, February 2008, <http://www.fondapol.org/v2/publication-details.php?id=261&lg=fr>.
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ESDP and a more balanced Alliance.8 Surely, this old transatlantic puzzle entails 
too many variables—not least the interests of  other countries—as to be sorted 
out in the light of  a one year Franco-American honeymoon. Yet, the changing 
circumstances seem to play in favor of  some sort of  Franco-American under-
standing. Notably, difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq have made evident that the 
‘war on terror’ is fought not just with guns but also with butter or, for that matter, 
policemen, teachers, judges and other civil administrators. If  there is anything 
Americans value from the EU, it is its capacity to mobilize a vast array of  differ-
ent resources for multinational crisis management. Furthermore, after the recent 
passive witnessing of  the EU Eastern enlargement in France or the country’s 
impotence vis-à-vis what President Sarkozy has referred to as the ‘anti-growth’ 
methods of  the European Central Bank, Paris strongly feels the need to score 
in Europe, and foreign and security policy makes a good case. Finally, the insti-
tutional agenda is promising: one week ahead of  a key NATO summit in Bucha-
rest (held this th of  April 2008),9 France and Britain had recently celebrated a 
productive summit in London,0 where President Sarkozy announced France’s 
deployment of  an extra 700 troops to the Eastern part of  Afghanistan. In addi-
tion, the French have published their Livre Blanc pour la Défense et la Sécurité 
in June 2008 and taken over the Presidency of  the EU Council in July 2008, the 
200 European Security Strategy was meant to be revised by the High Represen-
tative for CFSP later in 2008, and December 2008 marked the tenth anniversary 
of  the Franco-British Saint Malo Summit. Last but not least, a new American 
administration is in place since January 2009 and, only three months later, NATO 
will celebrate its 60th anniversary in Strasbourg and Kehl.
8 Sven Biscop, NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: no transformation without re-equilibration, (RIIR, Egmont Paper 
), Brussels 00.
9 The Bucharest Summit was originally intended to continue the job started at the 2006 Riga Summit, namely to make 
progress in the promised functional and geographical expansion of  the Alliance. Bucharest was practically monopo-
lized by the urgencies of  Afghanistan (although heavily related to the questions of  the geographical and functional 
scope of  NATO, a very specific case), enlargement to the Western Balkans and the issue of  relations with Georgia and 
Ukraine. See Philip Gordon, NATO: Enlargement and Afghanistan, testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 1/0/2008. 
0 The communiqué can be found at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/UK-FR%20Communique%2027008.
pdf>.
 On the revision of  the ESS see Thomas Valasek, Europe’s defence and its new security strategy (Centre for european 
Reform, CER Bulletin 7), London, Dec 2007/Jan 2008; Antonio Missiroli, Revisiting the European Security Strat-
egy—Beyond 2008 (European Policy Centre, Policy Brief  EPC), Brussels, April 2008.
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Russia’s Foreign Policy: A Review Of Putin’s Rule1
Oleg Kozlovsky
Introduction
Vladimir Putin has been Russia’s President for eight years from 2000–2008. His 
personal role in determining the country’s foreign policy is difficult to overes-
timate: not only the Constitution gives a President such an exclusive right, but 
Putin’s own style of  rule also proved to be independent and autocratic. Even now, 
the former President as Prime Minister appears to keep playing a decisive role in 
the national foreign policy. In this article, we will review the evolution of  Russia’s 
international relations during Putin’s rule and try to determine the instruments 
and true goals of  his foreign policy.
Russia’s foreign policy, particularly its perception of  the West has changed 
dramatically several times during the last eight years. We can roughly divide it 
into three phases:(1.) Inertial conflict, (2.) Tactical cooperation, (.) Ideological 
confrontation.
Phase I: Inertial Conflict
When Putin entered into office in January 2000, Russia was in the middle of  an-
other conflict with the West, started by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1999 
after the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Yugoslavia 
and deepened with the beginning of  a war in Chechnya. In a great part, this trend 
was caused by the domestic situation in Russia: strengthening of  the Communists 
and other Leftists and an increasing demand for an anti-Western policy.
Initially, Putin kept up with this policy “by inertia.” He opposed NATO expan-
sion into Central and Eastern Europe and was harshly criticized in Europe for 
human rights abuses in Chechnya. A number of  international scandals marked 
this phase, including a Kursk submarine disaster that killed 118 Russian seamen. 
Some of  the Russian officials blamed a US submarine for crashing into Kursk. 
There were also a number of  espionage cases like that of  Edmond Pope, when 
an American citizen was sentenced to a long prison term for spying (he was later 
pardoned by Putin).
1 This review was made shortly before the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 an the consequent recogni-
tion of  independence of  Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow. As a result, some assumptions of  the work may 
need a revision, although most of  its points were only proven by these events.
Oleg Kozlovsky
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However, this policy turned out counter-productive and inefficient quite soon. 
Russia’s economy badly needed foreign investments and access to international 
markets to recover after the crisis of  August 1998. The country didn’t have 
enough resources to oppose both Europe and the USA. It became clear that Rus-
sia had no option but to try to restore (or establish) partnership relations with the 
West.
Phase II: Tactical Cooperation
Putin used the terrorist attacks of  September 11th as an opportunity to start his 
new, co-operative policy. He expressed his support of  the USA and even helped 
establish military bases in ex-USSR Central Asia that were needed for the opera-
tion in Afghanistan. Cooperation of  counter-terrorist agencies played a signifi-
cant role in this period.
The goals of  Russian foreign policy during its second phase were supposedly the 
following:
– help Russian business gain access to foreign financial and goods markets;
– silence Western criticism towards Russian activities in Chechnya;
– improve Putin’s own image in the West and help him become a recognized 
member of  a community of  the world’s leaders.
The goals were therefore mostly of  tactical nature. Unlike the pro-Western policy 
of  early Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, the Kremlin did not pursue any ideological 
goals nor did it share the same values with the West during this phase of  “tactical 
cooperation.”
Russia conducted a “No Institutions” policy and avoided founding or joining 
any international institutions with Western countries, with rare exceptions like 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead, the cooperation was often seen 
in Russia as a matter of  personal friendship between Mr. Putin and his counter-
parts in the West. This approach to foreign policy was a tradition inherited from 
Yeltsin and, moreover, even from Russian Emperors, particularly comfortable for 
autocratic leaders as it leaves them with a maximum level of  freedom of  scope 
(unlike international institutions that limit such freedom to some extent).
This personality-based approach made Moscow’s activities in the the international 
arena unstable and dependent on the inter-personal relations of  the respective 
heads of  states. After Gerhard Schroeder, Silvio Berlusconi, and Tony Blair left 
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their offices, Russia could not maintain the same level of  international relations 
with Germany, Italy and the UK. The same is true for Russia’s nearest neighbors, 
particularly, Georgia and Ukraine.
Western heads of  states, however, accepted this mode of  international relations, 
decreased their level of  criticism towards Russian domestic policy, improved con-
ditions for Russian business and recognized Putin as one of  their kind.
Phase III: Ideological Confrontation
The gap between Putin’s domestic and foreign policies was growing in 2001–
00. While attempting to build an image of  modern and adequate leadership 
abroad, democratic institutions at home were successively being destroyed or 
oppressed. However, in 200 Putin’s cooperation policy began to fail. The first 
blow was the Yukos affair and the arrest of  Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 
of  that year, one of  the main sponsors of  all opposition parties, including the 
Union of  Right Forces, Yabloko, and the Communists. The oligarch’s opponents 
claimed that he was going to compete with Putin for the presidential post in 200. 
Russia’s richest man and some of  his colleagues were arrested and charged with a 
variety of  crimes from tax evasion to homicide. This way of  dealing with political 
opposition caused unrest, both among Russian elites and in the West.
Parliamentary elections took place just two months later and left Russian demo-
cratic parties out of  the Duma. European observers called these elections “un-
fair,” but Western leaders still refused to admit that Putin’s Russia was moving in 
a precarious direction.
The Orange Revolution of  200 in Ukraine was the turning point for Kremlin’s 
entire foreign policy. Vladimir Putin invested his reputation and reportedly a large 
amount of  Gazprom’s money in Victor Yanukovich, President Leonid Kuchma’s 
ally. Political strategists close to Kremlin (like Gleb Pavlovsky, Putin’s informal po-
litical advisor) worked in Yanukovich’s team and used a variety of  instruments that 
had brought victory to Putin and United Russia, including a large-scale propagan-
da campaign, the threatening of  political opponents, electoral fraud and possibly 
even the poisoning of  opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko. At the same time, 
Putin openly supported Yanukovich during bilateral talks and visits to Kyiv.
Many Ukrainians saw this as Moscow’s attempt to restore its imperial status and 
to diminish independence and sovereignty of  Ukraine. Mass protests on Maidan 
2 Eight Years under Putin. Foreign Policy, in: Kommersant Vlast, 28/01/2008. 
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Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv and in other places that followed 
the fraudulent elections were unforeseen by Yanukovich’s and Putin’s experts.
The non-violent Orange Revolution that brought Yushchenko to power be-
came the most shameful and painful international defeat for Putin. Moreover, it 
brought to life a number of  democratic non-violent movements in the Com-
monwealth of  Independent States—from Moldova to Kyrgyzstan, not excluding 
Russia. For the first time, Russian political elites saw how unstable the authoritar-
ian system built by Putin actually was. “The Ghost of  Maidan” became (and still 
remains) the Kremlin’s worst nightmare.
Sovereign Democracy
Pavlovsky and his colleagues had to find both an excuse for their failure in 
Ukraine and a means to fight the Russian “orangists,” as they called the new wave 
of  democratic opposition. Unsurprisingly, xenophobia was the solution.
The concept of  Kremlin’s new ideology that was later named “sovereign democ-
racy” was plain and simple: Russia has its own historical way, with western-style 
democracy not suiting Russian traditions. Moreover, any attempts of  other gov-
ernments or foreign/international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
support any groups or institutions in Russia without explicit resolution by Putin’s 
Administration or to criticize Kremlin were considered unfriendly activities. Sup-
porters of  “sovereign democracy” view Russia as a superpower and a leader in 
the multi-polar world again. They claim the USA and its allies want Russia weak 
and semi-colonized, the way it was in 1990s, their real interest being Russian 
natural resources, not modernization, democracy or human rights. Supporters of  
“Sovereign Democracy” suspect agents of  this anti-Russian conspiracy to have or-
ganized pseudo-democratic “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, 
effectively colonizing these countries in order to achieve their goals and to now 
plan the same kind of  intervention into Russia’s own domestic affairs in order to 
overthrow Vladimir Putin.
Such a theory is nothing completely new in Russian history. In fact, the roots of  
these views go back to the 180s, when Emperor Nicholas the First presented his 
ideology of  “Official Nationality.” Most Russian Tsars and even Cold-War times 
Communists later used certain variations of  this ideology. The greatest difference 
is that “sovereign democracy” does not necessary suppose military expansion, it 
is more defensive and economy-oriented. The reason is most probably the state 
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of  the Russian army, which is unsuitable to successfully wage a serious armed 
conflict with any foreign power.
The very term of  “sovereign democracy” was contested in Kremlin. Even the 
elected President Dmitry Medvedev argued that democracy did not need any ad-
ditional specifications. However, the ideology itself  has been a central subject of  
mass propaganda in Russia since early 200.
The idea of  “sovereign democracy” influenced both Putin’s domestic and foreign 
policies. The former got increasingly authoritarian and oppressive. New laws on 
NGOs, elections and extremism were approved, opposition rallies were banned, 
their participants arrested. The latter became openly anti-Western and aggressive 
to those ex-USSR countries that refused to accept superiority of  Moscow.
Kremlin’s Campaigning Tactics
Since 200 Putin tried to oppose Western diplomacy on almost every issue. 
He cooperated with the Palestinian Hamas government and with Venezuela’s 
President Hugo Chavez, sold armaments and nuclear technologies to Iran and 
was one of  the few to congratulate Alexander Lukashenko after the fraudulent 
presidential elections in Belarus in 00. He backed North Korea and criticized 
independence of  Kosovo. On numerous issues Moscow’s position was directly 
opposite to that of  the European Union (EU) and the USA.
Paradoxically, in most cases such a strategy cannot be explained in terms of  
geopolitics or economics. Russia, for instance, should have been interested even 
more than Europe and the USA in stopping Iran’s nuclear and missile program. 
At the same time, Tehran obviously felt no gratitude for this support and has not 
coordinated its foreign policy activities with Moscow.
Aggressive xenophobic campaigns became the main tool of  Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the West and its neighbors. In their books, some experts like 
Edward Lucas and Mark McKinnon even called this a new Cold War. A number 
of  these campaigns were conducted against different countries, mostly former 
Soviet republics but also others, including Ukraine, Moldova and Poland in 200, 
Georgia in 2006 as well as Estonia and the UK in 2007. All these campaigns fol-
lowed similar scenarios:
 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, London 2008.
 Mark A. McKinnon, The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet 
Union, New York, NY, 2007.
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. The country was called an enemy and was accused of  violation of  interna-
tional treaties or anti-Russian activity. There could be any cause for this or 
none at all.
2. Russian propaganda started to smear these countries intensively, with the 
ultimate aim of  depicting them as eternal enemies of  Russia and the Russian 
people.
. Youth groups were manipulated by the Kremlin to increase the level of  
xenophobic hysteria against the respective countries.
. Russian authorities exerted economic pressure on the target countries, usu-
ally denying its political motivation.
. Soon after the campaign achieved its peak, the level of  hysteria went down, 
strength of  propaganda decreased but neither did it really end, nor was eco-
nomic pressure lifted.
The active phase of  every such campaign was usually several months long. The 
first country to fall prey to such a policy was, of  course, Ukraine after its Orange 
Revolution. Russian official media presented Victor Yushchenko as a Western 
puppet and Hitler supporter. Hundreds of  thousands of  Ukrainians were report-
edly paid for participating in the revolution or fooled by Western propaganda. 
State television explained that Yushchenko planned to open NATO military 
bases in Ukraine, ban Russian language and honor Nazi war criminals. Pro-Krem-
lin youth organizations like the Eurasian Youth Union organized a number of  
anti-Ukrainian actions both in Russia and in Ukraine. Russian Gazprom claimed 
that it would raise gas prices for Ukraine and threatened to cut gas supplies if  
Ukraine refused to pay. These “gas war” tactics proved efficient and were later 
used against other countries like Georgia and Belarus. After about a year the 
active phase of  this campaign ended. However, Ukraine is still being smeared 
by Russian official media and politicians today, with fewer and fewer Ukrainians 
respecting Russia as a result.
Another well-known example is the latest anti-British campaign, which was 
started in 00 by the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi (“Ours”). Harassing Brit-
ish Ambassador Tony Brenton for his visit to a conference of  Russian democratic 
opposition coalition Other Russia, the “Nashis” disrupted his speeches, attacked 
his car and rallied near the embassy for weeks with silent support of  the authori-
ties. The Litvinenko-Lugovoy affair worsened the situation even more. Russian 
state television broadcasted documentaries telling that Britain has been following 
anti-Russian policies since the 19th century. The Russian taxation agency, Min-
 Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov, Putin: The Bottom Line, Moscow 2008.
6 Eight Years under Putin. Foreign Policy, in: Kommersant Vlast, 28/01/2008.
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istry of  Foreign Affairs and the Federal Security Service (FSB) forced the Brit-
ish Council to stop its activities in the country. Russian bombers appeared near 
Britain’s territory, causing new waves of  confrontation. At the same time, Russian 
officials accused Britain of  being unwilling to cooperate in the field of  counter-
terrorism. The crisis has come to a stalemate and Russian-British relations are 
now nearly as bad as they were during the worst times of  the Cold War.
In most cases, these campaigns were as little conducive to Russian international 
influence or financial gains as was cooperation with so-called “rogue states”. 
What was the reason for such a paradoxical foreign policy?
Domestic Policy is the Key
The only suitable explanation is that Putin’s foreign policy goals have to be 
viewed and understood through the domestic lens. In fact, anti-Western hysteria 
was an end in itself.
As a result, Putin succeeded in convincing both Russian people and elites that the 
country is once again surrounded by enemies, giving him an excuse for concen-
trating more power in his hands, for oppressing opposition at home and for driv-
ing international NGOs out of  the country. Kremlin’s main message to convey 
was the necessity to defend the country’s sovereignty against adversary offenses. 
Smearing democratic countries was part of  the attempt to convince people that 
the Western model of  democracy was far from perfect and certainly unsuit-
able for Russia. Fighting an “external foe” was to distract people from domestic 
problems and rally them behind the Government. Finally, following such a policy 
would let loose on actions that might be unpopular in the West, e. g. the infamous 
“gas wars.”
All of  these goals were short-term and tactical. Inconsistency and lack of  a gen-
eral strategy became obvious in many aspects of  Putin’s policy, which is char-
acterized by pragmatism if  not opportunism. Putin has been building a system 
devoid of  ideology and based on the sole value of  power, with preserving the 
Putin’s existing political power and helping state monopolies like Gazprom gain 
more economic power as the ultimate aim.
Will Russia’s foreign policy change under Dmitry Medvedev? The new President 
positions himself  as a more liberal figure compared to Putin and has even criti-
cized the term “sovereign democracy.” This has induced some experts to say that 
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Russia might adopt a softer policy towards its neighbors and the West.7 However, 
this optimism appears exaggerated, especially in light of  the recent crisis in Geor-
gia. There have been no visible signs of  a pro-Western turn in national foreign 
policy. Putin still plays a key role in Russian diplomacy. Even if  Medvedev be-
comes a more or less independent politician, we can hardly expect anything more 
than a few symbolic steps. After all, he is also one of  the architects of  the same 
system based on the one and only value—power.
7	 Черноморский	флот	уйдет	из	Севастополя, <http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2008/01/2/focus/1600> (2/01/2008).
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